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There’s not enough of anything to go around except 
people and death. 
                   
Saša Stanišić (2006, 155) 
 
 
This quote aptly captures the essence of the economic concept of scarcity. The latter 
denotes the situation which obtains whenever there is less of a good or resource 
available than needed to fulfill human wants and needs (Sobel et al. 2010). Such 
situations compel us to “make choices as to how to use and allocate scarce goods and 
services” (Denier 2008, 75). In short, scarcity entails the need to trade off various goods 
against others.  
In order to better grasp the logic of trade-offs, it is helpful to distinguish between the 
so-called ‘external’ and ‘internal’ aspect of the dynamics of scarcity (Denier 2008). The 
former is closely linked to the concept of ‘opportunity cost’, i.e. the cost attached to 
pursuing one action at the expense of another. For example, if I wish to own both a 
house and a boat, but only have enough money to buy one of both, the cost attached to 
purchasing a house is the pleasure I would have incurred by enjoying regular boat trips. 
This external aspect “refers to scarcity as a natural condition of limited resources (such 
as, money, time, attention, et cetera)” (Denier 2008, 75). It is precisely because of my 
limited amount of money, time and other resources that I am committed to making trade-
offs which, in turn, entail opportunity costs.  
The internal aspect refers to scarcity as an anthropological construction. It alludes to 
the idea that, besides ensuing from limited resources, scarcity is also induced by our 
unlimited wants and needs (Denier 2008). Suppose that I win the lottery jackpot. At that 
point, I would no longer need to trade off the house against the boat. Nevertheless, new 
trade-offs would inevitably emerge as my unlimited needs make it impossible to buy 
everything my heart desires. 
0.1 Scarcity in health care 
Scarcity is omnipresent in health care. Intensive care beds, high-tech scanners, organs, 
and oocytes are but a few examples of scarce health care resources. For ease of 
reference, we introduce a distinction between ‘financial’ and ‘commodity’ scarcity in 
health care in this dissertation. We use the latter as an umbrella term for those goods 
which are inherently in short supply, i.e. goods which are, by nature, scarce. Organs and 
oocytes are typical instances of commodity scarcity. Financial scarcity, by contrast, 
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refers to those resources which are theoretically abundant, but nevertheless provided in 
limited amount (or not at all) due to financial constraints or considerations. Intensive 
care beds and high-tech scanners fall into this category of scarcity.  
       
Even when narrowed down to health care, scarcity represents a vast topic of research. 
For example, it is the raison d’être of all issues pertaining to distributive justice in 
health care. Evidently, then, it is impossible to present an exhaustive analysis of any 
subset of issues relating to scarcity in health care, let alone to cover all the ground. In 
this dissertation, we mainly limit ourselves to a selection of ethical issues ensuing from 
the impact of population aging on scarcity. As we explain in this introduction, 
population aging is increasingly being perceived as a grave threat, in the realms of both 
‘financial’ and ‘commodity’ scarcity. More specifically, this demographic phenomenon 
raises concerns with regard to the sustainability of customary approaches to making the 
necessary trade-offs among scarce goods. The main aim of this dissertation is to present 
some of the most prominent, newly proposed alternatives to the current trade-offs and 
assess their ethical soundness. Part one of this dissertation addresses the alternatives 
put forward in the context of financial scarcity, whereas part two analyzes the proposals 
made in the realm of commodity scarcity.         
 
Below, we provide the reader with the necessary background information on, 
respectively, financial and commodity scarcity in health care. This overview will enable 
us to retranslate the aforementioned general aim of this dissertation into more specific 
research questions relating to both types of scarcity.   
0.2 Financial scarcity in health care  
Scarcity of financial resources entails a need for making trade-offs or allocation 
decisions at three general levels: the macro-, meso-, and micro-level (Putoto & Pegoraro 
2011).  
Health (care) is not the only valuable good within a society. Therefore, decisions must 
be made as to how to divide the overall budget between health (care) and other social 
goods, such as education, infrastructure, culture, defense, and recreation. The trade-offs 
which are made at this macro-level represent the key constraint within which 
allocation decisions at the lower levels are made.  
At the meso-level, decisions are made as to how to allocate the health care budget 
across various projects, procedures, and services. Choices at this level “may involve the 
priorities attached to, for example, treatment services versus preventative medicine; 
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particular patient groups, for example those with renal failure versus drug addicts; or 
certain hospital services, for example cancer services, versus other services such as 
respiratory care” (Putoto & Pegoraro 2011, 65).  
At the micro- or bedside level, clinicians decide how to allocate treatments and 
resources across individual patients. In determining the availability and supply of a 
particular resource, decisions at the meso-level influence the necessity and extent of 
patient selection at the micro-level.  
0.2.1   Rising health care expenditures 
At the macro-level, a clear trend is visible. For over three decades, health care 
expenditure in the  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries has grown at rates exceeding the economy’s growth rate (Pammolli et al. 
2012). As a result, it has absorbed an ever increasing share of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Between 1970 and 2004, the average health expenditure as a proportion of GDP 
almost doubled in the OECD, increasing from 4.9% to 8.8% (Baltagi & Moscone 2010). 
During this period, per-capita health expenditure increased with an annual average rate 
of 11.5%. There are large differences in average per-capita health expenditure across the 
OECD member countries, with the US ($6,037), Switzerland ($4,045), Norway ($4,103) and 
Germany ($3,169) ranking highest and Turkey and Mexico ($562 and $655, respectively) 
occupying the bottom of the list in 2004 (Baltagi & Moscone 2010). Recent projections 
suggest that, by 2060, the OECD average health expenditure will amount to 12% of GDP. 
When health expenditure is combined with long-term care spending, this figure 
increases to 13.9% (de la Maisonneuve & Oliveira Martins 2013).  
Given that EU member states are highly represented in the OECD, it is relatively 
unsurprising that these have also witnessed a growing ratio of average health 
expenditure to GDP (European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee 2012). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, health care expenditure increased rapidly in EU countries, 
mainly as a result of expanded population coverage. Although concerns over this trend 
caused the growth of public health expenditure to slow down in the 1980s and 1990s, it 
quickly picked up again from the late 1990s onwards. At present, the average health 
expenditure is 8% of GDP in the EU. Health care spending as a share of total government 
expenditure has also been growing and, on average, currently accounts for 12% to 15% 
of government outlays in EU countries.  
The trend of increased spending on health care is most pronounced in the United States. 
Between 1960 and 2008, inflation-adjusted national health expenditures grew at an 
average annual rate of 5.7%, increasing from $150.6 billion to $2,156.1 billion. This 
observation cannot be accounted for simply in terms of an increased population size. 
After all, annual real per-capita national health expenditures also increased markedly 
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during this period (from an average of $796 per person to $7,080) (Chernew 2010). 
Between 1960 and 2006, real per-capita health care spending grew an average of 2.5 
percentage points faster than GDP per year, producing an increase in the average health 
expenditure from 5.2% to 16% of GDP (Ginsburg 2008). It is projected that the growth 
rate of national health spending will continue to outpace that of GDP. As a result, the 
share of GDP devoted to health care is expected to reach 25% by 2037 (Emanuel et al. 
2012). According to recent projections of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this 
figure will amount to 49% in 2082 (Ginsburg 2008).      
0.2.2  Rising health care expenditures: positive evolution or crisis?  
The rapid growth of health care expenditures elicits two opposing reactions: it is either 
labeled a positive evolution or a crisis. Proponents of the former view argue that 
increased spending on health functions as an economic engine for the community in 
that it creates employment opportunities in the sector. In addition, they point out that 
the observed trend translates into increases in life expectancy and other significant 
health benefits and, thus, provides value for money (Cutler & McClellan 2001). However, 
the view that we ought to embrace rising health care expenditures represents a 
minority position. There is a consensus that any positive effects are largely 
overshadowed by the severe threat which recent developments pose to the viability of 
our health care systems.1 The fact that governments are increasingly putting the issue 
of cost containment in health care on the agenda lends credence to the widespread 
nature of the ‘crisis perception’ (de la Maisonneuve & Oliveira Martins 2013; UCL 
European Institute 2012). When enumerating the various downsides of rising health 
care costs, proponents of the ‘crisis view’ often distinguish between effects at the public 
and the private level. The discussion of such effects largely proceeds with reference to 
the US context. However, given that Europe is heading down a similar path of ever 
rising health care costs, many of the cited problems also apply in the European setting, 
albeit in a somewhat less pronounced way.        
 
A sustained increase in health care spending relative to GDP has two deleterious effects 
at the public level. First, such a development can ultimately only be financed by higher 
 
                                                     
1 Note that the problematic evolution is not the rise in health care costs as such, but the fact that health care 
costs are growing more rapidly than GDP. However, for ease of reference, we will use the terms ‘rising health 
care expenditures’, ‘rising health care costs’, and ‘increased health care spending’ as a shorthand for the 
observed trend that the growth rate of health care costs exceeds that of GDP.   
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taxes or higher debt. Second, this trend threatens to crowd out other public spending 
priorities. In the United States, 20% of the economy is, on average, devoted to federal 
taxes (Chernew 2010). Estimates of the Congressional Budget Office (2007) suggest that, 
under the assumption of a yearly 1% gap between health care expenditure growth and 
GDP growth, a 70% increase in taxes would be called for by 2050. Note that this 
represents a conservative estimate, given the historical trend of a 2.5% gap per year 
(Ginsburg 2008). A tax increase of this magnitude could have severe adverse economic 
implications. For example, it could lead to a decline in consumption by private 
individuals and the closing down of US branches of international companies.  
An alternative strategy to finance rising health care expenditures consists in further 
increasing the national debt. The size of the national debt is often measured relative to 
the overall economy (the debt-to-GDP ratio). At present, the US debt-to-GDP ratio 
amounts to approximately 73% (Congressional Budget Office 2013). Although national 
economies can endure substantial debt for a prolonged period without any real adverse 
consequences, there is a threshold level of debt beyond which such effects start to 
materialize. Economists disagree as to where this threshold lies. Whereas the European 
Union has imposed a maximum debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%, economic research indicates 
that anything below 90% is manageable (Chernew 2010).2 Under the most pessimistic 
scenario, projections by the Congressional Budget Office (2013) point towards a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 190% by 2038 – an increase largely driven by health care. Such a prospect, 
in Chernew’s terminology, is tantamount to ‘economic Armageddon’: interest rates for 
all borrowers (government, businesses and individuals) would soar, “GDP would 
contract significantly leaving many out of work, and the government would have few 
levers to respond” (2010, 287).      
 
Besides leading to an unsustainable tax level and debt-to-GDP ratio, a sustained increase 
in health care spending relative to GDP also implies that ever smaller amounts will be 
available for other public spending priorities, such as education, infrastructure, 
environmental issues, defense, development aid, and employment. Although these 
other public goals have value in themselves, their worth extends further still. For 
example, employment, education, safe water, clean air, and safe houses are important 
social determinants of health. In fact, their effect on health is greater than that of access 
to and use of health care services (WHO 2014). In short, devoting exorbitant levels of 
spending to health care may well prove an inefficient tool for promoting health.   
 
 
                                                     
2 In the Euro area, the debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 92.2% in the first quarter of 2013 and, thus, already 
exceeds the manageable threshold (Eurostat 2013). 
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At the private level, rising health care costs primarily translate into higher insurance 
premiums. The faster growth rate of health care spending relative to GDP further 
implies that such premiums rise more rapidly than workers’ earnings. This effect, 
combined with increases in taxes aimed at financing rising health care costs, has 
sharply reduced the disposable income of American families. In this respect, Auerbach 
and Kellerman (2011) have calculated that, between 1999 and 2009, health care cost 
growth at a rate exceeding economic growth accounted for an average yearly loss of 
$5,400 in disposable income for a median-income US family of four. In reducing private 
consumption of non-health care goods and services, rising health care costs affect the 
well-being of both families and the nation’s economy (Chernew 2010). Equally 
important, however, is the observation that the growing gap between premium trends 
and earning trends has impacted upon the affordability of health insurance – even for 
those in the middle class (Ginsburg 2008).  
 
Besides reducing individuals’ ability to purchase health insurance, rising premiums 
have also affected the provision of employer-based insurance. Various employers have 
either stopped providing health insurance altogether or shifted the increasing costs 
onto employees (Gabel et al. 2004; Bodenheimer 2005). In the latter case, numerous 
employees have been compelled to decline employer-offered health insurance. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the combination of a steadily disintegrating system of employer-
based insurance and the reduced affordability of personal health insurance has 
increased the numbers of people joining the ranks of the uninsured. Some of those 
losing insurance have been ‘lucky’ enough to qualify for Medicaid, the means-tested 
joint state and federal health insurance program for the low income and disabled. 
Nevertheless, their Medicaid status rests on shaky grounds. Medicaid has grown 
significantly over the past years, making the program a potential target for future cost 
containment efforts (Krugman & Wells 2006).  
One might expect that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‘ObamaCare’), in 
seeking to provide universal coverage, will render the problem of the increasing 
number of uninsured a thing of the past. However, doubts are increasingly being raised 
with regard to the Act’s potential for success. For example, Avik (2014) points out that 
ObamaCare has, thus far, expanded coverage to a mere 660,000 people, i.e. much less 
than the 7 million projected by the Congressional Budget Office. Moreover, if the act 
indeed proves unsuccessful, it could well be repealed by the following legislature.  
 
In addition to affecting employees, the rising costs attached to employer-based health 
insurance also threaten the viability of companies. Certain corporations cannot, due to 
binding institutional constraints, escape the provision of affordable health insurance for 
their employees. The ensuing higher cost structure of such companies compels them to 
impose higher prices on their products in order to remain profitable. As a result, they 
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incur a substantial competitive disadvantage relative to those companies which do not 
face such constraints. The introduction of the ObamaCare employer mandate, scheduled 
for 2016, is likely to magnify this adverse effect. This provision compels mid-sized and 
large companies – which comprise 4% of all US corporations –  to offer affordable 
coverage to their workers (Luhby 2014).  
 
All of the problems ensuing from increased health spending at the private level are 
exacerbated by the ongoing economic recession. Marmor et al. (2009) explain this as 
follows:  
Widespread job losses mean that millions of Americans stand to lose health 
insurance. In this economic climate, employers also face intensified pressures to 
restrain health care spending and cut back on insurance coverage for those still 
employed. Meanwhile, rising unemployment levels mean that many more 
Americans are eligible for Medicaid. States face an acute fiscal dilemma: they must 
find a way to pay for growing Medicaid enrollment precisely when tax revenues 
are declining […]. (Marmor et al. 2009, 485)  
0.2.3  Exploring solutions to the health care cost crisis 
It is generally agreed that a sustainable trajectory for health care spending lies close to 
overall GDP growth. In other words, health care costs should grow no faster than GDP, 
“so that the percentage of GDP spent on health care remains constant” (Berwick & 
Hackbarth 2012, 1514). However, there is disagreement as to the preferred approach for 
achieving this goal. At the most general level, there are two proposed routes, one 
presenting a painless and the other a painful prescription.  
The painless route consists in the elimination of waste, defined as the costs incurred by 
deliberate fraud, administrative inefficiencies, and useless medical interventions. The 
arguments in support of this view are twofold (Brody 2012). First, its adherents point 
out that waste accounts for 30% of health care spending in the US - $800 billion a year. 
Second, the administration of useless medical interventions, it is claimed, represents a 
source of harm to the patient. Futile treatments, for example, can cause complications. 
Moreover, useless diagnostic tests yield false positive results which, in turn, result in 
further tests and complications. Critics, however, warn that waste avoidance should not 
be hailed as the silver bullet for the health care cost crisis, for several reasons (Bloche 
2012). To begin with, whereas interventions are easily recognized as useless post 
factum, they are rarely identified as such at the moment of clinical decision-making. 
Admittedly, critics claim, high-quality studies of clinical effectiveness would go a long 
way to resolving this issue. Nevertheless, the performance of such studies is likely to 
cost tens of millions of dollars and span many years - time which is not available given 
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that the ‘suffocating’ effects of the health care cost crisis are already being felt. Finally, 
any effect of waste elimination on health care spending growth will be temporary, at 
most. For example, suppose that we cut out waste by reducing the annual rate of health 
care spending growth by 3% over a decade. Assuming that health care expenditures and 
GDP grow at an annual average rate of, respectively, 5.7% and 3%, we could hereby bring 
health care spending growth slightly below the level of overall GDP growth throughout 
this period. However, health care costs would soon resume their rise once we had cut 
out all waste. As Bloche puts it: “eliminating […] ineffective care would shift the cost 
curve down but wouldn’t change its slope” (2012, 1951).    
The shortcomings of the waste reduction strategy expose an ugly truth: any proposed 
solution to the health care cost crisis which does not address beneficial forms of care sets 
itself up for failure. Suggested measures for achieving success on this front frequently 
single out the elderly as the group which ought to sacrifice beneficial care. Two 
observations are generally invoked to support this choice. To begin with, a reference is 
made to health care expenditure statistics that purportedly show that those over 65 
years of age consume a disproportionate amount of health care. For example, whereas 
the elderly represent 13% of the population, they account for 36% of total health care 
expenditures in the United States. Furthermore, average per-capita health care 
expenditures for the elderly amount to $11,089 per year – a significant departure from 
the $3,352 per year for those aged 16 to 64 (Jecker 2013). Besides these statistics, the 
phenomenon of population aging is also appealed to in support of targeting the elderly. 
Population aging will reach its peak in 2030, at which point those over 65 will make up 
21% of the population (Fleck 2010). Both factors combined, it is argued, constitute a 
recipe for disaster. In short, the rationale behind the focus on beneficial care in the 
elderly is the conviction that population aging represents a major driver of rising health 
care costs.  
0.2.4  Saying ‘no’ to beneficial health care in the elderly 
There are two strategies for curbing spending on beneficial health care in the elderly. 
We can reduce either the supply of or the demand for such care. Although both types of 
proposal can be traced back to the early 1980s, they remain highly relevant in the 
contemporary debate on the health care cost crisis.  
0.2.4.1 Reducing supply of beneficial health care in the elderly 
In 1984, Richard Lamm, then governor of Colorado, famously stated that the elderly 
“have a duty to die and get out of the way” (Binstock & Post 1991, 5). Despite its 
controversial nature, this quote functioned as the impetus for a widespread public 
campaign to limit health care for the elderly. Daniel Callahan was, without a doubt, the 
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most ardent spokesperson of this campaign. In his 1987 book Setting limits: medical goals 
in an aging society, he portrayed the elderly as “a demographic, economic, and medical 
avalanche, one that could ultimately (and perhaps already) do great harm” (1987, 20). In 
response to this perceived threat, Callahan suggested implementing a policy which 
denies all life-extending treatment to the elderly beyond a certain age.3 Callahan’s 
proposal instigated widespread discussion, both in the media and in academic circles. 
With regard to the latter, the issue of justice between age groups in the provision of 
health care increasingly started to figure in the writings of philosophers - to the extent 
that it replaced the heretofore dominant focal point of justice between the rich and the 
poor (Binstock 2011). Besides philosophers, economists and public figures also joined in 
the debate.  
 
The proposals put forward by Callahan and others never made it to the level of official 
policy. Nevertheless, the idea of age-based rationing as a cost containment tool is still 
very much alive, both in (academic) theory and in practice. For example, as recently as 
last spring, Nancy Jecker (2013) published an article in the American Journal of Bioethics, 
advocating the denial of life-extending care to the elderly.4 Others make a somewhat 
less controversial claim. Rather than scrapping all life-extending treatment, their 
proposals impose an age limit on one specific intervention. For example, as a result of 
the growing number of elderly with end-stage renal disease, nephrologists are 
increasingly calling for a policy that would allow age-based rationing of expensive 
dialysis (see, for example, Knauf & Aronson 2009; Stevens et al. 2010).      
Although it is condemned by various international organizations (e.g. WHO and UN) and 
outlawed by most countries, age-based rationing nevertheless frequently occurs in 
practice (Giordano 2005). In a survey of physicians from four European countries – 
Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Italy – Hurst et al. (2006) found that over 
half of the respondents were inclined to ration medical interventions on the basis of 
age. Other studies provide insight into the specific types of treatments being (covertly) 
denied to the elderly in these and other countries. The most extensive rationing occurs 
in the United Kingdom, where physicians have admitted to employing age limits for 
heart bypass operations, ICU admission, angiograms and heart stress tests for angina, 
dialysis and kidney transplantation, and revascularization (Allin & Gusmano 2011; 
Williams 2009; Miranda & Nap 2006). A study in a Swiss university hospital found 
indications of significant underuse of stress tests and coronary angiography in elderly 
patients with acute coronary syndrome (Jenni et al. 2001). In addition, there was 
 
                                                     
3 We discuss Callahan’s proposal in more depth in chapter 1.  
4 This, too, will be addressed more extensively in chapter 1.  
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evidence of age-based rationing of echocardiography and statins in patients suffering 
from congestive heart failure and hypercholesterolaemia, respectively. In the United 
States, elderly patients with colorectal cancer have a significantly lower chance of 
receiving both surgery and chemotherapy (Williams 2009).  
The abovementioned practice of covert age-based rationing is likely to increasingly 
occur as the health care cost crisis further intensifies. Indeed, the ongoing health care 
reform in the United States already hints at the possibility of such a development. 
Besides providing universal coverage, ObamaCare also intends to significantly reduce 
health care expenditures. To this end, it has imposed cuts of $533 billion on Medicare 
over the next decade – the US national health insurance program that provides 
coverage to persons 65 years or older. In addition, the reform efforts provide for the 
establishment of a fifteen-member Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) which 
is charged with the task of suggesting measures for further cost reductions in Medicare 
(DeBolt 2010). Although the law prohibits the use of age as a rationing tool, some find it 
difficult to see how savings of the projected magnitude can be obtained without 
resorting to age-based rationing. As a result, it is feared that such savings will be 
achieved through covert age-based rationing (Kaplan 2010; Cannon 2011). Others even 
go as far as perceiving the health reform as a stepping stone to overt rationing – i.e. 
rationing as a matter of official policy (Binstock 2011).  
The issue of overt age-based rationing also recently arose in the United Kingdom, where 
the Department of Health urged the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) to consider taking the societal/economic contribution of a patient into account 
when deciding whether to pay for new drugs. However, NICE has rejected this 
government proposal on the grounds that it would – notwithstanding ministers’ claim 
to the contrary – inevitably disadvantage the elderly (Age UK 2014).    
0.2.4.2  Reducing demand for beneficial health care in the elderly  
There are two commonly proposed avenues for reducing demand for beneficial health 
care in the elderly. The first strategy consists in the promotion of healthy aging, i.e. 
efforts to prevent or delay age-related disabilities and chronic diseases which are 
burdensome, both to individuals and the health care system. This proposal is most 
vigorously endorsed by the World Health Organization (WHO) - although the latter 
employs the term ‘active aging’, rather than ‘healthy aging’, so as to emphasize that 
there are other factors, besides health care, that affect the way in which individuals and 
populations age (WHO 2002). The second strategy applies uniquely to the US context 
and involves the privatization of Medicare.  
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Active aging  
 
The WHO defines active aging as “the process of optimizing opportunities for health, 
participation and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age” (2002, 12). 
As is reflected by this definition, the WHO perceives one’s health status in older age as 
largely determined by factors which are (to a greater or lesser extent) malleable. These 
include, amongst others, determinants related to one’s lifestyle, one’s physical, social 
and economic environment. In devising recommendations for active aging, the WHO 
stresses the importance of addressing these determinants throughout the life course, 
i.e. from early life to late life.  
At the behavioral and lifestyle level, tobacco, physical inactivity and unhealthy diets 
represent the most significant risk factors for major diseases in old age. In response to 
this observation, the WHO urges the creation of supportive environments which “make 
the healthy choices the easy choices” (2002, 17). Specifically, it recommends local, 
national, and international authorities to take measures aimed at controlling the 
marketing and use of tobacco products. In addition, community leaders are encouraged 
to develop guidelines on physical activity for the elderly and provide infrastructure 
conducive to regular exercise (e.g. safe parks and walking areas). Diet-related 
recommendations range from the prevention of malnutrition to the implementation of 
policies and practices that reduce the misuse and abuse of alcohol and drugs.    
Inadequate levels of social support and physical environments that are maladapted to 
the elderly are also detrimental to health. The former is associated with increased 
morbidity, psychological distress, and a decrease in overall well-being and general 
health, whereas the latter is linked to isolation, depression, reduced fitness and 
increased mobility problems. With a view to reducing the risk for social isolation and 
loneliness, the WHO advocates the establishment of “community groups run by older 
people, traditional societies, self-help and mutual aid groups, peer and professional 
outreach programs, neighborhood visiting, [and] telephone support programs” (2002, 
8). Measures aimed at the creation of age-friendly environments include, amongst other 
things, the implementation of fall prevention programs and the protection of older 
pedestrians in traffic.  
Although poverty is a risk factor for ill health and disabilities at all ages, its adverse 
effects are magnified in the elderly. Relative to those with high incomes, poor older 
people have a 66% higher risk of developing lower levels of functioning. If we are to 
address this imbalance, the WHO (2002) claims, we ought to implement programs and 
policies targeting income inequities, low literacy levels, and lack of education.      
 
Besides the approach advocated by the WHO, there exists yet another proposed strategy 
for achieving the goal of healthy or active aging. The latter proposal is much more 
radical than the former. It claims that the most effective route to increasing healthy life 
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expectancy consists in tackling the biological, rather than the behavioral and 
environmental determinants of age-related diseases. This view is rooted in a scientific 
optimism. Specifically, its proponents argue that developments in the novel field of 
biogerontology – research into the biology of aging – will soon allow us to intervene in 
the human aging process. As this process is the common, underlying cause of all age-
related diseases, such interventions, it is argued, will enable us to address all of these 
pathologies simultaneously (Miller 2002). This, in turn, is said to offer the prospect of 
substantial increases in healthy life expectancy – increases of a much greater magnitude 
than those obtainable by the WHO approach.  
 
Medicare privatization 
 
Republican proposals to privatize Medicare have been around for years. The rationale 
behind such plans is that rising health care costs – which are largely attributed to 
Medicare growth – can be curbed by compelling private insurers to compete against one 
another for seniors’ business (Miller 2012). Under a recent proposal, put forward by 
Representative Paul Ryan, seniors and others currently on Medicare would be given an 
annual voucher of $8000 to buy a health plan from a private insurer of their choice 
(Levey 2011). However, even if commercial insurers cost less to run than government 
plans, reliance upon the former would account for only a part of the projected cost 
savings. The Congressional Budget Office has calculated that the extremely low amount 
of the voucher would imply that out-of-pocket expenditures for the elderly are doubled 
under Medicare privatization (Levey 2011). For many seniors, such a doubling would be 
beyond their reach. In short, part of the cost saving potential of Medicare privatization 
is obtained by ‘artificially’ reducing demand for health care on the part of the elderly.   
0.2.5  Research questions relating to financial scarcity in health care 
As health care costs continue to rise, the aforementioned proposals to curb spending on 
health care in the elderly are likely to further gain ground. It is, therefore, important to 
ask ourselves whether they represent a morally acceptable solution to the health care 
cost crisis. This question has already received much attention. However, it has typically 
been interpreted in a rather narrow sense. For example, moral assessments of proposals 
to impose age limits on the delivery of health care tend to focus on whether or not this 
practice amounts to age discrimination. The debate on Medicare privatization, in turn, 
generally revolves around the morality of ‘artificially’ reducing demand for health care 
on the part of the elderly. Finally, in the case of the biogerontological approach to 
healthy aging, the emphasis most often lies on the moral implications of a substantially 
prolonged lifespan. Specifically, the following questions have taken center stage: “Is a 
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significantly increased lifespan in accordance with human nature?” and “Do the positive 
effects of a radically prolonged lifespan outweigh the negatives (e.g. overpopulation, 
impact on the ecology, etc.)?” These issues and questions are undoubtedly important. 
However, the moral acceptability of proposals to curb spending on health care in the 
elderly does not merely hinge on the answers to these questions. Their ethical 
soundness is also dependent on whether they are likely to actually achieve their 
ultimate aim, i.e. whether they will succeed in reducing spending growth in health care 
to the level of overall GDP growth. It would, for example, be highly unethical to deny 
the elderly – or any other group for that matter (irrespective of whether the group is 
defined in terms of age or another criterion) – life-extending care if this practice offered 
little prospect of substantially controlling health care expenditures.5 The effectiveness 
of proposals to curb health care spending in the elderly has seldom or never been 
addressed in the literature. This is lamentable. After all, the adverse effects of the health 
care cost crisis have already started to materialize. Therefore, we cannot afford to adopt 
a trial and error approach to the problem.  
Part one of this dissertation will examine whether proposals to curb health care 
spending in the elderly represent an effective means of containing costs. It will do so by 
analyzing the extent to which these proposals tackle the root cause of the health care 
cost crisis. When assessing the efficacy of proposals aimed at reducing supply of 
beneficial health care in the elderly, we will take Callahan’s proposal as a case study. In a 
similar vein, we will use the biogerontological approach to healthy aging as a case study 
when determining the cost containing potential of proposals seeking to reduce demand 
for beneficial health care in the elderly. However, as will become clear during the course 
of our analysis, the conclusions for these two case studies can be extrapolated to any 
other proposal to curb health care spending in the elderly.  
0.3 Commodity scarcity in health care 
As noted at the start of this introduction, part two of this dissertation will be devoted to 
a discussion of ethical issues ensuing from population aging in the realm of commodity 
scarcity. We will predominantly focus on the stock example of commodity scarcity in 
 
                                                     
5 We are not hereby suggesting that age-based rationing automatically becomes ethically acceptable when it is 
found to be an effective cost containment tool. If it turns out to be an effective means of addressing the health 
care cost crisis, it could, for example, still be found to be unacceptable on the grounds that it constitutes age 
discrimination. 
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health care, i.e. the shortage of donor organs for transplantation. Within this context, 
we will mainly limit the scope of our discussion to kidney transplantation, given that 
the scarcity of this type of organ is most pronounced (Eurotransplant 2014; OPTN 2014).  
With respect to methods for dealing with the problem of kidney scarcity (and organ 
scarcity in general), it is useful to distinguish between ‘coping mechanisms’ and 
‘solutions’. We introduce the former concept to refer to strategies which are not aimed 
at diminishing the magnitude of the kidney scarcity, but merely attempt to make the 
best of the shortage. In other words, the term ‘coping mechanisms’ denotes the activity 
of devising criteria for the allocation of kidneys in a way which strikes a balance 
between the goals of equity and utility. By contrast, ‘solutions’ are strategies which 
endeavor to reduce the kidney scarcity, either by lowering demand for or increasing the 
supply of donor kidneys.  
Part two of this dissertation will be divided into two sections. Whereas the first section 
addresses ‘coping mechanisms’, the second is devoted to ‘solutions’.  
 
Below, we provide the reader with an overview of, respectively, current ‘coping 
mechanisms’ and ‘solutions’ in the context of kidney scarcity. In doing so, it will become 
clear how population aging is increasingly (being perceived as) threatening the viability 
of current ‘coping mechanisms’ and ‘solutions’. This overview will enable us to 
formulate more specific research questions for both sections making up part two of this 
dissertation.  
0.3.1 ‘Coping mechanisms’ 
Dialysis and kidney transplantation represent the two treatment options for patients 
with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). Renal transplantation is the preferred treatment 
modality in that it offers a longer lifespan, better quality of life, and lower economic 
costs for society (Vamos et al. 2009). Unfortunately, the shortage of donor kidneys 
remains a major barrier to access to transplantation. For example, as of February 14, 
2014, there were 99,339 patients waitlisted for kidney transplantation in the United 
States (OPTN 2014). Records spanning the last decade suggest that annually only 
approximately 16,000 patients receive a kidney transplant, whereas more than 30,000 
patients are added to the waiting list each year (OPTN 2013a). 
The scarcity of donor kidneys gives rise to a need for policies governing their allocation. 
So-called ‘organ exchange organizations’ are charged with the task of devising such 
policies. All organ exchange organizations employ a point system with a view to rank 
ordering patients on the kidney transplant waiting list. Whenever a donor kidney 
becomes available, it is offered to the patient with the highest number of points. 
Transplant candidates’ scores are determined on the basis of a number of patient 
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characteristics and other, primarily medically driven, criteria. The nature of these 
criteria as well as the weight assigned to them varies according to the organ exchange 
organization. Two of the largest such organizations are Eurotransplant and the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). The former is the supranational organization 
responsible for allocation of organs across eight European countries: Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia. UNOS is the 
administrator for the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), the 
unified transplant network established by the United States Congress.  
0.3.1.1  Eurotransplant 
Within Eurotransplant, the scoring system is based on five factors: waiting time, human 
leucocyte antigen (HLA) matching, mismatch probability, the distance between donor 
and transplant center, and the import/export balance between the participating 
countries (Eurotransplant 2013).  
Waiting time starts to accrue from the moment one initiates dialysis. Each waiting day 
accounts for 0.091 points, i.e. one can accumulate 33.3 points per year. Pediatric 
transplant candidates receive a 100 point bonus for the criterion of waiting time.  
The criterion of HLA matching refers to the immunological compatibility of donor and 
recipient. The probability of a successful transplant increases with the number of 
identical HLA antigens. More specifically, the greater the similarity between donor and 
recipient HLA, the smaller the chance for rejection and the higher the chance of a long 
graft survival (Desschans et al. 2008). The number of points awarded for this criterion 
range from 400 (in the case of a perfect match) to 0 (in the case of a complete 
mismatch). These points are doubled for pediatric patients.   
The mismatch probability criterion aims to ensure equitable access to kidney 
transplantation for (highly) sensitized patients by granting them bonus points. 
Sensitized patients have a low probability of finding a suitable kidney, given that their 
immune system makes antibodies against a general donor pool. Sensitization may occur 
as a result of pregnancy, a previous transplant, or blood transfusion.   
When an organ becomes available in their own country, transplant candidates receive a 
bonus of at least 100 points. Additional points can be obtained when the kidney 
originates from their regional or local center. The rationale behind this criterion of 
distance consists in minimizing the cold ischemia time, i.e. the amount of time between 
the procurement and the transplantation of the kidney. A prolonged cold ischemia time 
adversely affects the survival of the graft.  
In order to prevent countries with low donation rates from taking advantage of those 
with high donation rates, the import and export of kidneys between the different 
Eurotransplant member countries are constantly monitored. Transplant candidates in 
countries where the import rate largely exceeds the export rate are penalized.  
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Eurotransplant has established several special allocation programs aimed at specific 
groups of patients. One such initiative is the ‘Eurotransplant Senior Program’ (ESP), 
which automatically allocates all kidneys from donors ≥65 years to recipients aged ≥65 
years. Only elderly recipients awaiting a first transplant are eligible for the ESP. Under 
this program, points are assigned on the basis of waiting time and location of the 
donor/recipient pair (Desschans 2008).  
0.3.1.2  UNOS 
In the United States, kidney allocation is governed by waiting time, sensitization, and 
HLA matching, i.e. a subset of the criteria employed by Eurotransplant. However, as a 
result of the growing disparity between supply of and demand for donor kidneys, 
waiting time has accrued an ever increasing importance – to the extent that its 
contribution to the allocation outcome largely surpasses that of the biological criteria 
(Friedewald et al. 2013). Therefore, in practice, the current allocation system is heavily 
skewed towards the principle of equity.  
During the past decade, the kidney allocation system has increasingly come under 
attack. A principle concern is that it does not take into account transplant candidates’ 
projected life expectancy. Thus, under the current system, “higher priority could be 
given to transplanting a 65-year-old on dialysis with diabetes mellitus and extensive 
vascular disease who has accumulated more waiting time than a more recently listed 30-
year-old with no comorbidities” (Reese et al. 2010, 1981). This aspect of the existing 
system, it is argued, is especially problematic in light of recent changes in the 
demographics of the kidney transplant waiting list. Population aging, combined with 
the epidemic of diabetes mellitus, has led to a tremendous growth in the number of 
elderly patients with ESRD (Reese et al. 2010). For example, since 2000, the prevalence 
rate of ESRD increased by 28% and 37% in the 65-74 and the ≥ 75 age group, respectively 
(Williams et al. 2012). According to the 2007 United States Renal Data System (USRDS) 
Annual Data Report, the overall median age of new ESRD patients amounted to 64.6 
years in 2005 (Paraskevas et al. 2010). For patients ≥ 75 years, incidence rates of ESRD 
grew by 10% between 2000 and 2005. The increase in incidence and prevalence rates in 
the elderly has been accompanied by a corresponding growth in the number of elderly 
kidney transplant recipients. Whereas only 3% of deceased donor kidney recipients 
were older than 65 years in 1990, this figure rose to 16% in 2009 (Friedewald et al. 2013). 
Within the same time frame, the number of deceased donor kidneys going to persons 
aged 50 to 64 increased from 23% to 39%.  
 
In the context of a growing elderly ESRD population, an allocation system which does 
not penalize recipient candidates with limited life expectancy inevitably has the effect 
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of shifting the average recipient age upwards. In producing this effect, the current 
system, critics claim, amounts to an inefficient use (or even a wastage) of kidneys:  
A number of studies have shown that older adults with ESRD live longer with a 
kidney transplant than they would have lived on dialysis and therefore derive a 
benefit as individuals, but from a societal perspective, the comparative survival 
benefit derived from a transplant is greater in younger recipients. Specifically, 
younger patients gain more additional years of life from kidney transplantation 
than older patients do. Older kidney transplant recipients are more likely to die 
while their transplanted kidneys still function – an outcome that some view as a 
waste of valuable organs. Seen from the perspective of HTA [health technology 
assessment], a kidney transplanted into a younger person provides greater 
returns in terms of survival benefit, quality of life, and cost of therapy per year of 
life gained than a kidney transplanted into an older person. (Reese et al. 2010, 
1981) 
Besides shifting the average recipient age upwards, the current allocation system also 
has the effect of directing a growing number of kidneys from young donors to elderly 
recipients (Ladin & Hanto 2011). Critics point out that this constitutes an additional 
inefficiency, for two reasons (OPTN  2011). First, given that young donor kidneys have a 
substantially longer survival potential than kidneys from old donors, transplantation of 
the former type of kidney into elderly recipients is highly likely to result in unrealized 
graft years. In other words, due to their limited life expectancy, these recipients have a 
great likelihood of dying long before the young donor kidney has realized its full 
survival potential. Second, the flip side of a growing number of young donor kidneys 
going to the elderly is that young transplant candidates are increasingly receiving 
kidneys from older donors. The high life expectancy of young transplant candidates and 
the limited lifespan of an old donor kidney imply that this trend will lead to increased 
retransplantation rates in the young. In response to both types of inefficiency, critics of 
the current system advocate an allocation model which matches the survival potential 
of a kidney with that of its recipient.    
 
0.3.1.2.1  Proposals for a new kidney allocation system  
In 2003, the OPTN Board of Directors commissioned the Kidney Transplantation 
Committee to review the current allocation system and formulate suggestions for 
remediating the abovementioned concerns. The Committee devoted almost ten years to 
the fulfillment of this task (Friedewald et al. 2013). Over the course of this decade, it put 
forward three distinct proposals for revising the existing kidney allocation policy.  
The first proposal, developed in 2007, introduced two novel concepts: the ‘kidney donor 
profile index’ (KDPI) and ‘life years from transplant’ (LYFT). The former refers to a 
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metric which allows one to rank donor kidneys according to their quality and, thus, 
their potential for survival. The KDPI score for a donor kidney ranges between 0% and 
100%. The lower the score, the higher the projected survival of the kidney (Friedewald 
et al. 2013). Various factors are considered in the calculation of the KDPI score, such as 
whether or not the donor had a history of diabetes or hypertension. The concept of ‘life 
years from transplant’ provides a measure for rank ordering kidney transplant 
candidates according to their projected life expectancy. More specifically, a patient’s 
LYFT score reflects the number of extra years of life she could expect to live with a 
donated kidney compared with remaining on dialysis (Singh et al. 2009). The following 
patient characteristics adversely affect one’s LYFT score: 1) diabetic status 2) advanced 
age 3) elevated body mass index and 4) retransplant candidate status (Reese et al. 2010).   
Under the 2007 proposal, donor kidneys with the least potential for long-term survival 
(i.e. with a very high KDPI score) are allocated primarily on the basis of dialysis time 
(Wolfe et al. 2009). By contrast, the LYFT criterion primarily governs the allocation of 
kidneys with a very low KDPI score. Finally, kidneys of average quality are allocated on 
the basis of both dialysis time and LYFT, where the former and the latter are given a 
weight of, respectively, 60% and 40% in the calculation of the patient’s total allocation 
score. The implications of this proposal can be summarized as follows: 
Kidney transplant candidates with the greatest expected LYFT have an allocation 
advantage for organs with the longest potential survival. This priority diminishes 
as the survival potential of the organ decreases. Conversely, wait-listed patients 
with the longest dialysis times have an allocation advantage for potentially short-
lived donor organs, and dialysis-time priority decreases as the survival potential 
of the donor kidney increases. (Wolfe et al. 2009, 1525) 
Given that age accounts for 25% of one’s LYFT score, one can expect this model to 
adversely affect the elderly (Reese et al. 2010). Indeed, simulations suggest that, relative 
to the current system, this proposal would allocate significantly fewer kidneys to 
patients aged ≥ 65 years. Moreover, it would shift kidneys from young donors, many of 
which currently go to the elderly, away from this age group (Wolfe et al. 2009). After all, 
kidneys from young donors tend to have a high potential for long-term survival, 
whereas the elderly, on average, exhibit low LYFT scores. Despite the fact that it 
addresses both of the concerns raised with regard to the current allocation system, the 
2007 proposal was ultimately rejected. In support of this decision, a reference was made 
to the limited accuracy of the LYFT system in predicting which patients derive the 
greatest survival benefit from transplantation (Reese et al. 2010).  
 
In 2011, the Kidney Transplantation Committee issued a second proposal for revision of 
the current allocation system (Xu et al. 2012). Whereas the concept of KDPI was 
maintained, the LYFT criterion was dropped in favor of the so-called ‘estimated post-
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transplant survival’ (EPTS). The latter merely refers to a patient’s life expectancy with 
transplantation - as opposed to the difference between survival with and without a 
transplant (LYFT). Four factors come into play in the EPTS calculation: length of time on 
dialysis, any prior organ transplant, age, and diabetic status (Xu et al. 2012). The 2011 
proposal consists of two components (Ladin & Hanto 2011). First, it dictates that the best 
kidneys (KDPI ≤ 20%) be allocated to the candidates with the highest EPTS (candidates in 
the top 20% for EPTS). Second, it states that the remaining kidneys (KDPI > 20%) are to 
be allocated such that candidates who are within 15 years (older or younger) of the 
donor’s age have highest priority. The age distribution of the current waitlisted 
population is older than the distribution of the current donor population. Thus, a 
system which prioritizes candidates within 15 years of the donor age will tend to result 
in a younger population of recipients (OPTN 2011). In this respect, OPTN (2011) 
simulations indicate that, relative to the current system, the 2011 proposal reduces the 
number of kidneys going to the 50-64 age group by 6%. For the ≥ 65 age group, a 5% 
decrease in the transplantation rate would occur. Besides allocating fewer organs to 
older transplant candidates, the proposed model, through its first component, also 
results in a redistribution of longer lived organs from the old to the young.  
This second proposal of the Kidney Transplantation Committee also failed to make it to 
the level of official policy. In August 2011, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) ruled that the ± 15 year age-matching algorithm constitutes a breach of 
the 1975 Age Discrimination Act (Ross et al. 2012). The algorithm, according to the 
DHHS, employs age in an arbitrary fashion, whereas the Act stipulates that age may only 
legitimately be used as a proxy for medical variables.  
 
The Kidney Transplantation Committee’s most recent proposal retains the first 
component of the previously outlined model, i.e. the best kidneys (KDPI ≤ 20%) are to be 
allocated to the candidates with the highest EPTS (candidates in the top 20% for EPTS). 
In addition, the proposal introduces two further provisions (Friedewald et al. 2013). To 
begin with, kidneys with a KDPI score between 20% and 85% (moderate quality kidneys) 
ought to be reserved for transplant candidates with a moderate EPTS score. The rank 
order of these candidates would primarily be established on the basis of waiting time. A 
final provision of the proposal stipulates that the allocation of kidneys with a KDPI 
greater than 85% (the worst quality kidneys) be governed by an opt-in system. 
Transplant candidates who choose to register for the waiting list for such kidneys would 
be rank ordered solely according to waiting time. It is expected that this opt-in system 
will primarily attract the elderly, given that the benefit of decreased time to transplant 
offsets the risk of decreased graft longevity in this patient group. In June 2013, the OPTN 
Board of Directors approved this latest proposal. The new kidney allocation system is 
expected to be fully implemented by the end of 2014 (OPTN 2013b).  
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0.3.1.2.2  Criticisms of the new kidney allocation system  
Each of the aforementioned reform attempts has elicited an array of criticisms. The 
latter relate to the proposals’ impact on 1) living donation rates 2) diabetics and 3) the 
elderly.  
 
Impact on living donation rates 
 
In significantly increasing young adults’ chances of obtaining a deceased donor kidney, 
critics argue, the reform proposals are likely to considerably decrease this age group’s 
reliance upon living donation (Hippen 2009). Relative to deceased donor kidneys, living 
donor kidneys exhibit a prolonged potential for survival. Currently, over one-half of all 
kidneys transplanted in young adults originate from living donors (Ross et al. 2012). 
Thus, a decrease in living donor kidney transplantation rates in this age group would 
represent a significant loss in efficiency. Depending on the exact extent of the decrease, 
this inefficiency may offset the efficiency gains obtained by the reform proposals.  
Lower rates of living donor kidney transplantation in young adults, critics point out, 
would be accompanied by one of two scenarios, both of which exacerbate the 
aforementioned inefficiency. First, due to their poor prospects of obtaining a deceased 
donor kidney, the elderly may, under the reform proposals, experience a substantial 
increase in living donor transplantation rates (Hippen 2009). Such an outcome would 
entail a wastage of graft years, given that the lifespan of a living donor graft, in many 
cases, exceeds the life expectancy of elderly patients. Second, if the decrease in young 
adults’ reliance on living donation is not counterbalanced by an increase in the elderly, 
we would experience a reduction in overall living donation rates (Ladin & Hanto 2011). 
This, in turn, would imply a decrease in the size of the donor pool and, thus, in the 
number of graft years available for distribution across the ESRD population.      
 
Impact on diabetics 
 
Some critics raise concerns regarding the inclusion of diabetic status in the calculation 
of the EPTS score (Xu et al. 2012). It is argued that the EPTS criterion crudely lumps 
together all diabetics, without consideration for important variations in cause, severity, 
and duration of the disease. In addition, critics challenge the idea of singling out 
diabetes when other disease states, such as cardiovascular disease, also adversely affect 
EPTS. Finally, given that diabetes disproportionally affects certain racial and ethnic 
minorities, fears exist that a focus on this disease status will exacerbate already existing 
racial barriers to kidney transplantation.   
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Impact on elderly 
 
The most frequently cited concern relates to the reform proposals’ effects on the 
elderly. With regard to this issue, we can distinguish three general lines of criticism.  
Some critics argue that systems which deprioritize the elderly are unjustifiable on 
equity grounds. They invoke several reasons in support of this claim. First, age is similar 
to race and gender in that it is a morally irrelevant criterion. Thus, in relying upon this 
criterion, the reform proposals commit an act of discrimination (Hippen et al. 2011). 
Second, older patients are, numerically speaking, most strongly represented on the 
waiting list, a fact which suggests that they have the greatest need for kidney 
transplantation (Hippen 2012). Third, the elderly are often denied access to the waiting 
list on arbitrary grounds. Consequently, in penalizing older patients who do make it 
onto the waiting list, the reform proposals “further discriminate against a group who 
are already missing out” (Pussell et al. 2012, 363).  
Another line of criticism holds that decreased priority for the elderly need not 
necessarily represent an efficient use of the kidney donor pool. In this respect, Hippen 
(2009) claims that, besides maximizing benefit from transplantation, efficiency also 
involves a concern for minimizing harm. From the latter perspective, he claims, the 
reform proposals are counterproductive. Prolonged waiting times generally prove more 
fatal for the elderly, due to their decreased physiological robustness. Allocation policies 
which decrease priority for the elderly would, therefore, increase death rates on the 
waiting list. Whether or not the reform proposals can be seen as promoting overall 
efficiency, according to Hippen, largely depends on the trade-offs we are willing to 
make. As he puts it: “how many life years gained from transplantation are required to 
cancel out the harm of death?” (Hippen 2009, 1509). 
A final criticism is of a methodological nature. It claims that age is too inaccurate a 
predictor of EPTS. Segev (2009), for example, points out that some 60 year-olds are 
healthier and, therefore, derive greater benefit from kidney transplantation than some 
40-year-olds. In short, this line of reasoning laments the EPTS’ disregard for the 
heterogeneity among the elderly. What matters, according to these critics, is functional 
status, not age per se.  
0.3.1.3  Research questions relating to ‘coping mechanisms’ in commodity 
scarcity 
UNOS/OPTN policy makers have failed to seriously address the aforementioned 
concerns over the moral irrelevance of age in kidney allocation. They have settled for 
‘easy point scoring’, i.e. they merely make a hasty, uncritical reference to arguments 
that are commonly put forward in support of age-based rationing in the context of 
financial scarcity (see, for example, OPTN 2011). This response is disconcerting. 
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Criticisms of the organ allocation system should not be treated lightly. The perception 
that the new kidney allocation policy is based upon an irrelevant criterion may, if 
widespread, damage public trust in organ exchange organizations. This, in turn, could 
have serious consequences, such as a decreased willingness to register as an organ 
donor. It is, therefore, important that the transplant community provide the public with 
a solid argument for the moral relevance of age. The fact that other countries, such as 
Australia, are already considering a policy change similar to the one recently approved 
by UNOS only adds urgency to this task (Pussell et al. 2012). The first section of part two 
of this dissertation will, therefore, be devoted to the search for a more satisfactory 
account of the moral relevance of age than the one so far put forward by UNOS officials. 
In taking on this challenge, we will examine the moral relevance of age at both ends of 
the spectrum, i.e. at both the beginning and the end of life. 
0.3.2  ‘Solutions’ 
Besides allocation schemes, it is also important that we devise ‘solutions’ to the problem 
of kidney scarcity. As the gap between demand for and supply of kidneys grows, waiting 
times increase. This, in turn, implies “that more medically suitable candidates will 
become sicker at the time of transplantation (resulting in worse outcomes) and more 
medically suitable candidates will become too sick to receive a transplant at all or will 
die on the waiting list” (Hippen 2012, 238-239). In short, the importance of developing 
solutions to kidney scarcity derives from both concerns of efficiency and beneficence. 
Solutions fall into one two categories: they seek to either reduce the demand for or 
increase the supply of renal grafts.   
0.3.2.1  Reducing demand 
A frequently proposed strategy to shorten the waiting list is to impose stricter 
guidelines for listing patients for kidney transplantation (Curtis 2006). More specifically, 
suggestions have been made to limit admission to the waiting list to those with 
‘adequate’ life expectancy. It is hoped that, besides reducing demand for kidney 
transplantation by excluding high-risk candidates, this proposal will “also increase the 
longevity of grafts by reducing the number of patient deaths with functioning grafts 
and in turn decrease new listings for repeat transplantation” (Schold et al. 2008, 62).  
Evidently, this strategy is premised on the assumption that a considerable number of 
high-risk patients are currently listed for kidney transplantation. Preliminary evidence 
confirms this presupposition. In the US, approximately 11,000 patients with poor 
prognosis are waitlisted (Schold et al. 2008). However, many more (80,000 people) are 
not admitted to the waiting list, despite a decent to good prognosis (Hippen  2012). In 
short, rather than decreasing in size, the waiting list is likely to considerably increase in 
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the event of the implementation of a stricter criterion (‘adequate’ life expectancy). This 
finding suggests that vigorous efforts to curtail the waiting list may already be taking 
place. Such efforts, if indeed they are occurring, are ethically dubious, to say the least. 
After all, “there is little comfort in an abbreviated waiting list if, in fact, many of those 
who may benefit from transplantation are simply not referred” (Pussell et al. 2012).  
 
Another strategy aimed at curtailing the waiting list consists in preventing the onset of 
ESRD. At this stage, we already possess the know-how to prevent or delay the onset of 
chronic kidney disease (CKD), the precursor of ESRD (primary prevention) (Schoolwerth 
et al. 2006). In addition, we are capable of slowing the progression of both diabetic and 
non-diabetic CKD (secondary prevention). In the case of non-diabetic patients, sustained 
remission or regression of CKD has even been documented (Perico & Remuzzi 2012). 
Unfortunately, despite the availability of simple preventative measures, CKD and its 
modifiable risk factors remain highly under-treated and under-diagnosed (Schoolwerth 
et al. 2006). The preventative approach will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  
0.3.2.2  Increasing supply  
The most commonly pursued strategy to reduce the gap between supply of and demand 
for renal allografts is to increase the supply of donor kidneys, both from living and 
deceased sources.  
In the context of deceased donation, proposals for increasing supply include the 
liberalization of donor eligibility criteria, the introduction of alternative consent 
regimes, and the creation of a system of financial incentives.  
 
Over the past decades, continuous efforts have been made to expand the donor pool 
with less than medically ideal deceased donor kidneys. For example, in 2002, UNOS 
implemented a series of policies aimed at maximizing the recovery and use of so-called 
expanded criteria donor (ECD) kidneys. The latter include “all kidneys from donors 60 
years of age or older as well as donors aged 50-59 years with any two of the following 
characteristics: history of hypertension, death caused by a cerebrovascular accident or 
terminal serum creatinine immediately prior to organ recovery > 1.5 mg/dl” (Wynn and 
Alexander 2011, 325). As a result of these policies, the number of transplants with ECD 
kidneys increased by 51% between 2002 and 2007 (Wynn & Alexander 2011). Besides ECD 
kidneys, the reliance upon other types of marginal donor kidneys, such as kidneys with 
long cold ischemia time and kidneys from diabetic donors, has also increased over the 
years (Abouna 2008). A more controversial category of marginal donors are HIV-
infected patients. Although the use of HIV-infected donors is currently contraindicated 
in western countries, its potential utility for HIV-infected recipients is under 
consideration (Cofan et al. 2011).   
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Some argue that the adoption of an alternative consent regime offers the prospect of a 
significant increase in the kidney supply. At present, countries either operate under an 
opt-in or an opt-out (presumed consent) regime. Under presumed consent legislation, a 
deceased individual is classified as a potential donor in the absence of a registered 
objection to donation. However, in practice, in most countries, doctors seek relatives’ 
approval for donation. By contrast, an opt-in system operates under the default 
assumption of non-donation, i.e. one must actively register as an organ donor if one’s 
organs are to be removed after death. In countries currently employing an opt-in 
system, proposals have occasionally been made for a shift to an opt-out regime. The 
latter’s potential to increase the organ supply is premised on the assumption that 
individuals tend to stick with the default option (Schold & Segev 2012). Another, more 
radical, proposal advocates the adoption of conscription. Under such a system, organs 
are automatically removed after death, regardless of whether or not the person has 
provided implicit or explicit consent (Spital 2005).     
 
The introduction of financial incentives is perhaps the most controversial proposal to 
increase the supply of deceased donor kidneys. The nature of these proposed incentives 
ranges from explicit cash reimbursements to more subtle forms of payment. The 
prototypical example of the former is the so-called ‘futures market’, i.e. a system in 
which individuals would receive a payment, while alive, in return for the rights to their 
organs after death (Howard 2007). More subtle forms of financial incentives include 
payments to surviving family members of the deceased donor to support funeral costs 
or designated charities (Schold & Segev 2012). Moral concerns relating to 
commodification of the body and coercion have so far impeded the implementation of a 
system of financial incentives.    
 
The persistent shortage of deceased donor kidneys has fueled efforts to increase the size 
of the living donor pool. One such initiative is known as ‘altruistic’ or ‘Good Samaritan 
donation’ (GSD). Whereas living donation is typically limited to genetically or 
emotionally related donor-recipient pairs, this proposal would extend donation to 
strangers. Although the practice of GSD is relatively uncommon, there is evidence of 
increased willingness to consider such cases in US transplant centers (Mandelbrot & 
Pavlakis 2012). By contrast, very few European countries allow this type of donation. 
The reluctance to accept GSD is linked to concerns regarding the donor’s motivation 
and the potential for coercion and exploitation of the donor (Pascalev et al. 2013).  
 
Another, less controversial initiative to expand the living donor pool, is ‘paired 
donation’. The latter provides a solution in “cases in which there are two willing living 
donors who each turn out to be incompatible with their desired recipient but 
compatible with the other donor’s desired recipient” (Veatch 2000, 186-187). Kidney 
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paired donation allows such incompatible pairs to exchange kidneys, thereby ensuring 
that each recipient is provided with a compatible kidney. Whereas this practice 
ultimately amounts to donation to strangers, it differs from GSD in that the donor’s 
motivation consists in serving the interests of a genetically or emotionally related 
recipient. Since its introduction in the United States in 2000, kidney paired donation has 
experienced a rapid growth (Wallis et al. 2011).    
 
As is the case with deceased donation, there is also an increasing tendency within living 
donation to relax the medical eligibility criteria for donors. For example, donors with 
hypertension, renal cysts, and kidney stones are no longer systematically excluded 
(Kumar et al. 2000). Some foresee a continuing liberalization of donor eligibility criteria 
in the future, to the extent that (mentally) incompetent patients may eventually 
increasingly be regarded as an additional and easy source of kidneys (Van Assche et al. 
2014). Clearly, such a development would raise ethical issues concerning informed 
consent.  
 
A final proposal to increase the supply of living donors is the institution of a financial 
market. Proponents of this usually envisage a government-regulated organ trade where 
vendors are paid a fixed price and kidneys are allocated by an algorithm similar to the 
current point system for deceased donation (Matas 2004). Concerns similar to those 
raised by financial incentives for deceased donation have so far impeded the 
implementation of a legitimate financial market in living donation. Iran is a well-known 
exception to this rule (Becker & Elías 2007).       
 0.3.2.3 Research questions relating to ‘solutions’ to commodity scarcity      
The aforementioned strategies to increase the kidney supply have mainly been 
developed with the current extent of the kidney shortage in mind. Unfortunately, 
however, the effects of population aging and the obesity epidemic on the prevalence of 
ESRD are yet to fully materialize. In other words, the kidney shortage has far from 
reached its peak. Projections suggest that, by 2020, the prevalence of ESRD patients in 
the United States will approach 785,000, an increase of more than 60% from 2005 levels 
(Finn 2008). By 2030, the expected peaking point of population aging, the US ESRD 
population could reach 2 million (Bayliss et al. 2011).  
As we have seen, population aging and its effects have fuelled a recognition among 
policy makers that the traditional kidney allocation systems (i.e. traditional ‘coping 
mechanisms’) are no longer viable. Surprisingly, however, when it comes to devising 
solutions to the kidney shortage, the implications of population aging have gone largely 
unnoticed. In short, little or no thought has been given to the question of whether the 
currently proposed solutions are well-suited to accommodate an ever aging kidney 
transplant waiting list and the accompanying, projected surge in demand. Given that we 
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are quickly approaching the peak of population aging, an examination of this question is 
long overdue. In the second section of part two of this dissertation, we address this 
lacuna in the research on the merit of currently proposed solutions. We will mainly do 
so by analyzing the implications of transposing these solutions to the 2030 setting.  
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0.4 Overview of research questions 
Throughout the previous sections, we have already formulated the specific research 
questions for this dissertation. However, as these have been presented in a dispersed 
fashion, it is useful to bring them together in a clear overview.  
 
Financial scarcity in health care 
 
1. Are proposals to curb spending on health care in the elderly an effective means of 
addressing the health care cost crisis?  
 
1.1. Is age-based rationing of life-extending care an effective means of addressing 
the health care cost crisis?  
 
1.2. Is the biogerontological approach to healthy aging an effective means of 
addressing the health care cost crisis?  
 
Commodity scarcity in health care 
 
‘Coping mechanisms 
2. Are there acceptable moral grounds to use recipient age in the allocation of kidneys?  
 
2.1. Are there acceptable moral grounds to deprioritize the elderly in the allocation 
of kidneys?  
 
2.2. Are there acceptable moral grounds to prioritize pediatric patients in the 
allocation of kidneys?  
‘Solutions’ 
3. Are the currently proposed solutions to the kidney shortage well-suited to 
accommodate the projected surge in demand related to population aging?  
In addition to the abovementioned questions, the background of which was provided in 
the previous sections, we will also take a look at commodity scarcity in health care in 
the Belgian context. Specifically, we will address the following question: 
4. What are some of the recently proposed solutions to commodity scarcity in health 
care in Belgium and are these ethically sound? 
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0.5 Structure of the dissertation 
Part 1: Financial scarcity in health care 
As we have seen, health care costs are rising at an unsustainable rate. The cause of this 
trend is often attributed to population aging. As a result, proposed solutions to the 
health care cost crisis frequently target the elderly. Part one of this dissertation 
examines two solutions of this type: age-based rationing of life-extending care and the 
biogerontological approach to healthy aging.  
 
Chapter 1 is devoted to age-based rationing. The aim of this chapter is twofold. To begin 
with, we wish to provide the reader with an extensive overview of the most common 
philosophical arguments put forward in support of denying the elderly life-extending 
care. There are two specific reasons why such an overview is important. First, given that 
many of these arguments are frequently misrepresented in the literature on age-based 
rationing, it is crucial to portray their content in an unbiased manner. Second, some of 
the philosophical arguments in defense of age-based rationing will reoccur in part 2 of 
this dissertation on commodity scarcity.  
The second, most important, aim of this chapter consists in analyzing the extent to 
which age-based rationing represents an effective tool for combating the ever 
increasing rise in health care costs. We argue that age-based rationing ultimately fails as 
a solution to the health care cost crisis. More specifically, we show that, in failing to 
address the root cause of the problem at hand, it provides, at best, temporary relief from 
rising health care expenditures.  
 
Chapter 2 addresses the biogerontological approach to healthy aging, i.e. the idea that we 
can significantly extend healthy life expectancy by intervening in the aging process. 
The structure of this chapter largely mimics that of the first chapter. The chapter starts 
out with an overview of recent developments in the field of biogerontology. This will 
help to shed light on what the biogerontological approach involves and what it hopes to 
achieve. In a subsequent section, we scrutinize the various assumptions underlying the 
claim that interventions in the aging process offer the prospect of substantially 
reducing the growth in health care costs. We show that each of these presuppositions is 
dubious and we, thus, conclude that the biogerontological approach fares at least no 
better than age-based rationing as a cost containment tool.  
 
Although the failure of the biogerontological project as a cost containment device has so 
far not been picked up on in the literature, the idea of intervening in the aging process 
has nevertheless been criticized on other moral grounds. The biogerontological 
approach faces strongest opposition from deontologists. The latter consider the act of 
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intervening in the aging process impermissible on the grounds that it would (most 
probably) bring about an extended maximum lifespan – a state of affairs which they 
deem intrinsically bad. In a bid to convince their deontological opponents of the 
permissibility of this act, proponents of biogerontology invoke an argument which is 
grounded in the well-known doctrine of double effect. Surprisingly, their argument, 
which we refer to as ‘the double effect argument’, has gone unnoticed. Chapter 3 exposes 
and critically evaluates the use of ‘the double effect argument’. To this end, we first give 
a brief account of the doctrine of double effect. Next, we review a series of excerpts 
from the ethical debate on biogerontology in order to substantiate the presence of 
double effect reasoning. We, then, attempt to determine the role which ‘the double 
effect argument’ is meant to fulfill within this debate. Finally, we assess whether the act 
of intervening in aging actually can be justified using double effect reasoning.  
 
Part 2: Commodity scarcity in health care 
As mentioned before, part two of this dissertation is made up of two separate sections. 
These address, respectively, ‘coping mechanisms’ and ‘solutions’ in the context of 
commodity scarcity. One of the main aims of part two consists in analyzing the 
implications of population aging for current ‘coping mechanisms’ and ‘solutions’ in 
relation to kidney scarcity.   
 
Part 2, Section 1: coping mechanisms  
As we have seen, the demographic phenomenon of population aging is perceived as 
jeopardizing the availability of kidneys for the non-elderly under the current allocation 
system. This observation has incentivized UNOS to formulate a new kidney allocation 
policy, the implementation of which will take place at the end of this year. Although the 
new policy has the important effect of deprioritizing the elderly and the middle aged, 
UNOS officials have so far failed to provide a satisfactory account of the moral relevance 
of age in kidney allocation.  
In Chapter 4, we develop one argument which could serve to ground the moral 
acceptability of deprioritizing the elderly. We do so within a broader framework aimed 
at minimizing harm. For this, we draw on Feinberg’s conception of harm as a setback to 
one’s interests. Our argument supports the prioritization of those between their mid 20s 
and mid 50s. Thus, whereas the low priority accorded to the elderly and middle aged 
(55+) under our framework is in alignment with UNOS policy, our proposed system 
departs from the latter in that it also grants children lower priority.   
 
Chapter 5 takes up where the previous chapter left off, i.e. it further builds upon our 
argument that, from a harm minimizing perspective, children ought to be deprioritized 
in kidney allocation. This view stands in stark contrast with transplant practice. Many, 
if not all, organ exchange organizations (including UNOS) prioritize pediatric patients 
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over all other age groups. Numerous arguments have been put forward in support of the 
practice of pediatric prioritization. If valid, these arguments would substantially weaken 
our position on the appropriate level of priority for pediatric patients. It is, therefore, 
crucial that we examine their soundness. We identify five commonly cited arguments in 
support of pediatric prioritization and show that none of these succeeds in justifying 
this widespread practice.          
 
Part 2, Section 2: solutions  
As we have seen, proposed solutions to the kidney shortage fall into one of two 
categories: they seek to either reduce the demand for or increase the supply of renal 
grafts. Section 2 will be devoted to supply-oriented strategies.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on a specific subset of strategies aimed at increasing the kidney supply, 
i.e. those which have so far not yet been implemented generally (e.g. conscription, 
financial incentives/markets, etc.). Moral debates on these supply-oriented strategies 
generally tend to revolve around issues such as autonomy, coercion, and 
commodification of the body. While these issues are undoubtedly important, they are 
only of practical relevance if these strategies prove to be a sustainable solution to the 
kidney shortage. In other words, we must first assure ourselves that these proposals are 
viable in the long-run. Chapter 6 examines this issue of long-term sustainability which 
has so far not yet been addressed in the literature. We argue that the aforementioned 
strategies aimed at enlarging the donor pool are shortsighted in that they are not well-
suited to addressing the impact of population aging on future levels of demand, for 3 
reasons. First, it would not be financially viable to fully utilize any significantly 
expanded kidney pool. We show that, as a result of this financial limitation, the supply-
oriented strategies at hand are likely to necessitate rationing of both transplantation 
and dialysis. Second, leaving aside budgetary constraints, there are formidable obstacles 
to implementing these strategies in a timely fashion, i.e. before population aging 
reaches its peak. Third, these supply-focused proposals fail to acknowledge the global 
reach of the ESRD ‘crisis’.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 shift the focus away from population aging and kidney scarcity. An 
ethical analysis of currently proposed supply-oriented strategies would not be complete 
without a reference to the Belgian context. This is all the more important given that, 
very recently, there have been two changes to the Belgian law relating to supply-
oriented strategies in the context of commodity scarcity. The first change relates to the 
relaxation of eligibility criteria for living liver donors. The second, by contrast, involves a 
shift from an opt-in to an opt-out regime in the setting of post mortem donation of body 
material for research purposes. Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to an ethical analysis of these 
highly topical developments.  
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Chapter 7 addresses the tendency towards an increased reliance upon living donation as 
a means of increasing organ supply. As we have seen, donor eligibility criteria for living 
donation are becoming ever more lenient. A recent amendment of the Belgian 
transplantation law represents a radical move in the liberalization of these criteria. It 
allows minors as young as 12 to donate a liver lobe to a sibling under certain 
circumstances.  
In the academic literature and professional guidelines, little attention is paid to the 
development of an ethical framework for the practice of living liver donation by minors. 
The focus is frequently limited to donation of regenerative tissues and kidneys. 
However, liver donation differs in important respects due to the increased medical risks 
and the lack of substitute therapies. Therefore, in this chapter, we assess whether living 
liver donation by minors is ethically appropriate. We argue that living liver donation by 
minors is only justifiable if minors are competent to consent to donation or if the 
procedure is in their best interests. Whereas minors may possess adult-like levels of 
cognitive maturity, they lack sufficient psychosocial maturity to give valid consent to 
donation. In addition, living liver donation is generally not in a minor’s best interests. 
As regards the latter, the potential psychological benefits a minor may experience as a 
consequence of living liver donation are insufficiently empirically supported and are 
unlikely to outweigh the short-and long-term medical and psychological risks. 
Therefore, we conclude that minors should not be considered as potential living liver 
donors.   
 
Chapter 8 swaps the heretofore dominant focus on organ shortage for an analysis of the 
broader category of scarcity of human biological material. Moreover, it shifts away from 
donation for therapeutic purposes to donation for research purposes. Research on human 
biological material holds great promise for developing better means of preventing, 
diagnosing, and treating diseases. Biological material removed post mortem is a 
particularly valuable resource for research as some tissues only become available after 
death. In order to obtain such tissues more easily, Belgium has recently extended its 
presumed consent regime for post mortem removal of organs for transplantation to post 
mortem removal of body material for research purposes. However, given that the Belgian 
public has not been informed of this extension, the new law, in practice, amounts to 
conscription or ‘routine removal’ of body material after death for research purposes.  
In chapter 8, we attempt to determine which consent regime should govern the post 
mortem procurement of body material for research. Given that, in practice, the Belgian 
system boils down to conscription, we first analyze whether a regime of routine 
removal is ethically acceptable. In view of this aim, we assess the various arguments 
which could be put forward in support of  a duty to make body material available for 
research purposes after death. Our analysis suggests that a duty to make one’s body 
material available for research after death can be substantiated on at least two grounds 
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(a duty to refrain from free-riding and a duty to contribute to the maintenance of public 
goods) and possibly also on a third ground (a duty of easy rescue, depending on how 
such a duty is interpreted), but that this duty is always conditional. We conclude that 
this duty could support conscription but only as a last resort and only if a way were 
found to guarantee that two conditions that attach to the duty would be met. Since 
neither of these two criteria is currently fulfilled, conscription must be rejected. We 
conclude, however, that the duty to make body material available for research purposes 
after death is sufficiently strong to defend a policy of presumed rather than explicit 
consent. 
 
In a final section of this dissertation, we will summarize the most important findings 
with respect to our research questions and objectives. In doing so, it will become clear 
how our research contributes to the general debate on scarcity in health care. In 
addition, this summary will reveal that financial and commodity scarcity are much 
more intertwined than one would, at first sight, assume. We will end our dissertation 
with some recommendations for future research.  
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1.1 Introduction  
As noted in the general introduction, proposals for age-based rationing first occurred in 
the 1980s, as an expression of growing fears that population aging would lead to an 
unsustainable rise in health care expenditures. In this chapter, we analyze these 
proposals, in both their original formulations and their present-day form.  
The chapter consists of three sections. In a first section, we present an overview of the 
most important age-based rationing proposals. For each proposal, we put forward the 
main existing criticisms of it. In a second section, we provide an overview of general 
criticisms of age-based rationing, i.e. criticisms which target the concept of age-based 
rationing, independently of any specific proposal. In the final and most important 
section, we shift the focus away from a descriptive to a normative analysis. More 
specifically, we examine whether age-based rationing represents an effective means of 
addressing the health care cost crisis.     
1.2 Overview of age-based rationing proposals and their 
criticisms  
As it is impossible to provide an exhaustive overview of age-based rationing proposals, 
we limit ourselves below to five of the most prominent arguments: the prudential 
lifespan account, the biographical lifespan account, the original fair innings argument, 
the extended fair innings argument and the capabilities approach to age-based 
rationing. 
1.2.1 Daniels’ prudential lifespan account  
Norman Daniels has played a pioneering role in the age-based rationing debate. He 
developed his views on the subject in his book Am I My Parents’ Keeper? (1988). These 
views largely build upon Daniels’ general account of justice in relation to health care, 
which he set out in his book Just Health Care (1985). In the following sections, we first 
examine some central tenets of this general theory. Next, we take a closer look at how 
Daniels applies his theory of just health care to the issue of age-based rationing.    
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Just Health Care  
 
In Just Health Care, Daniels seeks to provide a justification for the claim that there is a 
right to health care. He argues that only an acceptable, general theory of distributive 
justice can serve to ground this right. For this endeavor, Daniels relies upon John Rawls’ 
theory of justice as fairness (Rawls 1973).6 In order to apply this general theory of justice 
to health care, Daniels argues, we must first address the following question: “Is health 
care special?”. He uses this question as shorthand for a number of other questions, such 
as: “What explains the special importance we attribute to health care?” and “Why 
should health care be treated differently from other kinds of preferences?”.  
With a view to addressing the abovementioned questions, Daniels invokes David 
Braybrooke’s (1968) distinction between two broad categories of need: course of life needs 
and adventitious needs. The former refers to needs that are independent from time and 
space, i.e. those things which are essential for the fundamental human projects. In 
short, the course of life needs are important, irrespective of the particular choices and 
preferences of individuals (Daniels 1985). A deficiency with respect to such needs 
endangers ‘species-typical normal functioning’. Food is a prime example of a course of life 
need in that adequate nutrition is a prerequisite for living in the way characteristic of a 
typical member of our species. Other examples include clothing, shelter, and 
companionship. Whereas course of life needs are universal, adventitious needs originate 
from the wants and desires a particular person has at a certain point in time. They are 
less urgent, non-basic needs. For example, my desire to attend college induces the 
adventitious need for textbooks (Matthews & Russell 2005).    
Health care needs, according to Daniels, fit the characteristics of course of life needs. 
Daniels’ adherence to the so-called ‘biomedical model of health and disease’ accounts 
for this particular classification of health care needs. Under this model, health is defined 
in terms of the absence of diseases, whereas diseases represent “deviations from the 
 
                                                     
6 Daniels’ account constitutes an extension of Rawls’ theory in that the latter has no particular relevance to 
health. Rawls distinguishes ‘primary social goods’ from ‘primary natural goods’. The former category includes 
rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. “These 
goods are primary goods because they are things that persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, 
and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. They are social primary goods in 
view of their connection with the basic structure: liberties and opportunities are defined by the rules of major 
institutions and the distribution of income and wealth is also regulated by them” (Denier 2007, 105-106). 
Health (alongside vigor, intelligence, and imagination) is considered by Rawls as a ‘primary natural good’. The 
distribution of this type of good is not so directly influenced by the basic structure. ‘The primary natural 
goods’ fall outside the scope of Rawls’ concern. As we explain later on, Daniels extends the scope of Rawls’ 
theory to include health care by subsuming health care organizations under the basic arrangements in society 
that help to promote fair equality of opportunity (
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natural functional organization of a typical member of a species” (Daniels 1985, 28). 
Thus, health care needs refer to things we require in order to maintain or restore 
normal species functioning. What is it about normal species functioning that prompts us 
to attach such great moral importance to course of life needs and health care needs in 
particular? According to Daniels, it is the relationship between species typical 
functioning and opportunity. In order to clarify this relationship, he introduces the 
concept of a ‘normal opportunity range’. The latter denotes “the array of life plans 
reasonable persons in it [a given society] are likely to construct for themselves” (Daniels 
1985, 33). The share of the normal opportunity range open to a specific individual is 
determined by her skills and talents. However, normal species functioning also 
influences the share of the normal range open to an individual. As Daniels puts it: 
“Impairment of normal functioning through disease and disability restricts an 
individual’s opportunity relative to that portion of the normal range his skills and talents 
would have made available to him were he healthy” (Daniels 1985, 33-34).  
 
Everyone has a fundamental interest in preserving their share of the normal 
opportunity range. This, coupled with the impact of disease upon this share, explains 
why people treat health care needs as special and important. However, the mere fact 
that we attach importance to such needs does not necessarily imply that there is a social 
obligation to protect people’s share of the normal opportunity range. Nevertheless, we 
can easily establish a right to health care once we consider that disease and disability 
create inequalities in opportunity, i.e. they reduce the number of opportunities available 
to an individual, relative to a healthy individual with the same set of skills and talent. 
Such inequalities in opportunity, according to Daniels, imply that Rawls’ principle of fair 
equality of opportunity can be extended so as to also govern the design and function of 
health care institutions and practices.7  
 
 
Am I My Parents’ Keeper?  
 
In Am I My Parents’ Keeper?, Daniels (1988) addresses the problem of a fair or just 
distribution of resources between age groups. The prudential lifespan account is his 
answer to the problem. This solution involves a fundamental shift in perspective. The 
intergenerational equity debate, Daniels observes, tends to be construed in terms of 
various age groups competing for scarce resources in health care. For example, the 
 
                                                     
7 Upholding fair equality of opportunity does not require equalizing individual shares of the normal 
opportunity range. It merely dictates that such shares be equal for persons with the same skills and talents. In 
short, a fair share does not necessarily amount to an equal share.  
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interests of working adults who pay high premiums are pitted against those of the frail 
elderly who consume a vast portion of health care resources. Rather than viewing the 
various age groups (infants, adolescents, the middle-aged, and the elderly) as distinct 
groups of people, Daniels urges us to see them as different stages of one person’s life. 
This shift from an interpersonal to an intrapersonal point of view implies that our task 
no longer consists in devising principles of justice which govern the distribution of 
resources between competing individuals. Rather, we must find a principle suitable for 
budgeting resources over our own lifespan. With respect to this intrapersonal resource 
allocation issue, Daniels claims, prudence is a safe guide to justice. Thus, the task 
becomes one of determining how prudent deliberators would distribute health care 
resources over the various stages of their lives.  
 
The choice situation wherein prudent deliberators find themselves has three important 
characteristics. The first refers to knowledge which these deliberators are assumed to 
already possess. The remaining characteristics, by contrast, pertain to information 
constraints.  
Prudent deliberators work under the assumption that they have a fair share of health 
care resources at their disposal to allocate over their lives. In other words, they know 
that the fair equality of opportunity principle governs the design of the health care 
system. Their concern is to refine this principle in such a way that it becomes amenable 
to governing allocations over a life.  
Prudent deliberators assume that they will live through each stage of life under the 
system they are designing, i.e. they are blinded with regard to their age. The following 
example illustrates the necessity of this information constraint. Suppose that prudent 
deliberators know that they are old. In other words, they are aware that they will live 
under the institutions they are to reason about prudentially only through the late stages 
of their lives. Under such circumstances, deliberators would have a vested interest in 
allocating substantial resources to the old. In a similar vein, young deliberators, aware 
of their age, would distribute a significant portion of the resources to the young. The 
absence of an information constraint on age would entice prudent deliberators to pit 
the interests of their own age group against those of other age groups. Thus, the 
problem of age group justice would, once again, take on an interpersonal dimension. 
However, the appeal to prudence is only justifiable on an intrapersonal level. It is 
precisely in order to maintain this intrapersonal perspective that we must deny 
individuals information about their age.  
Prudence, according to Daniels, dictates a concern for well-being over one’s whole lifespan. 
For this reason, we must blind the rational deliberators from knowing their current 
conception of what is good in life. Such knowledge would skew their decisions towards 
their current plan of life. This type of bias is inconsistent with respect for lifetime well-
being in that one’s life plans are likely to change over time.  
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Before examining how prudent deliberators allocate their fair share of health care 
resources over their lifespan, Daniels refines the notion of a ‘normal opportunity range’. 
In this respect, he introduces the concept of the ‘age-relative normal opportunity 
range’. This variant on the original concept is designed to reflect the fact that lives have 
phases in which different general goals and tasks are central. For example, whereas 
nurturing and training are central during childhood and youth, adult years are devoted 
to the pursuit of a career and family. In short, the ‘age-relative normal opportunity 
range’ represents a much richer variant on the original notion in that it is sensitive to 
the differences in opportunities open to a person at each stage of life.  
According to Daniels, prudent deliberators would, under the abovementioned 
constraints, favor a distribution of health care resources that allows them to enjoy, at 
each stage of life, their fair share of the normal opportunity range open to them. Thus, 
this distribution rule provides the answer to the question of what is just or fair between 
age groups. Daniels explains the rationale behind this adaptation of the fair equality of 
opportunity account to the age group problem as follows:  
 
From their perspective, prudent deliberators do not know what their individual 
situation is or what preferences or projects they might have at a given stage of 
their lives. Still, they do know that they will have a particular plan of life, indeed, 
possibly different ones at different stages of their lives, and that this plan of life 
defines what is meaningful for them. This means that it is especially important for 
them to make sure social arrangements give them a chance to enjoy their fair 
share of the normal range of opportunities open to them at each stage of life. This 
protection of the age-relative normal opportunity range is doubly important 
because they know they might want to revise their life plans. Consequently, they 
have a fundamental interest in guaranteeing themselves the opportunity to 
pursue such revisions. But impairments of normal functioning clearly restrict the 
portion of the normal opportunity range open to individuals at any stage of their 
lives. Consequently, health-care services should be rationed throughout a life in a 
way that respects the importance of the age-relative normal opportunity range. 
(Daniels 1988, 76) 
 
In order to further develop his account of age group justice, Daniels (1988) subsequently 
confronts prudent deliberators with a somewhat altered choice situation. This time, 
prudent deliberators face substantial resource limitations in addition to information 
constraints. The scarcity of resources is such that the provision of very expensive life-
extending medical services in later stages of our lives comes at the cost of reduced 
access to such services in earlier stages of life. Under these circumstances, prudent 
deliberators have two distinct options, referred to by Daniels as ‘scheme A’ and ‘scheme 
L’. ‘Scheme A’ amounts to age-based rationing in that everyone over the age of 70 or 75 – 
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identified by Daniels as the normal lifespan – is denied high-cost life-extending 
treatment. The resources that are hereby freed up secure greater access to life-
extending treatment for the young. Thus, ‘scheme A’ increases the chances of the young 
of reaching a normal lifespan. ‘Scheme L’, by contrast, rejects age-based rationing in 
favor of an allocation based on medical need. The greater medical need of the elderly, 
then, calls for transferring to the elderly a part of the resources previously devoted to 
the young. As a consequence, ‘scheme L’ increases the chances of the elderly of living a 
longer-than-normal lifespan at the cost of reducing the probability of the young 
reaching a normal lifespan. With a view to quantifying the choice situation, Daniels 
ascribes (purely theoretical) numerical probabilities to the effects of both schemes. He 
invites us to imagine ‘scheme A’ as having a 1.0 probability of reaching the age of 75 
(and of dying immediately upon reaching this age). ‘Scheme L’ should, for the sake of 
argument, be conceived of as offering a 0.5 probability of reaching 50 and a 0.5 
probability of reaching 100.   
 
Daniels claims that prudent deliberators would invoke the ‘Standard Rule’ as a tool for 
assessing both schemes. This rule dictates that one maximizes one’s expected net 
benefit or payoff when faced with choices. In the case at hand, where the payoff is 
defined in terms of the number of years lived, prudent deliberators ought, then, to 
maximize the expected lifespan. At first sight, the ‘Standard Rule’ seems to instruct 
prudent deliberators to be indifferent between the schemes as both produce an 
expected lifespan of 75 years. However, an attitude of indifference, Daniels argues, is 
only warranted in the absence of any knowledge concerning the distribution of diseases 
and disabilities over a lifetime. Prudent deliberators are not entirely devoid of such 
knowledge in that they are aware of the more frequent occurrence of diseases and 
disability in old age (say after age 75).  According to Daniels, “this knowledge suggests 
that it would be imprudent to count the expected payoff of years late in life quite as 
highly as the expected payoff of years more likely to be free of physical and mental 
impairment” (1988, 89-90). Discounting of the years beyond age 75 tips the balance 
towards ‘scheme A’.       
There is yet another line of reasoning which, under the ‘Standard Rule’, would also yield 
a preference for ‘scheme A’. On this alternative account, prudent deliberators define the 
payoff in terms of the success of their probable plan of life. On a general level, we can 
distinguish between two types of life plans. On the one hand, there are life plans the 
success of which hinges on the fruitful completion of the typical tasks of early and 
middle years. On the other hand, we can conceive of plans of life under which the later 
stages of life are deemed to contribute most to the overall meaningfulness of life. 
Despite being unaware of their own conception of the good, prudent deliberators 
nevertheless know that the former life plan is much more common than the latter. In 
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increasing their chance of living through the middle stages of their lives, ‘scheme A’ 
most ensures the success of their probable plan of life.  
 
Daniels stresses that his prudential lifespan account should not be viewed as a blanket 
endorsement of age-based rationing. The latter only constitutes a prudent choice and, 
thus, a fair distribution of resources between age groups under specific circumstances. 
To begin with, age-based rationing is unwarranted when carried out in a piecemeal 
fashion. Thus, for example, Daniels rules out an age rationing scheme adopted by some 
hospitals or physicians only. Age-based rationing ought to consistently deny the elderly 
life-extending treatment. Only then will the unequal treatment of age groups (through 
age-based rationing) nonetheless amount to an equal treatment of persons. The fact 
that we all age implies that every one of us experiences the burdens and benefits 
attached to a systematically applied age rationing scheme. It is precisely in this sense, 
according to Daniels, that age-based rationing distinguishes itself from differential 
treatment on the basis of, for example, sex and race.  In addition to the consistency 
requirement, Daniels also formulates a constraint relating to scarcity. The appeal to age-
based rationing as a cost constraining device, he argues, is only justifiable under 
conditions of real scarcity. For example, if scarcity is merely attributable to wastage, 
such as runaway administrative costs, it does not qualify as real. Finally, the prudential 
lifespan account is part of an ideal theory, i.e. it assumes the presence of just 
institutions as well as compliance with the principles governing these. For example, 
prudent deliberators, as noted above, work under the assumption that health care 
institutions provide everyone with a fair share of basic goods. Absent these ideal 
conditions, age-based rationing is unwarranted.   
 
Criticism 
  
Criticisms of Daniels’ account fall into one of two categories: they relate to either his 
general theory of justice in health care or his prudential lifespan account. Below, we 
examine the criticisms of Nancy Jecker and Margaret Battin as instances of, 
respectively, the former and the latter. Note that the distinction between both types of 
criticism is artificial in that any criticism of Daniels’ general theory has ramifications for 
his prudential lifespan account.   
 
 
Jecker’s criticism of normal functioning 
 
Jecker’s criticism targets the claim that health care institutions have the societal 
obligation to protect the normal opportunity range and, thus, to address deviations 
from normal species functioning (1989). She argues that this claim is inconsistent with 
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our considered moral judgments.8 Her criticism has two distinct components. First, she 
shows that we do not generally believe that a disease ought to necessarily constitute a 
deviation from normal species functioning in order for it to qualify for public coverage. 
Second, she contends that we do not generally perceive deviations from normal species 
functioning as a sufficient condition for eligibility for public coverage. Below, we discuss 
both claims, in this respective order.  
 
Jecker observes that old age is associated with various negative effects which qualify as 
species typical for the elderly, rather than as impairments of age-relative normal 
functioning. For the elderly in general, she cites the examples of mild hearing loss and 
mild vision impairments. In the specific case of elderly women, Jecker enumerates the 
following examples: “menopausal sympathetic nervous system disorders characterized 
by flushes and sweating episodes; loss of bone mass (which begins in the mid-thirties) 
leading to osteoporosis and to accompanying painful debilities, such as collapsing 
vertebrae and increased risk of spontaneous fractures; and relaxation of the pelvic 
supporting tissues frequently resulting in urinary stress incontinence” (Jecker 1989, 
672). On Daniels’ account, there is no societal obligation to make available to the elderly 
interventions aimed at alleviating these negative effects as the latter do not represent 
deviations of age-relative normal functioning. In other words, given that the 
opportunities afforded by, for example, good sight are not normally available to the 
elderly, mild vision impairments cannot be said to diminish the age-relative normal 
opportunities of the elderly. Daniels’ reluctance to publicly fund remedies for the 
abovementioned impairments, according to Jecker, does not fit with our considered 
judgments. She concludes, contrary to Daniels, that medical interventions need not 
necessarily have the effect of restoring normal species functioning in order to be 
considered a requirement of justice.  
 
In the following stage of her argument, Jecker considers the example of high-cost, high-
risk interventions which, if successful, restore normal species functioning. Daniels, 
according to Jecker, is committed to the public provision of such treatments. By 
contrast, Jecker claims, our considered judgments instruct us to take into account costs 
and risks, in addition to the potential for restoration of normal species functioning. 
 
                                                     
8 The concept of considered moral judgments is at the heart of the method of reflective equilibrium. The latter 
is a coherentist method for the justification of moral beliefs. This method “consists in working back and forth 
among our considered judgments (some say our “intuitions”) about particular instances or cases, the 
principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on 
accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary 
in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them” (Daniels 2011).  
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Consequently, the mere fact that a medical intervention has such potential does not 
constitute a sufficient grounds for including it in the basic health care package.  
 
Battin’s senicide proposal 
 
Margaret Battin (1987) has provided a highly provocative criticism of Daniels’ account. 
Whereas she endorses the moral justifiability of age-based rationing, Battin disagrees 
with the specific policy which Daniels proposes in this regard. Recall that Daniels 
sanctions a redistribution of life-extending resources from the old to the young. Battin 
does not consider this to be far-reaching enough. She points out that, despite the elderly 
consuming a third of all health care, only a relatively small portion of these 
expenditures is devoted to life-extending measures. In other words, there would be no 
substantial redistributive achievement under Daniels’ proposal. This, in turn, implies 
that the prospect of the young reaching a normal lifespan is only minimally increased. 
If, as Daniels himself suggests, rational self-interest maximizers seek to optimize the 
chances of reaching a normal lifespan, they will, according to Battin, redirect to the 
young virtually all medical resources currently reserved for the elderly.  
 
Presumably, if care is to be denied, it will be the highest-cost […] varieties of care, 
including care which does not directly serve to maintain life. […] Expensive 
diagnostic procedures and therapies like CAT scans or nuclear magnetic 
resonance imaging, renal dialysis, organ transplants, hip replacements, 
hydrotherapy, respiratory support, total parenteral nutrition, individualized 
physical therapy, vascular grafting, major surgery, and high tech procedures 
generally would be ruled out. Hospitalization, and the nearly equally expensive 
inpatient hospice care, might not be permitted, except perhaps briefly; sustained 
nursing home care […] would no doubt also be excluded. […] At most, perhaps, 
minimal home hospice care and inexpensive pain relief could be routinely 
granted, together with some superficial care in transient acute illness not related 
to chronic conditions or interdependent diseases. (Battin 1987, 325-326) 
 
Faced with a highly restricted right to the use of health care resources in old age, parties 
to the original position will, according to Battin, adopt a policy of senicide. In other 
words, they will consent to policies which impose the direct termination of life at the 
onset of profound illness or irremediable chronic disease in old age. There are two 
reasons why rational self-interest maximizers prefer being killed off over carrying on 
living in the face of minimal medical care. To begin with, whereas denial of treatment 
beyond minimal hospice care and inexpensive pain relief will occasionally result in 
immediate death, it will most often condemn the patient to a prolonged period of 
morbidity, only later followed by death. Endurance of suffering only represents a 
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prudent choice whenever there is hope of returning to normal health. Obviously, an 
extensive form of denial of treatment precludes this prospect. Therefore, rational self-
interest maximizers will opt for senicide as a means of avoiding the discomfort, 
disability, and pain associated with disenfranchisement from medical care. Besides the 
avoidance of suffering, direct termination policies offer an additional advantage. In 
isolation, a policy of extensive treatment denial still involves some medical 
expenditures for the elderly, i.e. costs associated with minimal hospice and palliative 
care. When coupled with direct termination practices, a treatment denial policy 
succeeds in averting even these minimal costs. In short, senicide policies allow for a still 
greater transfer of resources to the young, thereby further increasing their chances of 
reaching old age.   
 
Battin acknowledges that the implementation of direct termination age-rationing 
policies in ‘real life’ is likely to invite abuse. Therefore, she argues, such policies would 
need to be supplemented with the following three protective measures.  
First, whereas the treatment denial-component of her proposal would be binding, the 
senicide-component would not be. In other words, beyond a predetermined age cut-off, 
one would consistently be denied access to virtually all forms of medical care. However, 
an elderly person who has just learned that her health is on a downhill course would, 
knowing that she will not receive the needed care, have two options. She could choose 
to ‘tough it out’ and wait for death to occur naturally. Alternatively, she could opt for 
the instantaneous, painless termination of her life. Despite the voluntary nature of the 
senicide-component, Battin is nevertheless convinced that her proposal would yield a 
near to maximal transfer of resources from the elderly to the young. After all, she 
foresees a shift towards a societal recognition of a moral ‘duty to die’ – a duty that will 
incentivize the majority to opt for senicide.  
Second, Battin highlights the need for public awareness of the direct termination age-
rationing policy. In addition, the public must understand that, whereas one loses out in 
old age under this policy, one nevertheless benefits from it over one’s lifetime. With the 
exception of the first generation, all subsequent generations will experience an 
increased chance of reaching old age as a result of the previous generation opting for 
senicide. It is precisely this insight which will fuel the recognition of a moral duty to die. 
The latter in turn, will guarantee the success of the policy. 
Third, the age cut-off for medical care does not imply that upon reaching this age one is 
expected to opt for senicide. For example, suppose that the age cut-off is set at 70. A 
healthy, vigorous 80-year-old would, then, not be expected to end her life. This 
expectation only falls on the shoulders of those who experience the first signs of 
profound illness or irremediable chronic disease.  
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1.2.2 Callahan’s biographical lifespan account 
Daniel Callahan’s Setting Limits (1987) has highly impacted the debate on age-based 
rationing. The starting point of this book is an analysis of our current views on the goals 
of medicine (especially health care for the elderly). Developments in high-technology 
medicine, Callahan claims, have largely formed our views on this matter. He identifies 
the elderly as the group which has benefited most from the technological progress of 
recent decades. In this respect, Callahan cites the examples of dialysis and critical care 
units. In removing or bypassing many of the traditional frailties of old age, such 
advances have brought about significant increases in life expectancy. As a result, we 
have come to view the aim of medicine in relation to old age as one of producing ever 
greater increases in life expectancy. In other words, the goals of medicine are currently 
defined in terms of a ‘modernization of aging’. This view resists labeling age-related 
declines in physical and mental vigor as inevitable, i.e. as inherent in the aging process. 
Rather, it considers such deficiencies to be equally amenable to medical intervention as 
conditions afflicting younger age groups. In short, the goal of modernizing old age 
consists in aggressively resisting the process of aging.  
In addition to the emergence of high-technology medicine, the value system of western 
society has also encouraged the development of the modernized view of aging. 
According to Callahan, one of the cornerstones of this value system is individualism, the 
conviction that, insofar as they do not harm others, individuals have a right to pursue 
their own, private conception of happiness. Thus, individualism denotes the 
preoccupation of individuals with their own good, as opposed to the good for society as 
a whole. This value system dictates that medical care be concerned with the satisfaction 
of individuals’ wants and desires. Whereas the implications hereof are merely left 
implicit by Callahan, Matthews and Russell (2005) succeed in eloquently capturing these:  
 
Thus, since most individuals want to live as long as possible, a principal aim of 
medicine (on this view) ought to be to enable them to go on living, whatever age 
they have attained so far: as a principal aim, it ought to be pursued at however 
great a cost. Again, since most individuals want to continue to enjoy youthful 
levels of activity, a principal aim of medicine ought to be to enable them to do so 
(once more, whatever the cost). Medicine should aim to make it possible to be as 
active at 75 as one was at 35. (Matthews & Russell 2005, 65) 
 
In holding that, in medicine, everything possible ought to be done, the goal of 
modernizing old age functions as a catalyst for endless, never satisfied progress. 
Testimony to this are the ever increasing expenditures on health care for the elderly. 
According to Callahan, such rising costs, combined with an aging population, pose a 
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grave economic threat. This issue compels us to reconsider our view that medicine 
ought to conquer all diseases and increasingly push back the frontier of death. Besides 
these economic concerns, Callahan identifies three further reasons for abandoning the 
goal of ‘modernizing’ old age. First, the latter approach is self-defeating in that for any 
disease conquered another will take its place. Second, it is questionable whether the 
modernizing view has increased the well-being of the elderly, given that its successes in 
terms of increased life expectancy have been accompanied by a steady increase in 
chronic diseases. Finally, the modernization project fails to confer meaning and 
significance on old age. A public philosophy on the meaning of aging is indispensible, 
Callahan argues, if efforts to limit expenditures on health care for the elderly are not to 
convey the message that the elderly are unworthy of any further investment.  
 
Given the importance of imbuing old age with a sense of meaning and significance, 
Callahan embarks upon this task before exploring alternatives to the current conception 
of the goals of medicine. He distinguishes three specific sources of meaning and 
significance for the elderly, linked to past, present, and future. First, in representing a 
living link with the past, the elderly  are in a unique position to pass on to the young – 
in a way that is reminiscent of preliterate societies - the hitherto accumulated 
knowledge and experience. Second, given the limited number of life years ahead of 
them, the elderly are compelled to cultivate the art of making the most of the present. 
In short, while people of any age may develop this disposition, it comes most naturally 
to the old. The latter, therefore, are well placed to instruct the young in this art. Finally, 
Callahan sees an important role for the elderly with regard to the future:  
 
It should be the special role of the elderly to be the moral conservators of that 
which has been and the most active proponents of that which will be after they 
are no longer here. Their indispensable role as conservators is what generates 
what I believe ought to be the primary aspiration of the old, which is to serve the 
young and the future. […] If the young are to flourish, then the old should step 
aside in an active way, working until the very end to do what they can to leave 
behind them a world hopeful for the young and worthy of bequest. The 
acceptance of their aging and death will be the principal stimulus to doing this. 
(Callahan 1987, 43) 
 
Callahan draws upon this specific obligation of the elderly to the future when searching 
an alternative to the medical goal of modernizing old age. Pain and suffering, he claims, 
impede the elderly from assuming their active role of service toward the young. 
Therefore, medicine ought to be directed towards the relief of both. However, the scope 
of medicine for the elderly does not extend any further, i.e. it precludes the provision of 
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more life as such. In other words, medicine ought to align itself with the obligation of 
the elderly to withdraw and prepare for death.  
These newly defined goals of medicine are still rather abstract in that they do not yet 
specify the point in old age at which one is no longer entitled to life-extending 
treatment. Callahan defines this point as occurring upon the fulfillment of a ‘natural 
lifespan’ (by our late 70s or early 80s). He stresses that, in introducing the concept of the 
‘natural lifespan’, he is not committing the fallacy of deducing normative judgments 
from nature. Rather, the choice for this specific yardstick of late 70s or early 80s is 
meant to reflect the common cultural judgment that this is the amount of time needed 
to ‘write one’s biography’. In other words, there is a cultural sentiment that upon 
reaching the late 70s or early 80s, 1) one’s life’s possibilities have, on the whole, been 
accomplished and 2) one’s parental responsibilities discharged. In addition, death at this 
stage, while generally considered a loss, is not perceived as an ‘evil’. This is in stark 
contrast to the death of a child, an event which, without exception, elicits unbearable 
grief. In short, death after a natural lifespan qualifies, in Callahan’s words, as a ‘tolerable 
death’.  
Callahan formulates a number of caveats in relation to his age-based rationing proposal. 
To begin with, he emphasizes that even in the absence of soaring expenditures on 
health care for the elderly, it would still be wise to implement his proposal. After all, as 
mentioned above, a sense of limitations is necessary if old age is to have meaning and 
significance. Next, Callahan acknowledges that his proposal gives rise to a classic policy 
dilemma: should we impose an exact cut-off age or employ an age range (e.g. late 70s-
early 80s)? The former risks overlooking the unique features of individual biographies, 
whereas the latter may invite abuse. Extended public discussion, Callahan claims, would 
be needed to resolve this issue. This brings us to Callahan’s final caveat. He stresses that 
his proposal is not fit for immediate implementation. As the goal of modernizing old age 
remains the dominant view, a proposal which imposes limits on health care is likely to 
be met with strong resistance at this point in time. Rather than forcing such a proposal 
upon unwilling elderly, it should be introduced democratically, “preceded by a decades-
long period of changing our thinking, attitudes, and expectations about elderly health 
care” (Callahan 1987, 227). In other words, Callahan foresees an attitudinal shift in the 
elderly which, in turn, would incentivize them to self-impose his proposal. He deems 
the occurrence of such a shift realistic, for two reasons. First, a century and more ago, it 
was understood that old age represented an inevitable stage in life, swiftly followed by 
death. Thus, the past teaches us that it is perfectly possible for the elderly to cultivate a 
more accepting attitude towards aging and death. Second, once the elderly realize that 
the exclusion of life-extending treatment frees up resources for ensuring better basic 
health care coverage (e.g. long-term care, nursing and home care), any concerns of  
Callahan’s proposal representing a reduced commitment to their welfare would soon be 
allayed.  
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Criticism 
 
Whenever the term ‘age-based rationing’ comes up, Callahan’s name immediately 
springs to mind for those familiar with the subject. Thus, it should not come as a 
surprise that his account has received more criticism than any other theory of age-
based rationing. Unfortunately, the deeply engrained nature of the tendency to link 
Callahan with the concept of age-based rationing also means that most of these 
criticisms target the general idea of using an age cut-off, rather than the specifics of his 
proposal. Such general criticisms belong under section 1.3 of this chapter. Below, we 
limit ourselves to critique at the level of the specifics. 
 
The most controversial aspect of Callahan’s account is its central concept, i.e. the 
‘natural lifespan’. Various critics object to the definition of the ‘natural lifespan’ in 
terms of 70 to 80 years of life (see, for example, Kilner 1988; Cohen-Almagor 2001). Peter 
Singer (1988) is the most renowned exponent of this line of criticism. He argues that the 
biographical lifespan is not as fixed and time-independent as Callahan takes it to be. In 
order to illustrate his point, Singer asks us to imagine that we live under circumstances 
where aging sets in at a later stage in life than it currently does. Under such conditions, 
he claims, “our reproductive systems might remain, at 50 or 60, in the condition that 
they now are at 30 or 40” (Singer 1988, 158). If, then, we chose to have children at the 
age of 60, our parental responsibilities could not possibly be discharged by the age of 70. 
However, Singer claims, we need not resort to such a far-fetched scenario in order to 
make the point. The job can also be done by a slightly more realistic scenario, i.e. that of 
freezing our sperm and ova and subsequently relying on IVF and surrogacy in order to 
have a child at a (highly) advanced age. In any case, both scenarios illustrate that the 
age at which we have discharged our responsibilities towards our children is not fixed 
for all time.  
In a similar way, Singer argues, the age at which our life possibilities have been 
accomplished is also not ‘engraved’ in a time-independent manner. Rather, this age is 
highly relative to our circumstances and, more precisely, to our expectation of how long 
we shall live in health and vitality. For example, in a society where everyone can expect, 
on average, to live to 73, it may be reasonable to assume that life offers no new, radical 
opportunities to a 70-year-old. However, this assumption no longer seems tenable in a 
society in which everyone expects to live in health and vigor well into their 90s.  
Given the considerations outlined above, Callahan finds himself in an awkward 
predicament. He has no choice, Singer claims, but to concede that the cut-off point for 
the ‘natural lifespan’ is place-and time-dependent in that it shifts according to the 
circumstances we face. Any failure to do so commits Callahan to a literal, non-
biographical interpretation of the term ‘natural lifespan’ – precisely the interpretation 
which he wishes to avoid.  
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1.2.3 The original fair innings argument 
The fair innings argument was first formulated by John Harris (1985). However, he put it 
forward as a purely theoretical argument, without endorsing it himself (see, for 
example, Harris 2005).  He describes the argument as follows:  
 
The fair innings argument takes the view that there is some span of years that we 
consider a reasonable life, a fair innings. Let’s say that a fair share of life is the 
traditional three score and ten, seventy years. Anyone who does not reach 70 
suffers, on this view, the injustice of being cut off in their prime. They have 
missed out on a reasonable share of life; they have been shortchanged. Those, 
however, who do make 70 suffer no such injustice, they have not lost out but 
rather must consider any additional years a sort of bonus beyond that which could 
reasonably be hoped for. The fair innings argument requires that everyone be 
given an equal chance to have a fair innings, to reach the appropriate threshold 
but, having reached it, they have received their entitlement. (Harris 1985, 91)  
 
Harris emphasizes that the fair innings argument applies only to those cases where one 
individual has had a fair innings and the other not. In such cases, the argument dictates 
that the latter be given priority whenever it is impossible to provide life-extending 
treatment to both. By contrast, when both individuals are on the same side of the 
threshold age (either below or above it), we ought to be indifferent.   
 
Criticism 
 
Like other accounts of age-based rationing, the fair innings argument has not escaped 
criticism. Unfortunately, many of the criticisms are off the mark in that they 
misrepresent the content of the argument. Michael Rivlin’s (2000) critical account is, in 
this respect, exceptional. He identifies the following three problems with the fair 
innings argument: (1) its reliance upon the concept of a ‘fair share of life’ (2) its narrow 
definition of fairness and (3) its unsubstantiated appeal to the distinction between what 
is unfair and what is unfortunate.  
 
According to Rivlin, the concept of a ‘fair share of life’ is nonsensical. In support of this 
claim, he contrasts a person’s life with a cake, i.e. an object in relation to which talk of a 
fair share indisputably makes sense. The reference to a cake which is to be divided 
suggests that three conditions must be met in order for there to be a (fair) share of a 
certain something. First, we must be able to ascertain the size of this ‘something’, i.e. it 
is only because we are able to assess the size of the cake in front of us that we can cut it 
in a way that is deemed fair. Second, this ‘something’ must be amenable to division. 
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Finally, possessing a share of something implies that one can give away one’s share. 
How does (a) life fare with respect to these conditions? We do not, in advance, know the 
‘size’ of a life. It is only once a life is over that we can determine its length. In addition, a 
life is not divisible. Finally, one cannot give, for example, five years of one’s life to 
another person.  
 
The nonsensical nature of the concept of a ‘fair share of life’, according to Rivlin, does 
not preclude one from passing judgment on the (un)fairness of age-based rationing as 
endorsed by the fair innings argument. After all, he argues, not all talk of fairness 
relates to the concept of a fair share. In this respect, Rivlin cites the case of a policeman 
planting drugs on an innocent person in order to gain a conviction. Although the 
concept of a fair share does not enter into the equation here, this case nevertheless 
elicits a judgment of unfair behavior on the part of the policeman. Having settled the 
possibility of judgments of (un)fairness outside the context of fair shares, Rivlin goes on 
to demonstrate the unfairness of policies based on the fair innings argument. 
Specifically, he finds fault with the argument’s definition of fairness in terms of length 
of life only. In this respect, he contrasts a young drunk driver who has injured himself 
with an elderly person whose illness is not self-inflicted. In this case, Rivlin claims, it is 
unfair to prioritize the younger person over the older one. He stresses that his 
complaint about the fair innings argument “is not that older people are not receiving 
their fair share, but that the younger people are being treated unfairly, i.e. just because 
they are young” (Rivlin 2000, 3).  
 
A final criticism of Rivlin pertains to the fact that the fair innings argument labels it an 
injustice when a person does not achieve the fair innings. Proponents of the argument, 
he claims, fail to explain why such an occurrence qualifies as ‘unfair’, rather than 
merely ‘unfortunate’. In the absence of such substantiating material, the idea of an 
entitlement to a reasonable span of life cannot be taken seriously.  
 
 
1.2.4 The extended fair innings argument 
Alan Williams (1999) has reformulated the original fair innings argument. In keeping 
with his health economics background, Williams’ starting point is the efficiency 
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criterion of QALY (quality adjusted life year) maximization.9 Although he sees value in 
distributing resources so as to maximize the output of QALYs, he also acknowledges that 
this criterion faces equity-based problems.10 One such problem is the so-called ‘double 
jeopardy’ issue – a concern frequently voiced by opponents of QALY maximization. 
Central to the ‘double jeopardy’ argument is the claim that those with a permanent 
disability or illness suffer a double disadvantage under the use of QALYs. Besides 
carrying the burden of their disability or illness, such patients will, all other things 
being equal, generally also lose out in the competition for health care resources due to 
their lower quality of life. John Harris (1987), who first invoked the ‘double jeopardy’ 
argument, formulates the problem as follows:  
 
QALYs dictate that because an individual is unfortunate, because she has once 
become a victim of disaster, we are required to visit upon her a second and 
perhaps graver misfortune. The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life 
and QALYs then require that in virtue of this she be ruled out as a candidate for 
life-saving treatment, or at best, that she be given little or no chance of benefiting 
from what little amelioration her condition admits of. (Harris 1987, 120) 
 
The concern for ‘double jeopardy’ incentivized Williams to adapt the traditional QALY 
maximization model (Oliver 2009). His extended fair innings model aims to balance this 
efficiency criterion with equity-based considerations. In other words, it expresses a 
willingness to sacrifice some overall efficiency for a more equitable distribution of 
health (Tsuchiya 2000). It does so by introducing equity weights for QALY gains. Rather 
than weighting every gained QALY as counting for one, irrespective of the recipient, 
 
                                                     
9  A QALY is a year of life expectancy adjusted for quality of life. A year in perfect health is assigned value 1, 
whereas death is worth 0. Thus, the quality of a year of life will range between 0 and 1 (although it may, in 
principle, acquire a negative value if the quality of someone’s life is considered worse than death). A medical 
intervention providing 10 additional years of life in a health state assigned a value of 0.6 will confer 6 QALYs 
on the patient.   
QALYs can be used for various purposes. For example, QALYs may be relied upon to determine which of rival 
therapies should be preferred for treatment of a particular condition. Alternatively, they may be used to 
decide which conditions should be prioritized in the allocation of health care resources. In addition, QALYs 
can provide guidance when determining which of two patients should receive a particular scarce health care 
resource. In the latter case, the QALY maximization model dictates that preference be given to the patient 
who stands to gain the greatest number of QALYs. Williams’ extended fair innings argument is concerned with 
this use of QALYs.     
10 Note that it is relatively rare for adherents of QALY maximization to acknowledge, let alone remedy, the 
inequitable nature of this criterion. Many proponents simply argue that nobody’s QALYs count for more than 
anyone else’s and that the QALY concept is, therefore, equitable (see, for example, McKie et al. 1996).  
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Williams’ model allows the weight of a QALY to vary according to who gets it. 
Specifically, a QALY gain is valued more highly for people who are unlikely to reach a 
fair innings than for those who can expect to have a fair innings or more. Contrary to 
the traditional fair innings argument, Williams’ model does not equate the fair innings 
benchmark with an entitlement to a certain number of life years. Rather, it defines the 
fair innings as the number of quality adjusted life years one is entitled to over a lifetime. 
This number is determined by the average quality adjusted life expectancy at birth. In 
short, every QALY gain incurred by a medical intervention is weighted more heavily the 
less likely one is to reach the average quality adjusted life expectancy at birth.  
In order to assess the likelihood of any particular individual reaching the fair innings, 
Williams relies on two factors: a person’s past accumulation of health and their 
expected future accumulation of health. The former factor refers to the number of 
QALYs the person has enjoyed so far. For those who have been fairly healthy so far, this 
number will be close to the number of life years lived. By contrast, in individuals who 
have been severely disabled all their lives, the QALY score will strongly diverge from the 
number of life years lived. The concept of a person’s ‘expected future accumulation of 
health’ denotes the number of QALYs a particular individual can still expect to enjoy 
(from now onwards up until her death). This number will vary according to the person’s 
age, sex, lifestyle, health status, social class, etc.  
A person’s ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ is the sum of her past QALYs and her 
future, expected QALYs. The smaller one’s ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ is, 
the smaller one’s likelihood is of reaching the fair innings (the average quality adjusted 
life expectancy at birth in society).  
 
We can now take a closer look at the quantification process involved in assigning equity 
weights to the QALYs gained by a medical intervention. In this respect, Williams 
distinguishes three scenarios. First, if one’s ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ is 
equal to the fair innings, every QALY gained will be assigned a weight 1. Second, if one’s 
‘expected lifetime experience of health’ exceeds the fair innings, a QALY will be 
assigned a weight <1. Finally, an ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ beneath the 
fair innings level will result in a weight >1.  
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Fig. 1 Relationship between ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ and equity weight 
assigned to a QALY. Note that this visualization merely represents this relationship on a 
generic level. As Williams himself asserts, the exact shape of the curve will vary 
according to a society’s level of aversion to inequalities in lifetime experience of health 
as measured in QALYs.  
 
 
An example will help to better grasp the implications of Williams’ extended fair innings 
model. Consider two persons, A and B, who are equal in all but one respect. A has a 
serious disability, whereas B is a non-disabled person.11 Both are in need of a kidney 
transplant. A stands to gain 6 QALYs, while B incurs a gain of 9 QALYs following 
transplantation. Suppose that, absent a kidney transplant, A and B have an ‘expected 
lifetime experience of health’ of 50 and 60 QALYs, respectively. Furthermore, assume 
that, as a result of this difference, a QALY gain is accorded weight 2 for A and weight 1.2 
for B.  
Under the traditional QALY maximization model, B would be prioritized as she has more 
QALYs to gain from transplantation. However, as the abovementioned example 
illustrates, a greater QALY gain does not necessarily imply prioritization under 
Williams’ model. Despite A having fewer QALYs to gain, the weight accorded to each of 
these QALYs more than offsets this disadvantage (2x6 versus 1.2x9).  
 
                                                     
11 We here follow the line of reasoning made by proponents of the ‘double jeopardy’ argument, i.e. we assume 
that a disabled person has a lower quality of life, relative to a non-disabled person. This assumption has four 
implications in the example: 1) A stands to gain fewer QALYs from the intervention than B; 2) A has a lower 
registered score of past QALYs; 3) without treatment, A has fewer QALYs to look forward to than B; 4) the 
combination of 2) and 3) implies that A has a lower ‘expected lifetime experience of health’.   
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Williams’ model has important implications for various other social groups12, besides 
the disabled. As we are concerned in this chapter with age-based rationing, we limit 
ourselves to examining its impact upon the elderly. This impact is twofold. To begin 
with, the elderly have, in most cases, fewer QALYs to gain from a treatment for the 
simple reason that they have fewer years left to live. In this respect, Williams’ model 
shares the same bias against the elderly as the traditional QALY maximization method. 
As a result of this feature, QALY maximization models have been branded as ‘ageist’ 
(see, for example, Harris 1994). However, in weighting QALYs, Williams lends credence 
to the view, previously expressed by Kappel and Sandøe (1992), that the traditional 
QALY method is not ageist enough. The older you are, the higher the probability of 
reaching the fair innings or of already having achieved it. Therefore, the small number 
of QALYs gained by an elderly person will generally be assigned a low weight under 
Williams’ model. 
The abovementioned considerations do not merely illustrate how Williams’ model 
diverges from the traditional QALY maximization method. They also allow us to 
contrast his proposal with the age-based rationing models previously discussed in this 
chapter. In establishing an age cut-off, the prudential lifespan account, the biographical 
lifespan account, the original fair innings argument, and the capabilities approach 
espouse a form of direct age-based rationing. In other words, age in itself functions as 
the discriminator in these proposals. By contrast, in Williams’ model the rationing 
criteria are features that are merely correlated with age (i.e. ‘QALY gains’ and ‘expected 
lifetime experience of health’). As a result of it being an indirect form of age-based 
rationing, Williams’ proposal merely tends to disadvantage the elderly, rather than 
consistently denying them treatment.   
 
Criticism 
 
Erik Nord (2005) offers the most comprehensive critique of the extended fair innings 
argument. He sees two major problems with it.  
First, Nord questions the relevance attributed to past suffering by Williams’ proposal. In 
this respect, he asks us to consider the following scenario. Two 50-year-olds, A and B, 
 
                                                     
12 Williams’ model has a particularly interesting implication for the sexes. Men, as is well-known, have a lower 
life expectancy than women. Despite women experiencing a lower health-related quality of life, their 
advantage in terms of life expectancy nevertheless makes for a higher ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ 
(Williams 1999). Thus, all other things being equal, the extended fair innings argument attributes a higher 
weight to QALY gains incurred by men. We refer the reader to Tsuchiya and Williams (2005) for an interesting 
argument in support of such preferential treatment of men, i.e. an argument for treating the difference in 
‘expected lifetime experience of health’ between men and women as an inequity, rather than merely an 
inequality.  
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require a medical intervention. Both stand to gain an equal number of QALYs. B scores 
lower on ‘expected lifetime experience of health’ due to her history of lifetime 
moderate illness – a stark contrast with A’s healthy past. At present, A is severely ill, 
whereas B continues to be only moderately ill. Under Williams’ model, B would receive 
priority over A. However, Nord challenges the intuitive appeal of this outcome. “Should 
not medical urgency be the decisive criterion?”, he asks. In support of his claim, Nord 
refers to current medical practice, where past suffering is seldom or never taken into 
account. Current practice, according to Nord, has a  sound moral basis in that medicine 
can alleviate only present and future suffering. Past suffering, by contrast, is ‘sunk 
costs’.  
Second, Nord draws attention to a hidden implication of the extended fair innings 
argument for the elderly. The original fair innings argument merely governs the 
distribution of life-extending medical resources. However, in focusing on QALY gains, 
the extended fair innings argument also regulates interventions that merely impact 
upon one’s quality of life. As a result, the latter argument disadvantages the elderly both 
in the competition for lifesaving and non-lifesaving resources. Thus, for example, an 80-
year-old in extreme pain would lose out in the competition for pain relief therapy to a 
20-year-old with a similar condition. This is, for Nord, a step too far.  
1.2.5 Jecker’s capabilities approach to age-based rationing  
The prudential lifespan account, the biographical lifespan account, and the fair innings 
argument all date from the 1980s. However, theorization about age-based rationing is 
still well and truly alive. Nancy Jecker’s recent account (2013) of justice between age 
groups is testimony to this fact. The starting point of Jecker’s analysis is her 
dissatisfaction with a feature shared by both social contract theories and the prudential 
lifespan account. Social contract approaches to justice require that contracting agents 
be perceived as having cognitive rational capacities sufficient for choosing principles of 
justice. As a result, they exclude as a contracting party certain mentally impaired 
individuals. This, in turn, implies that the interests of such individuals can be addressed, 
at most, as an afterthought, i.e. once the basic institutions have already been designed. 
Consequently, investments in services for the cognitively impaired, such as special 
education, are at risk of being shortchanged.  
In making these observations, Jecker aligns herself with the well-established ‘disability 
critique’ of social contract theories. The novelty of her approach lies in the realization 
that the aforementioned concerns have implications for age group justice and, more 
specifically, for the prudential lifespan account. Presumably, prudential deliberation 
also presupposes a threshold level of cognitive rational capacities. However, this 
threshold requirement, Jecker points out, does not merely affect those with chronic 
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mental impairment. It also excludes certain age groups. To begin with, children lack the 
competency to choose principles of justice. The same holds true for (many of) the very 
old, due to the high prevalence of dementia in this age group. In excluding the very 
young and the very old from prudential deliberation, the prudential lifespan account 
fails to guarantee that equal consideration will be given to all parts of our life. It hereby 
undermines the rationale behind veiled prudence. As Jecker puts it: 
 
Only if it were possible for individuals to deliberate at each and every stage of life 
from a first-person point of view could prudential planners place themselves 
under a veil of ignorance and reasonably assume that they could be members of 
any age group. Expressed differently, the condition of justifiability to all, 
mentioned earlier, cannot be met unless we could, at each stage of our life, 
consider and agree to justice principles. However, such a possibility could never 
be fully realized, for at both ends of the lifespan, our situation is similar in key 
respects to the situation of persons with lifelong disabilities. Just as persons living 
with chronic intellectual impairment may not be able to participate directly and 
on their own behalf in consenting to justice principles, so too healthy children 
lack the cognitive capacity to participate directly in choosing justice principles. 
Although in healthy children this deficit is temporary and due to immaturity, the 
practical result is the same, namely, consent is unattainable. At the other end of 
the lifespan […] due to the high prevalence of dementia, the oldest old are 
frequently unable to understand and consent on their own behalf to justice 
principles. (Jecker 2013, 5) 
 
The inability of prudential deliberators to fairly and equally represent both their 
younger and older selves, according to Jecker, renders the prudential lifespan account 
an inept approach to the problem of justice between age groups. The alternative favored 
by Jecker is Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities account of justice. Nussbaum (2000; 2006) 
identifies a set of basic capabilities without which human flourishing is impossible. 
These include, amongst others, life, bodily health, bodily integrity, control over one’s 
environment, and play. On this account, justice dictates that we bring every person’s 
basic capabilities up to the threshold level required for human dignity. People require 
differing levels of resources in order to attain this threshold level due to their varying 
abilities to convert resources into functioning and capability. For example, a person in a 
wheelchair will, relative to a person with normal mobility, require more resources if 
both are to achieve a similar level of ambulatory ability (Denier 2007). In addition to 
health status, social determinants of health also impact upon one’s ability to convert 
resources into actual functioning and capability. In this respect, Jecker cites the 
example of a poor person who, despite the generous coverage provided for her 
medication, cannot afford the out-of-pocket cost attached to it. Its ability to 
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accommodate our knowledge of social determinants of health is one of the main 
features which attracts Jecker to the capabilities approach. She also sees two other 
advantages of using this account of justice. First, it imposes an objective standard in that 
the criterion of human dignity sets the threshold level for the basic capabilities. In this 
respect, the capabilities approach stands in stark contrast with social contract theories 
and the prudential lifespan account, both of which define the requirements of justice in 
terms of distributive principles that individuals have rationally agreed to accept. 
Second, in supporting a set of basic entitlements for everyone, regardless of age or 
disability, the capabilities approach escapes the problems identified by the ‘disability 
critique’ and its offshoot.  
 
Under the capabilities approach, Jecker claims, any specific age-based rationing scheme 
is justified on condition that it does not breach the central tenet, i.e. it must not result 
in certain capabilities being reduced to a level below the threshold for human dignity. 
With respect to the type of age-based rationing schemes it authorizes, the capabilities 
approach converges with other accounts of age group justice. In other words, it allows 
barring people from life-extending interventions (cure) after a normal length of life, 
while prohibiting the exclusion of the elderly from care. The former scheme is, 
according to Jecker, permissible on the grounds that the normal lifespan converges with 
the threshold level for the capability ‘life’. Jecker projects that the denial of life-
extending interventions after a certain age will yield significant cost savings. She bases 
this projection on two facts. First, the largest share of the high health care costs 
associated with old age is incurred during the last year of life. Second, population aging 
entails that an increasing number of elderly will experience their last year of life after 
the threshold set by the capabilities approach.  
Contrary to life-extending interventions, basic caregiving cannot justifiably be 
subjected to an age cut-off. In order to substantiate this claim, Jecker takes a closer look 
at long-term care, an important category of care for the elderly. Long-term care services 
are those that elderly people with “limited mobility, frailty, or other declines in physical 
or cognitive functioning may require in order to accomplish activities of daily living” 
(Jecker 2013, 12). A failure to provide such services, according to Jecker, brings the 
capability of ‘bodily integrity’ – the ability to move freely from place to place – below 
the threshold level required for human dignity.  
 
Criticism 
 
Given the recent nature of Jecker’s proposal, few criticisms of it are available in the 
literature. Therefore, we have chosen to provide our own assessment (Capitaine et al. 
2013). Our criticism focuses on the cost saving potential of her account. Below, we argue 
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that the requirement to bring everyone up to the threshold level of the basic 
capabilities is, in terms of health care costs, highly burdensome.13   
 
With regard to the capability ‘health’, Jecker does not clarify which health care services 
we are committed to providing in order to meet the threshold requirement. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that we are dealing with a very demanding threshold as 
the latter is defined in terms of human dignity. In order to ensure a level of health in 
accordance with human dignity, we would be required to provide a wide array of 
services which currently do not qualify for public coverage. For example, one would 
seemingly be entitled to IVF, gender transition surgery, and stem cell therapy for 
Alzheimer’s. A mere look at the cost of IVF suffices to show that public coverage for the 
latter type of procedures is likely to contribute to a substantial increase in health care 
expenditures. In 2002, the prevalence of infertility among married women in the US 
amounted to 7.4% (Stephen & Chandra 2006). In the US, the cost of a standard IVF cycle 
is $12,513 (Chambers et al. 2009). The cost of public coverage for IVF soon becomes 
extravagant when we take into account that the dignity threshold for ‘health’ entails an 
individual’s entitlement to an indefinite number of cycles.        
Besides increasing the number of health care services eligible for public coverage, the 
dignity threshold for ‘health’ also commits us to ‘upgrading’ several of the currently 
provided public services. For example, consider traditional dialysis, a service which 
Medicare14 currently provides irrespective of the patient’s age. Nocturnal home dialysis, 
which is only partly covered by Medicare, constitutes a substantial improvement upon 
traditional dialysis. In addition to contributing to higher energy levels, home dialysis 
also implies that patients need no longer spend 12 hours each week in a hospital (Garber 
2004). The incidence of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) is projected to increase 
substantially due to the obesity epidemic. This, combined with the fact that home 
dialysis is more costly than its traditional counterpart, suggests that (full) public 
coverage for the former is likely to represent a significant financial burden.     
One might object that we have employed the term ‘dignity’ too loosely, thereby 
overestimating the impact of the threshold requirement on health care spending. 
However, even if the sufficiency level for ‘health’ were low, Jecker’s proposal remains 
open to the charge that it undoes the minimal savings achieved. After all, the threshold 
level for the capability ‘life’, i.e. the normal lifespan, is undeniably very demanding. The 
requirement to bring everyone up to the normal lifespan is highly susceptible to the 
 
                                                     
13 The sections below have been lifted from Capitaine et al. (2013).  
14 Medicare is the US national health insurance program that provides coverage to persons 65 years or older. 
It also provides coverage for certain disabilities and end-stage renal disease, irrespective of the patient’s age 
(Graham et al. 2010).  
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bottomless pit problem. Stein defines the latter as follows: “The problem is that even 
when it is impossible to raise people to the threshold, it is often possible to spend an 
unlimited amount of resources raising them toward the threshold. Often enormous 
investments – another doctor, another hospital, another medical research project – can 
make some improvement, however small, or can increase, however slightly, the 
likelihood of achieving a large improvement” (Stein 2009, 499). The bottomless pit 
problem is best illustrated by ‘last chance therapies’, so named because they are the 
only hope for patients facing death in the near future. Generally, these therapies offer 
only a relatively small prospect of a relatively small increase in life expectancy (Daniels 
& Sabin 1998). Examples include left ventricular assist devices (LVAD), totally 
implantable artificial hearts (TIAH), and total parenteral nutrition (TPN). Fleck (2002) 
identifies two main characteristics of last chance therapies. First, the cost of the 
therapy, per individual, is very high. For example, for infants suffering from necrotic 
small bowel syndrome, the costs of TPN range from $50,000 to $200,000 per year. 
Second, last chance therapies are frequently of benefit to a substantial number of 
patients. For example, TIAH and LVAD could, on a yearly basis, prolong the lives of 
350,000 and 550,000 patients, respectively, in the United States. As these figures suggest, 
the aggregate cost of any specific last chance therapy would be extremely high. In the 
case of TIAH alone, we would witness a $105 billion increase in annual health care 
expenditures (Fleck 2010). Thus, public coverage for all last chance therapies for 
everyone in the pre-normal lifespan stage of life, as prescribed by the normal lifespan 
threshold, is likely to be prohibitively expensive.  
Admittedly, the abovementioned considerations do not alter the fact that the denial of 
life-extending treatment to the elderly produces cost savings. They do, however, render 
it questionable whether these savings will outweigh the exorbitant costs associated with 
the threshold requirement of human dignity. In other words, rather than yielding cost 
savings, Jecker’s proposal may exacerbate the health care cost crisis.  
1.3 Age-based rationing: general criticisms 
Above, we have examined several theoretical justifications of age-based rationing as 
well as criticisms targeted specifically at one or other of these proposals. However, the 
general concept of age-based rationing, viewed independently of any such specific 
justification, has also been heavily scrutinized. Below, we discuss a series of these more 
‘general’ criticisms.  
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1.3.1 Age-based rationing as a discriminatory policy 
The most frequently cited line of criticism questions the non-discriminatory nature of 
age-based rationing schemes. Critics have denounced such schemes as being biased 
against one or more of the following social groups: the poor, the elderly, and women. 
The first subset of criticisms is highly straightforward. In limiting the establishment of 
an age cut-off to publicly provided services, it is argued, age-based rationing schemes 
favor those elderly who could afford personally to pay for life-extending care (Levinsky 
1990). The criticisms relating to the other social groups, by contrast, require further 
elaboration. Below, we first discuss the claim that age-based rationing is ageist. Next, we 
examine the feminist-inspired criticism.  
  
Discrimination against the elderly  
 
According to its proponents, age-based rationing cannot be faulted with discrimination 
of the elderly in that it respects the ethical principle of equality. This principle, they 
stress, does not require us to treat the young and the old equally. The old and the young 
differ in important respects (e.g. lifetime lived). These differences require and, 
therefore, justify the differential treatment of age groups. However, critics consider the 
practice of age-based rationing to be based on a misinterpretation and, consequently, a 
violation of the principle of equality. Given that human beings matter morally, they 
argue, “their claims on one another derive from their status as beings of a particular 
sort and not from contingent features of their lives like age, life expectancy, or quality 
of life […]” (Harris 2005, 96). In short, the principle of equality dictates that society grant 
each person, regardless of their age, the same level of respect, concern, and protection. 
This reading of the principle, it is argued, has the advantage of being endorsed by 
virtually all declarations, conventions, and charters on human rights (Harris 2005; 
Giordano 2005). Moreover, it avoids the problems encountered by the alternative 
reading. According to John Harris (2005), the principle of equality, as interpreted by 
proponents of age-based rationing, has as an inevitable corollary the view that it is less 
of an injustice to murder the old than the young.  
The abovementioned criticism of age-based rationing views the young and the old from 
a slice-of-time perspective. In other words, it focuses on age groups at a single instant in 
time, rather than perceiving them as different stages in a person’s life. As such, it is 
vulnerable to criticism on the part of adherents of Daniels’ account. Recall that, 
according to Daniels, differential treatment of age groups, when viewed from a 
diachronic perspective, does not amount to unequal treatment of persons. It is precisely 
in this respect that age-based rationing distinguishes itself from discriminatory 
practices, such as racism and sexism. There are critics who grant this distinction, while 
at the same time maintaining the charge of discrimination against age-based rationing 
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(see, for example, Kilner 1988).  Sexism and racism, these critics argue, are deemed 
unjust, not merely because they treat people unequally over a lifetime. The repugnance 
felt towards these practices is also fed by their reliance upon an irrelevant, and thus, 
illegitimate criterion. Age, according to these critics, shares this feature of irrelevance, 
in various respects. For example, it is an unreliable predictor of the outcome of medical 
interventions in the elderly (see below). Moreover, one’s age is a matter of fact, not of 
choice. In displaying at least one similarity with racism and sexism, these critics argue, 
age-based rationing does not entirely escape the charge of discrimination.  
 
Discrimination against women 
 
Other critics show less interest in the potential discriminatory effects of age-based 
rationing along the age-axis and concentrate instead on the male-female dimension. In 
this respect, it has been argued that age-based rationing disproportionately affects 
women. There are two ways in which age-based rationing schemes are thought to affect 
men and women differently (see, for example, Bell 1989; Howe & Lettieri 1999). First, the 
higher life expectancy of women entails that an age cut-off for life-extending care robs 
them of a greater number of life years. Second, as a result of their longer life 
expectancy, women are more highly represented among older age groups. Thus, a 
greater number of women than men would be subjected to age-based rationing. In 1991, 
Nancy Jecker argued that such unequal treatment of the sexes constitutes an inequity. 
Admittedly, she no longer adheres to this view, given that she now supports age-based 
rationing.15 However, as her analysis still serves as a reference point for many of those 
invoking the issue of women and age-based rationing, it is worthwhile taking a look at 
it.  
 
Jecker assesses the differential effects of age-based rationing on the sexes against three 
distinct readings of the ethical standard of equality. On each reading, she argues, this 
principle is violated.  
First, equality may be understood in the sense appealed to by Daniels, i.e. as 
necessitating equal treatment of people over a lifetime. While we all age, we do not 
 
                                                     
15 In her latest work, Jecker provides the following argument against the view that the differential effects on 
the sexes amount to an inequity: “[…] in response to these concerns [about the differential treatment of the 
sexes under age-based rationing], defenders of the capabilities approach can reply that after reaching a 
normal lifespan, neither men nor women are entitled to publicly funded life-extending care. Thus, even if 
women are disproportionately impacted by age-based rationing of publicly funded life-extending care, they 
are not being denied a resource that they are entitled to receive” (Jecker 2013, 11).  
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change sex. Therefore, on this account, differential treatment of the sexes cannot be 
acquitted of the ‘discrimination charge’.   
Second, the equality principle is sometimes interpreted in terms of equal respect for 
persons. Age-based rationing, according to Jecker, fails to convey equal respect for men 
and women (as well as for the young and the old) in that it qualifies as a ‘person-
centered’ rationing device. She contrasts this notion with so-called ‘resource-centered’ 
rationing schemes. The latter appeal to the features of certain treatments, such as their 
cost or technological sophistication, as a grounds for denying them to people. By 
contrast, ‘person-centered’ rationing regulates access to treatment by reference to 
people’s characteristics, such as age, sex, or ability to pay. In treating certain individuals 
as less deserving due to the kinds of people they are, this type of rationing defies the 
principle that all possess an equal worth and dignity. Jecker anticipates the response 
that age-based rationing relies on age, not sex, as a criterion and, therefore, cannot be 
faulted with signaling unequal respect for men and women. In short, this 
counterargument draws attention to the indirect, unintended nature of the harm to 
women under age-based rationing policies. However, Jecker argues, the inadvertent 
exclusion of social groups does not necessarily preclude injustices. In fact, implicit 
rationing, she warns, often poses a more daunting threat, relative to the overt use of a 
criterion. After all, in escaping public scrutiny, undeliberate rationing schemes are able 
to deflect attention away from themselves while nevertheless excluding certain people. 
Third, the standard of equality may refer to a requirement of equal opportunity for all. 
In depriving them of fewer life years, Jecker argues, age-based rationing policies allow 
men to enjoy a larger share of the opportunities which life affords. She acknowledges 
that Callahan would object to this analysis on the grounds that life stages beyond the 
age cut-off do not open up any important, new opportunities anyway. Given that all of 
life’s opportunities present themselves before the age cut-off, Callahan would argue, 
there is no inequality in that neither men nor women are deprived of any opportunities 
through age-based rationing. However, according to Jecker, this view assumes that, 
upon reaching the cut-off, men and women will have enjoyed equal opportunities. This 
is a problematic assumption owing to the discrimination women face in various areas of 
their lives. One might still object that this prior injustice is not remedied by granting 
women their expected lifespan – that is, at least, if one assumes once again that stages 
beyond the age cut-off are devoid of (important) opportunities. Jecker criticizes the 
latter assumption on the grounds that it takes the male life expectancy as a standard for 
determining when opportunities cease to present themselves in life. With a view to 
illustrating this claim, she asks us to imagine that life expectancy for men and women, 
respectively, is 70 years and 140 years. It would be foolish, Jecker claims, to suggest that 
the 70 additional years which women have at their disposal do not offer any 
opportunities. There is no reason why the same reasoning should not also apply to 
women’s current edge over males. In short, in depriving women of their ‘full’ life 
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expectancy (and the corresponding opportunities), age-based rationing perpetuates and 
compounds the injustices they have previously endured.    
1.3.2 Age-based rationing as a return-on-investment policy  
The values underlying age-based rationing have also attracted the attention of critics. 
The exclusion of the elderly, it is argued, is driven by the (morally) questionable return-
on-investment logic. In other words, this practice inscribes itself in a tradition which 
assigns worth to people on the basis of their societal contribution (understood in terms 
of employment), rather than their membership of the human species. Erich Loewy 
(2005a) is perhaps the most ardent exponent of this line of criticism. On his view, the 
return-on-investment rationale behind age-based rationing poses a grave threat to 
society in that it is partially reminiscent of Hitler’s children’s euthanasia and T-4 
program. Others discredit the return-on-investment maxim by reference to a reductio 
ad absurdum argument. A consistent application of this maxim, they argue, would not 
merely single out the elderly as candidates for reduced health care. Rather, it would also 
affect all patients with chronic diseases, such as multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, 
and cystic fibrosis (Kluge 2002). In fact, due to their longer life expectancy, such patients 
are likely to offer a lower return-on-investment than the elderly. The repugnance felt at 
the prospect of denying treatment to, for example, a young paraplegic, according to 
Rivlin (1995), suffices to illustrate the untenable nature of the return-on-investment 
logic in health care.  
Besides questioning the merit of an economic index of social worth, critics have also 
challenged the soundness of the inference leading from this specific logic to age-based 
rationing. They have done so on two distinct grounds. Some argue that, rather than 
disadvantaging the elderly, a focus on economic productivity calls for prioritizing them 
over the young. With a lifetime of employment behind them, the elderly have already 
earned their credentials as productive members of society (Kilner 1988). According to 
others, the return-on-investment maxim dictates treating the elderly on a par with the 
young. This view is premised on the observation that the elderly still actively contribute 
to society, both directly and indirectly (Giordano 2005). Direct forms of productivity 
include, for example, the frequent participation of the elderly in voluntary sectors. 
Indirect contributions to the labor market refer to the fulfillment of ‘babysitting’ duties 
whereby the elderly enable younger adults to work outside the house.  
1.3.3 Age-based rationing as a slippery slope 
The next set of criticisms targets the tendency of age-based rationing policies to set in 
motion a slippery slope. We can distinguish three variants of this argument. To begin 
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with, some argue that the exclusion of the elderly sets the stage for the denial of life-
extending treatment to other social groups. Robert Binstock formulates this concern as 
follows: “If elderly people can be denied access to health care categorically, then what 
group of us could not? Members of a particular race, religion, or ethnic group? […] Any 
of us is vulnerable to social constructions that portray us as unworthy” (Binstock 1994, 
39).  
Other critics warn for ever increasing restrictions on the age groups, rather than the 
social groups, granted access to life-extending treatment. In other words, they fear that 
any initially chosen age cut-off will be susceptible to repeated downward pressure 
(Harris 2005; Rivlin 1995). In support of this assumption, these critics remind us that the 
exclusion of age groups beyond the selected cut-off age is premised on the high cost 
attached to their treatment. However, in barring these age groups from treatment, they 
argue, one creates a situation wherein those just below the age cut-off become the most 
expensive age group. At that point, the very raison d’être behind age-based rationing, 
i.e. cost containment, induces an incentive to also exclude the latter age group. This 
downward movement, it is expected, will only come to a halt once the age cut-off 
coincides with retirement age (Loewy 2005a). After all, the contribution of the working 
age population to society more than makes up for the medical costs incurred by this 
group.  
The third variant of the slippery slope argument shares with the former the concern for 
the elasticity of the age cut-off. However, it considers this threshold to be susceptible to 
upward, rather than downward pressures (Rivlin 1995; Barry 1991). Suppose that the age 
cut-off is set at 75. Critics claim that it would be hard, if not impossible, to deny an 
elderly person who is one day past her 75th birthday a treatment which offers the 
prospect of an additional 10 years in relatively good health. In opening the door to ever 
further deviations from the official policy, such exceptions render age-based rationing 
subject to the whims of doctors. Once it has shed its image of a rigid, objective 
benchmark, critics argue, the concept of an age cut-off loses any of the appeal it may 
initially have had.  
1.3.4 Age-based rationing as a last resort policy 
Some critics argue that we need not resort to drastic measures, such as age-based 
rationing, in order to address the health care cost crisis. There exist, they claim, other 
effective cost-containing routes which, contrary to age-based rationing, are morally 
just. In the United States, the reigning in of the system’s exorbitant administrative costs 
is frequently invoked as an alternative (Loewy 2005b). Other, more universally 
applicable, solutions have also been put forward. In this respect, Roger Hunt (1994) 
proposes a combination of three strategies. First, all futile treatments should be 
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withheld. Second, where it is not yet in place, we should consider instituting euthanasia 
on the basis of respect for the autonomy of terminally ill patients. Whereas Hunt 
stresses that voluntary euthanasia should never be driven by economic motives, he 
nevertheless grants that it would yield savings. Third, Hunt claims, treatment is 
frequently imposed upon a patient on the basis of the contrary-to-fact assumption that 
one is acting in accordance with the patient’s wishes. He cites the example of a patient 
with advanced cancer who is prescribed expensive, aggressive treatment, when she, if 
offered an informed choice, would opt for a palliative approach. Hunt claims that “a 
more educated and empowered patient population, an improved awareness of the 
palliative mode of care, a co-ordinated multidisciplinary approach, and improved 
medical communication skills will lead to treatment that better meets the needs and 
interests of patients, and at less cost” (Hunt 1994, 54). While Hunt’s recommendations 
are rather abstract, David Thomasma (1991) provides a concrete measure for keeping in 
check doctors’ tendency for overzealous use of invasive, expensive treatments. He 
proposes a system whereby retirees are compelled to execute an advance directive 
concerning certain optional treatments. Thomasma conceives of such a program as 
follows:  
 
The ideal of autonomy can be underlined in such a program by permitting a wide 
range of choices about the optional treatments. However, because society must be 
protected from increasing health care costs, individuals would not be able to 
exercise complete freedom over the choices to be made. A good compromise 
would be to require that persons make decisions about their care in the future, 
but that society would not mandate that specific decisions be made. Limits could 
be placed on certain technological interventions for certain categories of diseases, 
but individuals could choose which of the available technologies should be used in 
the event he or she succumbs to specific illnesses. (Thomasma 1991, 157-158) 
 
1.3.5 Age-based rationing as a myopic view on the cure-care distinction  
The cure-care distinction, which lies at the hearth of age-based rationing proposals, is 
also an object of criticism. In proposing a departure from life-extending treatment in 
favor of interventions aimed at improving quality of life of the elderly, proponents of 
age-based rationing conceive of the cure-care distinction as clear-cut. However, critics 
argue, clarity with regard to this matter is relatively rare. It is generally confined to 
cases involving a patient who is suffering from a clearly terminal illness and whose life 
expectancy is measured in days or weeks (Cassel & Neugarten 1991). Such cases allow us 
to select interventions which unambiguously belong to the ‘care category’. However, 
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when multiple chronic diseases are at play – as is the case in the majority of elderly 
patients - the boundaries of care and cure become much more fuzzy. Especially in very 
old people, interventions that improve the quality of life may inevitably prolong life. In 
this respect, Cassel and Neugarten (1991) cite the hypothetical case of a 99-year-old 
woman who is experiencing attacks of fainting caused by cardiac arrhythmia. With a 
view to preventing further fainting episodes and the corresponding risk of falls and 
fractures, she is prescribed a pacemaker. Despite the prescription being aimed merely at 
‘care’, it will nevertheless have a life-extending effect due to the beneficial impact of the 
pacemaker on the patient’s heart rhythm. Cassel and Neugarten identify a large range of 
similar cases: “The observation that treatments that improve life and those that extend 
life are often indistinguishable applies to almost any palliative measure, ranging from 
the administration of insulin to persons with diabetes and the administration of oxygen 
to persons who suffer from shortness of breath, to modern, technology-intensive 
treatments for health failure or symptomatic malignancies” (Cassel & Neugarten 1991, 
86).   
1.3.6 Age-based rationing as a blunt instrument  
A final line of criticism states that the practice of age-based rationing fails to capture 
the heterogeneity among the elderly. Age-based rationing, it is argued, is driven by the 
assumption that, above a certain age, people stand to benefit little from certain medical 
procedures. This assumption holds true for the elderly taken as a group. In other words, 
the outcome of such procedures is, on average, worse in the elderly because the 
prevalence of impairments that adversely shift the risk/benefit ratio increases with age 
(Evans 1997). However, critics stress, we can infer from this statement of probability 
absolutely nothing about the individual patient in front of us (Evans 1997; Loewy 2005b). 
Other than requiring intensive care or surgery, the patient may very well be in good 
health. In such a case, the outcome of treatment will differ little from the outcome in 
younger patients (Giordano 2005). Given that health status, rather than chronological 
age, predicts outcome, these critics argue for favoring a case-by-case approach over the 
outright exclusion of the elderly from medical treatment.    
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1.4 Age-based rationing: a promising route to cost 
containment in health care?  
How do age-based rationing proposals fare in terms of their ethical credentials? Do they 
represent ethically acceptable solutions to the health care cost crisis? Above, we have 
outlined the main concerns put forward by critics of age-based rationing. Although it 
may, from a theoretical point of view, be interesting to assess the validity of these 
criticisms, practical considerations do not necessarily call for such an evaluation. In 
practice, questions related to the soundness of these concerns are rendered obsolete if it 
is established that age-based rationing proposals defeat their own object, i.e. the 
achievement of substantial cost savings. In other words, age-based rationing, as a 
proposed solution to the health care cost crisis, is automatically rendered morally 
unacceptable if it turns out to be an ineffective cost containment tool. Therefore, we 
believe that in any ethical analysis of age-based rationing proposals inquiries into their 
efficacy ought to precede all other questions. Despite its primary moral importance, the 
issue of efficacy is seldom addressed in the literature. We have already briefly touched 
upon this issue in relation to the discussion of Jecker’s proposal. The capabilities 
approach to age-based rationing, we concluded, runs the risk of exacerbating the health 
care cost crisis. Of course, the specifics of Jecker’s account do not allow for extrapolation 
of this finding to other age-based rationing proposals. Below, we examine the cost 
saving potential of age-based rationing in a way which makes abstraction of any specific 
account. In other words, we analyze the general claim that, in introducing an age cut-off 
beyond which life-extending cure is denied in favor of care, one obtains savings of a 
sufficient magnitude to solve the health care cost crisis. Specifically, we assess the two 
main presuppositions underlying this assertion.  
 
The elderly commonly receive heroic care at the end of life 
 
The first presupposition underlying age-based rationing proposals relates to the so-
called ‘high cost of dying’. Research has repeatedly shown that the age-related increase 
in health care expenditures is largely attributable to the high costs incurred during the 
last year of life and the high mortality in old age. A study by Lubitz and Riley (1993) is 
frequently invoked as a means of illustrating the magnitude of the expenses associated 
with the last year of life. This study provides data on the medical costs in the last year of 
life of Medicare enrollees who died in 1988 (‘decedents’). These costs were almost seven 
times higher than those incurred by ‘survivors’ during that year ($13,316 versus $1,924 
per person-year). Although these decedents made up a mere 5.1% of Medicare enrollees, 
they accounted for 27.2% of total Medicare payments in that year. Unfortunately, we 
have not found any up-to-date information on Medicare payments per person-year for 
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decedents in their last year of life. However, updated data suggest that the share of total 
annual Medicare expenditures devoted to persons in their last year of life has remained 
relatively constant (25.1% in 2006) (Riley & Lubitz 2010). A comparable situation appears 
to obtain in the Netherlands, where expenditures on people in their last year of life 
account for 26.1% of total annual medical costs for the retired population (Polder et al. 
2006).   
 
The high costs associated with the last year of life are sometimes deemed ‘wasteful’. On 
this view, these costs are interpreted as resulting from the application of aggressive 
treatment to patients who are clearly terminal. From this perspective, the solution is 
simple: we should refrain from resorting to such treatment in futile cases, i.e. patients 
headed towards their last year or last months of life (see, for example, Fries et al. 1993). 
Unfortunately, things are much more complicated. Although aggressive interventions in 
the last year of life clearly qualify as futile from a retrospective perspective, they are 
unlikely to be viewed as such at the moment they are administered. The current state of 
the art in medicine makes it close to impossible – with the exception of cancer patients 
– to predict death twelve or six or even three months in advance (Scitovsky 2005). Given 
the difficulty of prospectively identifying those in their last year of life, the only 
reasonable means of addressing the high costs incurred during this period consists in 
introducing an age cut-off beyond which life-extending treatment is denied. This is 
precisely the rationale behind age-based rationing proposals (Scitovsky 2005).  
 
The specific presupposition underlying the claim that age-based rationing has 
significant cost saving potential exhibits the following structure:  
 
1. The largest share of health care costs for the elderly is incurred during 
the last year of life.  
2. A considerable part of the health care costs incurred during the last 
year of life is attributable to the provision of life-extending care.  
3. In denying people life-extending care beyond the normal lifespan, we 
can significantly attenuate the costs associated with the last year of life.16   
 
The intuition underlying the second premise – the belief that it is common for older 
persons to receive heroic care at the end of life – is widespread. It stems from the 
abovementioned finding that a large portion of annual Medicare expenditures (around 
 
                                                     
16 While this line of reasoning is implicitly present in various age-based rationing proposals, Jecker (2013) 
appeals to it explicitly.  
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30%) is devoted to the small percentage of enrollees who die (approximately 6%). 
However, these data are misleading in that they represent the total costs incurred 
during the last year of life, rather than merely those associated with life-extending care. 
Only about 3% of Medicare beneficiaries who die receive aggressive life-extending care. 
Spending on the latter type of intervention accounts for only a very small portion of the 
Medicare expenditures related to the last year of life (Pan et al. 2007). Thus, in setting 
limits on life-extending care, we are unlikely to achieve cost savings of the magnitude 
envisaged by proponents of age-based rationing. 
 
Population aging is an important driver of rising health care costs 
 
As noted in the general introduction, age-based rationing proposals operate under the 
assumption that the aging of the population represents an important, if not the most 
important, contributor to rising cost pressures in the health care sector. In severely 
limiting access to health care for the elderly, it is claimed, such proposals address this 
key driver of increasing expenditures and thereby guarantee substantial cost savings. 
However, this second presupposition is no less problematic than the first. Past spending 
trends suggest that population aging, by itself, has been only a minor driver of the 
annual growth in health care expenditures. For example, analysis of health care 
expenditure in British Columbia between 1975 and 2005 indicates that population aging 
increased health spending by only 0.7% per year (Lee 2006). British Columbia is an 
interesting object of study given that it has a higher than average proportion of elderly 
relative to other provinces. In Australia, population aging has been responsible for only 
10% of increases in federal government health care costs over the last decade (Coory 
2004). Moreover, spending patterns between 1995 and 2009 across OECD countries show 
that population aging accounted for a mere 0.5% of  the annual increase in health care 
expenditures (4.3%) (de la Maisonneuve & Oliveira Martins 2013).  
Analysis of past spending patterns is only meaningful to a certain extent. After all, 
population aging has yet to reach its peak, which is expected to occur around 2031 (Lee 
2006). However, projections suggest that population aging will remain a minor driver of 
increases in health spending during this period. Richardson and Robertson (1999) 
present projections for Australia for 1995-2051. Regarding the effect of population aging 
on health expenditure, they conclude: “if ageing were the only source of expenditure 
growth the relative size of the health sector would significantly decline as GDP would be 
expected to rise more rapidly than health expenditures” (Richardson & Robertson 1999, 
14). Data for the European Union and the US also point towards a small effect of 
population aging on future increases in health spending (Przywara 2010; Fogel 2009).  
 
Medical technology is the prime determinant of the increase in health care costs 
(Dormont et al. 2006; Przywara 2010). Given the rather abstract nature of the term 
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‘medical technology’, it is useful to consider more closely what it is generally 
understood to encompass. The various available definitions tend to converge on a broad 
construal of the term, as illustrated by the following two definitions:   
 
Technological innovation in medicine includes new physical capital and 
equipment, new surgical procedures, drugs and treatments, as well as new 
procedures based on original combinations of the above. (Pammolli et al. 2012, 
627) 
 
We define new medical technology as new products, procedures or practice styles 
related to new knowledge about disease or diagnostic or treatment technologies 
that alter the mix of medical goods and services that are used. (Chernew &  
Newhouse 2012, 7) 
 
Depending on the country studied, medical technology accounts for 27% to 75% of the 
annual growth in health spending (European Commission and the Economic Policy 
Committee 2012). Between 2007 and 2060, technology alone is projected to yield a 6% 
increase in the share of GDP devoted to health care (from 6.7% to 13%) within the 
European Union. This effect is more than the threefold of that of population aging. In 
Belgium, the effect of medical technology, relative to population aging, is even greater 
(a 4:1 ratio) (Przywara 2010).  
 
New medical technologies impact upon spending growth in ways that extend beyond 
their unit cost and uptake rate. The aggregate effect of a new technology on health care 
costs is also determined by the way it influences the use of existing services. A new 
technology can either increase or decrease the dependence on already available services 
and products. The former effect is known as ‘complementarity’, whereas the latter is 
referred to as ‘substitution’(Chernew 2010).  
There are various mechanisms through which an innovation can create 
complementarity (Chernew & Newhouse 2012). For example, it can do so by extending 
life expectancy as patients are likely to consume additional health care services in these 
extra years of life. While such incremental services are undoubtedly beneficial, they 
have a general tendency to significantly increase health care expenditures. An example 
of this mechanism is the potential link between innovations in treating coronary artery 
disease and the increased incidence of end-stage renal disease. Heart disease patients 
have an elevated risk of developing renal disease. Thus, whereas such patients are likely 
to have died prior to the introduction of this innovation, they may now live long enough 
to develop end-stage renal disease and become dependent upon dialysis.  
A second type of complementarity occurs when health outcomes (risk-benefit ratios) for a 
certain patient population improve as a result of the fine-tuning of a surgical procedure. 
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As a result, patients who otherwise may not have been treated are drawn into this 
procedure (Chernew 2010). This type of complementarity explains the observation 
made by Fuchs (1999) that, from 1987 onwards, the rate at which various treatments 
(angioplasty, hip replacement and knee replacement) were provided to the oldest old 
rapidly increased. Another example of this type of complementarity relates to surgical 
advances in the procedure of cholecystectomy (surgical removal of the gallbladder) in 
the 1990s. These resulted in a 60% increase in the use of the procedure. The innovation 
mainly drew into treatment asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic patients, for whom 
the risk-benefit ratio was previously unfavorable. The subsequent increase in health 
care expenditures was not only related to the rise in the number of procedures 
performed, but also to growing numbers of office visits and diagnostic testing. 
Complementarity of this type can increase the cost of a new technology by as much as 
50% (Chernew & Newhouse 2012).  
 
Substitution generally occurs when an innovation replaces an established service. For 
example, “coronary angioplasty may substitute for more invasive coronary artery graft 
bypass surgery” (Chernew & Newhouse 2012, 9). In a similar vein, laparoscopic 
techniques can supplant traditional open procedures. Whether or not substitution will 
lead to cost increases, depends on the relative unit costs of the two services (supplanted 
versus supplanting) and the magnitude of any quantity changes. The latter refers to the 
process whereby, for example, a new pharmaceutical, in supplanting and old one, 
decreases (or increases) the frequency of the recommended daily intake.  
 
In aiming to address population aging, rather than medical technology, age-based 
rationing proposals fail to tackle the root cause of the health care cost crisis. 
Consequently, they do not represent a promising solution to the problem. Admittedly, 
in denying life-extending treatment to the elderly, such proposals inadvertently address 
the issue of medical technology. However, they do so only partially. After all, although 
the use of medical technology is likely to be highly concentrated in life-extending 
treatment, it is not limited to the latter. Moreover, and most importantly, medical 
technology is not limited to, nor largely concentrated within, the elderly population. In 
fact, its use is approximately evenly distributed between the young (<65) and the old 
(>65) (see, for example, Polder et al. 2002). Thus, any savings obtained through limiting 
the use of technology in the elderly will quickly be undone if its use remains 
uncontrolled in the younger population. An example will help to illustrate the 
temporary nature of the cost savings achieved under age-based rationing. Suppose that 
we implement Callahan’s proposal of denying life-extending treatment to the elderly. 
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Life-extending treatment for those over 65 years of age accounts for 25% of total annual 
health care expenditures (Polder et al. 2002).17 In 2010, health care accounted for 7.1% of 
GDP (Przywara 2010). Thus, if Callahan’s proposal had been implemented in 2010, the 
share of GDP devoted to health care would, in that year, instead have amounted to 
approximately 5.3% (i.e. a reduction of 1.8%). Between 2010 and 2030, the use of 
technology in those under 65 years of age is projected to increase the share of GDP 
devoted to health care by 1.5% (Przywara 2010). Thus, it would only take a little over 20 
years before the cost savings induced by Callahan’s proposal are nullified by 
uncontrolled technological growth in the younger population. From that point onwards, 
we would once again face rising health care expenditures. Note that this example still 
overestimates the (temporary) cost saving potential of Callahan’s proposal, for two 
reasons. First, we have assumed a denial of life-extending treatment to those over 65 
years of age, whereas Callahan’s proposed cut-off age lies around 80. Second, our 
example assumes that, in being denied life-extending treatment, the elderly are also 
deprived of any other form of medical care. However, on Callahan’s account, the denial 
of life-extending treatment is accompanied by the provision of care. Moreover, in 
certain cases, treating a condition works out cheaper than offering care (Clarke 2001).   
1.5 Conclusion  
Despite having its roots in the 1980s, the idea of age-based rationing is still very much 
alive. The fact that it continues to enjoy a relatively large constituency is disconcerting, 
irrespective of whether or not age-based rationing amounts to age discrimination. It is 
highly unethical to exclude the elderly – or any other group for that matter 
(irrespective of whether the group is defined in terms of age or another criterion) – 
from beneficial forms of treatment when this practice defeats its own object, i.e. it fails 
to provide a solution to the health care cost crisis. Age-based rationing rests on the 
misguided assumption that population aging represents a major driver of rising health 
care expenditures. Although it addresses medical technology (the true driver of rising 
health care costs), it does so only partially and inadvertently. Consequently, age-based 
rationing provides, at best, a temporary relief from rising health care costs. As we will 
 
                                                     
17 The facts we base our example upon hold for the Netherlands. However, projections suggest that the Dutch 
figures are representative for other EU- countries (Przywara 2010).  
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see in the next chapter, other proposed solutions to the health care cost crisis also fail 
to recognize the important role of medical technology. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Population aging is now a global phenomenon. This shift in society’s age structure has 
been a gradual process in developed countries, spanning over more than a century. In 
more developing regions, however, population aging has only recently begun and is 
proceeding at a much faster pace than it did in developed countries (Kinsella & Phillips 
2005).  
The current demographic situation is the result of both improvements in life 
expectancy and declining fertility rates. The baby boomers will soon accelerate the 
process of population aging as they enter old age en masse.  
Graying populations are a human success story in that they represent the culmination 
of social and technological progress. Nevertheless, population aging is generally viewed 
as a burden, rather than a blessing. ‘The coming entitlement tsunami’ and the 
‘demographic earthquake’ are just a few of the expressions that are frequently used to 
characterize this phenomenon (Beard & Williamson 2010). One of the concerns is that 
an aging population will cause health care costs to spiral out of control. For example, 
according to projections made by the trustees of Medicare the program will go bankrupt 
in 2018 (Callahan & Prager 2008). Such dire predictions have initiated a widespread 
search for effective ‘remedies’.  
 
In the previous chapter, we examined one of the proposed measures for constraining 
the feared escalation of costs related to population aging. Another type of cost 
containment proposal consists in reforming Medicare in the US. The first cries for 
reform can be traced back to the early years after Medicare’s enactment in 1965, and 
ultimately resulted in a partial privatization of the program. Since the 1990s, attempts 
to further privatize Medicare have been ongoing (Geyman 2004). These reform 
proposals distinguish themselves from the earlier ones in that they are framed as a 
much needed answer to the challenges of population aging. The underlying idea is that 
competition between private insurers will reduce health care costs (Wiener & Tilly 
2002). Congressman Paul Ryan has recently proposed that Medicare move toward a 
system wherein the government gives seniors a fixed payment to purchase a private 
plan of their choice (Cannon 2011). Critics fear that such a system will burden seniors 
with high out-of-pocket expenditures, rendering many of them unable to receive the 
needed care. In addition, critics point to existing data which suggest that, in the area of 
cost containment, private plans perform worse than traditional Medicare (Geyman 
2004).  
Proposals pertaining to age-based rationing and Medicare reform have been around for 
quite some time. A more recent cost containment proposal (see, for example, Micans 
2005; Dorshkind et al. 2009; Olshansky et al. 2006) is to invest more in biogerontology - 
 102 
research into the biology of aging. The idea is that such research will enable us to tackle 
age-related diseases simultaneously, thereby ensuring that the elderly enjoy an 
increased healthspan (i.e. that they enjoy an increase in the number of years spent in a 
disease-free state). This, in turn, it is believed, will reduce the pressure on the health 
care system. To date, this argument has received no attention, which is surprising given 
the highly recognized need for cost containment in health care. The aim of this chapter 
is to evaluate this argument, which we will refer to as ‘the cost containment argument’, 
by critically examining its most fundamental presuppositions. Before we embark upon 
this task, however, we provide a more detailed account of what the biogerontological 
approach involves and what it hopes to achieve. 
2.2 The biogerontological approach 
Research aimed at tackling age-related diseases is primarily focused on developing 
methods for treating or preventing these pathologies individually. This approach, 
however, has only very limited potential for prolonging the healthspan of the elderly. 
The incidence of most age-related diseases increases exponentially during the last stage 
of life so that comorbidity is an inescapable fact for many elderly (Butler et al. 2008). 
Consequently, even if we succeeded in eradicating any one of the major age-related 
diseases, its place would immediately be taken by yet another.  
It is only by tackling age-related diseases simultaneously that one is guaranteed a 
substantial impact on the overall length of healthy life. This approach amounts to 
intervening in the aging process as aging is the common, underlying cause of all age-
related diseases. Depending on the extent to which the healthspan is prolonged, 
significant increases in either average life expectancy or maximum lifespan are 
expected (Vincent et al. 2008). The endeavor of intervening in aging is, therefore, 
commonly referred to as ‘lifespan extension’18. Given the combined benefit of increased 
healthspan and lifespan, many biogerontologists deplore that less than 0.1% of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget goes to anti-aging research (Olshansky et al. 
2006).   
 
Biogerontology was long viewed as a fringe science (Fishman et al. 2008). However, 
recent developments within the field have caused it to gain scientific legitimacy.  
 
                                                     
18
 We use the terms ‘lifespan extension’ and ‘anti-aging’ interchangeably throughout this chapter.  
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A large part of the research efforts has been devoted to caloric restriction – an 
experimental setting wherein caloric intake is reduced to about 40% below ad libitum 
levels. Contrary to malnutrition, the intake of important nutrients, such as vitamins and 
minerals, is still guaranteed. Studies on laboratory animals demonstrate that caloric 
restriction results in a substantial increase in both average life expectancy and 
maximum lifespan (Hackler 2004). Moreover, age-related diseases are postponed and 
their incidence is reduced (Ingram et al. 2004).  
Most humans would probably have difficulty adhering to such a drastic dietary regimen. 
This recognition has initiated the search for substances that are able to mimic the 
effects of caloric restriction in the absence of a reduced caloric intake. Resveratrol, a 
chemical found in the skin of black grapes, potentially offers promising prospects in this 
respect (Baur 2010). According to various studies, resveratrol activates sirtuins, 
enzymes that possibly form the basis of the beneficial effects of caloric restriction 
(Canto & Auwerx 2009). Resveratrol appears to markedly prolong the lifespan of yeast, 
fruit flies and roundworms (Baur 2010). In obese mice, the administration of resveratrol 
produces a positive effect on health and survival. Although non-obese mice exhibit a 
noticeable improvement with regard to certain age-related forms of deterioration, 
resveratrol does not appear to produce a life-prolonging effect in this population 
(Pearson et al. 2008).   
 
Researchers are also investigating the role of gene mutations in longevity. The 
importance of gene mutations became apparent upon the release of data concerning the 
lifespan of the so-called Ames dwarf mice (Miller 2002). This phenotype is a result of a 
mutation in the PROP-1 gene (Liang et al. 2003). Ames dwarf mice lack growth hormone, 
prolactin, and thyroid stimulating hormone (Dollé et al. 2001). Research indicates that 
the average life expectancy of male Ames dwarf mice is 49% longer than that of normal 
control mice (Liang et al. 2003). Females exhibit a 68% increase in average life 
expectancy. In addition, the maximum lifespan of both male and female mutants is, 
respectively, 20% and 50% longer, compared to the control group. Moreover, at an 
advanced age, Ames dwarf mice still score well with regard to locomotor activity and 
cognitive functioning (Kinney et al. 2001). Finally, they exhibit a much lower prevalence 
of adenocarcinoma of the lung, relative to the normal control group (Ikeno et al. 2003).  
To our knowledge, only one study has, so far, examined the life-extending potential of a 
similar mutation of the PROP-1 gene in humans. The study population of this research 
consisted of individuals who, due to a mutation in this gene, have a specific form of 
dwarfism (Laron 2005). Although the observations recorded in this isolated study do not 
allow us to draw definite conclusions, they nevertheless suggest that there could 
possibly be a connection between this specific variant of human growth hormone 
deficiency and a prolonged lifespan.  
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There is much disagreement concerning the expected outcomes of biogerontological 
research. The different opinions on this matter can be translated into four ‘life 
extension scenarios’: prolonged senescence, compression of morbidity, decelerated 
aging, and arrested aging.  
Prolonged senescence amounts to the failure of the anti-aging research enterprise: life 
itself is prolonged, while the healthspan is not. For instance, decrepitude would start to 
set in at the age of 55 and one would die at the age of about 95 (Derkx 2009).  
The prospect of a prolonged senescence is sometimes invoked as an argument against 
anti-aging research. However, this argument is not compelling. As previously noted, 
most age-related diseases show an exponential increase from a certain age onward. Each 
age-related disease increases our risk of death. It is, thus, unlikely that we could live to 
experience a period of decrepitude of the length envisaged by the prolonged senescence 
scenario (de Grey 2005).  
 
Those who anticipate a compression of morbidity believe that interventions in the aging 
process would have but a marginal effect on the length of our lives. Individuals would 
live long, healthy lives and then die rather quickly after experiencing a negligible period 
of decrepitude (Juengst et al. 2003).  
The fact that the absence of age-related diseases is extremely beneficial in terms of 
mortality risk explains the implausibility of the compressed morbidity scenario. The 
considerably extended healthspan, envisaged under this scenario, amounts to a 
substantial postponement of the onset of age-related diseases. It is, therefore, highly 
unlikely that no similarly meaningful extension of life would occur (Gems 2009; de Grey 
2006).  
 
Proponents of decelerated aging argue that we can postpone age-related diseases to 
such an extent that both average life expectancy and maximum lifespan are increased. 
Under this scenario, 90-year-olds would, for example, enjoy the health and vigor of 
today’s 50-year-olds (Juengst et al. 2003). Miller (2002) envisages an average life 
expectancy of around 112 and a maximum lifespan of around 140.  
We see no reason to question ‘decelerated aging’ as an outcome of anti-aging research. 
Most biogerontologists seem to share this view (Gems 2009).  
 
Arrested aging undoubtedly constitutes the most radical scenario. It is tantamount to 
achieving total mastery of the aging process in that its harmful effects would be entirely 
prevented. This approach involves the continuous repair of the molecular and cellular 
damage responsible for the onset of age-related frailty (de Grey et al. 2002). The aim is 
to repair the damage before it reaches a level at which it induces age-related 
pathologies. Whether or not the scenario of ‘arrested aging’ is plausible, depends upon 
the feasibility of the SENS-project (Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence), the 
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single proposed project for achieving this feat. Aubrey de Grey, the man behind SENS, 
has identified several forms of damage responsible for age-related pathologies and 
degeneration. For each type of damage, he has formulated a strategy targeted towards 
its repair (de Grey et al. 2002). Suggested therapies for repairing the damage range from 
genetic interventions to stem cell therapies. Although de Grey (2003) acknowledges that 
these fixes will initially be imperfect, he expects the added years to be sufficient for us 
to develop improved fixes. The latter, in turn, would provide us with still more life 
years, enabling the production of still better repair methods, and so on. As long as we 
keep developing new, improved therapies fast enough, we should be able to postpone 
age-related diseases indefinitely. As these pathologies would no longer occur, a state of 
‘virtual immortality’ would be attained in the sense that death would only result from 
accidents, suicide, wars, and so forth (Binstock 2004).   
The SENS-proposal lacks persuasiveness for several reasons. First, each of the therapies 
proposed by de Grey is unlikely to be realized any time soon. This renders the prospect 
of all of the proposed strategies being implemented very remote (Warner et al. 2005). 
Second, even if we were able to accomplish this feat, there is no guarantee that we 
would hereby have arrested the aging process. There appear to be other types of 
damage, besides those identified by de Grey, contributing to age-related decline (Estep 
III et al. 2006). Moreover, still other important forms of age-related damage could well 
be discovered in the future. In sum, we would probably end up having to repair an 
insurmountable amount of damage in order to arrest the aging process. 
2.3 Presuppositions underlying the cost containment 
argument  
The authors who advance the cost containment argument (i.e. the claim that the 
biogerontological approach represents a viable route to cost containment in health 
care) rely on a number of presuppositions. We will scrutinize the four main 
assumptions. 
2.3.1 Life extension will decrease the frailspan 
Proponents of the cost containment argument support their reasoning by reference to 
the ability of anti-aging interventions to prolong healthspan. However, what is required 
for financial gains to be conceivable are not so much increases in healthspan as absolute 
reductions in frailspan (i.e. the period of age-related frailty). Thus, although most of 
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them do not explicitly state this, all proponents of the cost containment argument must 
presuppose that any increase in healthspan will be accompanied by a decreased 
frailspan.  
Most proponents of the cost containment argument seem to think that various life-
extending scenarios are plausible. Holliday, for example, advocates “measures to 
prevent or delay the onset of these [age-associated] diseases” (Holliday 1996, 90) . Along 
the same lines, Micans speaks of the possibility to  “slow or prevent the signs of aging 
from occurring” (Micans 2005, 550) . None of them rule out the possibility of decelerated 
aging. The latter is, as we have argued, the most plausible scenario. Thus, we need to 
analyze its implications for the frailspan in order to assess the above presupposition.  
It is often thought that decelerated aging will be accompanied by a curtailed frailspan. 
This prediction is based on the observed reduction in frailspan in rodents whose aging 
process has been slowed down through caloric restriction. Extrapolations of this kind 
are, however, unwarranted (Gems 2011).19 Moreover, even if extrapolations from 
rodents to humans were somehow justified, there would be little point in employing 
studies on caloric restriction as a reference point. For reasons previously cited, most 
humans are unlikely to engage in this dietary regimen as a method for decelerating 
aging.  
We are currently unable to decelerate the human aging process. Rather than enticing us 
into making uneducated guesses, this fact should encourage us to refrain from any 
judgment concerning the effect of decelerated aging on the human frailspan. Thus, 
contrary to what proponents of the cost containment argument presuppose, we cannot 
exclude the possibility of the frailspan retaining its current length or even increasing in 
length.  
One might argue that a curtailed frailspan is not required in order for health care 
savings to occur. Harris (2004), for instance, attempts to show that life extension, even 
when accompanied by an increased frailspan or a frailspan of the current length, still 
makes good economic sense. His argument relies on economic discounting, a technique 
used to determine the present value of a financial cost that will be incurred at some 
point in the future. By enabling us to translate future costs into their present value, 
economic discounting provides us with a sound way for comparing costs incurred at 
different moments in time. Economic discounting is not to be confused with an 
adjustment for inflation. Future costs need to be discounted in order to account for the 
time value of money.  
Harris reasons that we gain financially from life extension because the latter amounts to 
postponing the moment in time when we start incurring frailty-related health care 
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 Evidently, the same holds true for extrapolations from findings in Ames dwarf mice to humans.  
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costs. He uses the example of a newborn. Under present circumstances, this newborn 
will reach the period of frailty and its associated costs at around 70. In Harris’ example, 
the newborn will reach this period only after 1000 years20 in the case of life extension. 
According to Harris, the present-day discounted cost of treating that person in 70 years 
will be substantially higher than the present-day cost of treating that same person in 
1000 years. There is, however, no reason why this should necessarily be the case. Harris 
does not seem to take into account that, over time, health care costs can increase 
considerably in real terms. Thus, health care costs could, between year 70 and year 1000, 
increase to such an extent in real terms that the discounted cost of treating that person 
in 1000 years is higher than that of treating the same person in 70 years. In sum, there is 
no guarantee that an increased frailspan or even a frailspan of the current length would 
be financially beneficial. Proponents of the cost containment argument must, therefore, 
presuppose the occurrence of a reduction in frailspan. 
2.3.2 Life extension will enjoy a considerable uptake rate 
Let us accept for the sake of argument that the deceleration of the aging process will be 
accompanied by a decrease in frailspan. The reduction in health care costs, envisaged by 
proponents of the cost containment argument, is substantial. The prospect of 
considerable savings presupposes a sizeable amount of people using life-extending, anti-
aging technologies. However, this is, as we argue below, a problematic presupposition.  
 
The little available research concerning community attitudes towards life-extending 
technologies points towards a rather low uptake rate. In a recent study (Partridge et al. 
2011), for instance, only 35% of the respondents answered affirmatively when asked 
whether they would use a life-extending technology. Another study (Underwood et al. 
2009) found just over half of the participants willing to consider lifespan extension. 
Despite appearances to the contrary, these outcomes need not be more reassuring than 
the ones from the former study. After all, whether or not these respondents would 
actually opt for lifespan extension, as opposed to merely considering it, depended on a 
number of conditions being fulfilled. Some participants stated that they would only use 
life-extending technologies if their loved ones were to do so. Others referred to the 
absence of any negative impact on society as a prerequisite. Thus, if life extension 
technologies become available, far fewer than 50% of these respondents would actually 
end up using them.  
 
                                                     
20
 Although we have previously argued that a lifespan of 1000 years is highly unrealistic, we have chosen to 
stick to Harris’ example in order to offer an accurate representation of his argument.  
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Interesting results have also emerged from a study conducted by Lang et al. (2007). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 conditions. Whereas those in the first 
condition were informed that research on aging offered hopeful prospects with respect 
to physical, mental, and psychological fitness in old age, participants in the second 
condition were told the opposite. The control group received no information 
concerning research on aging. Participants in each group were asked which age they 
would like to reach. Surprisingly, the answers did not vary significantly across the 3 
conditions. In each of the 3 conditions, the average desired lifetime was approximately 
86 years – well below the current maximum lifespan. Less than 10% of the respondents 
wanted to live to 120 or beyond.  
 
There is another reason why it is problematic to presuppose a substantial uptake rate of 
life-extending technologies. These technologies will, like any other new medical 
technology, be very expensive. Thus, very few people will have access to them. In fact, 
relative to many other types of new technology, the cost of lifespan extension can be 
expected to be of an even higher order as it will most probably involve higher research 
and development costs. Firstly, human aging is a highly complex biological process, 
which suggests that any intervention designed to tackle it would need to be equally 
complex. Secondly, many aging mechanisms seem to act over the entire lifespan. The 
effectiveness of anti-aging interventions would, therefore, probably be inversely related 
to the age at which they are begun (Hadley et al. 2005). The early administration age, 
combined with the (current) lack of valid biomarkers of aging, suggests that clinical 
trials would probably span the entire lifetime of the enrolled subjects (Sprott 2010).  
 
Proponents of the cost containment argument might respond that the cost of life-
extending technology will diminish after a while. Although this is likely to happen, this 
fact does not necessarily do much to further their cause. Given the complexity of aging, 
one will most likely have to undergo numerous, different types of interventions in order 
to achieve the desired effect. For example, a combination of stem cell treatments, 
pharmaceuticals and genetic consultations could be required (Ehni & Marckmann 2009). 
Thus, even if each of the needed interventions became cheaper over time, the ‘whole 
package’ would probably still not be affordable for a significant part of the population.  
 
Another response might be that public coverage of the needed interventions will be 
provided in order to guarantee wide access to life extension. Mackey (2003), for 
instance, puts forward this argument. This line of reasoning is problematic. Various 
considerations are involved in deciding whether or not a drug or intervention qualifies 
for public coverage. The financial cost of the drug/intervention is obviously an 
important consideration. As noted above, life extension involves the application of 
various, very expensive interventions. Thus, public coverage might not be feasible in 
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budgetary terms. However, even if budgetary feasibility were not an issue, there would, 
from a purely financial perspective, probably be little incentive to provide public 
coverage. After all, as we will argue further on, life extension is likely to be more 
expensive than the current approach of treating or preventing age-related diseases 
individually.  
Another important consideration is the extent to which the drug/intervention is 
medically necessary. In the case of life extension, the question of medical necessity 
tends to be framed in terms of whether or not aging is a disease (Caplan 2005). The latter 
issue is currently highly debated (Butler et al. 2004). The controversy surrounding this 
issue makes it difficult to predict the final outcome of the debate.  
The level of public support for coverage of a drug/intervention is also taken into 
account in coverage decisions. The widespread reservations about using life extension 
among the public will need to subside for it to score well on this criterion. Once again, it 
is difficult to predict the chances of this happening.  
We have discussed only a few of the important criteria involved in coverage decisions. 
Nevertheless, our discussion suffices to show that it is premature to posit public 
coverage of life-extending interventions as a solution to the problem of access.  
2.3.3 Population aging is an important driver of rising health care costs 
Even if we accept, for the sake of the argument, the correctness of the two previous 
presuppositions, then the cost containment argument still lacks persuasiveness. After 
all, it encompasses a questionable presupposition concerning the problem in response 
to which anti-aging interventions are put forward. The argument has as its starting 
point the claim that population aging will cause health care expenditures to rise to an 
unsustainable level. Thus, it presupposes that the aging of the population is an 
important, if not the most important, contributor to rising cost pressures in the health 
care sector.  
 
As we have discussed extensively in the previous chapter, population aging represents 
but a minor driver of rising health care costs. In exaggerating the role of population 
aging in (future) health care cost increases, proponents of the cost containment 
argument overestimate the cost saving potential of life-extending interventions. The 
problems facing the cost containment argument, however, potentially go much deeper. 
In the following, we argue that life-extending interventions not only save less than 
proponents of this argument claim, but could actually increase health care 
expenditures.  
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Recall that medical technology is the prime determinant of the increase in health care 
costs. New technologies and the intensified use of old ones are responsible for about 
50% of the annual growth in health spending (Callahan 2009). Thus, it seems that life 
extension, by relying on technology, would be part of the problem, rather than the 
solution, when it comes to keeping health care costs in check. Proponents of the cost 
containment argument might respond that life extension distinguishes itself from the 
average new technology in that it would save more resources than it costs. In other 
words, they might claim that the savings achieved through the reduction of the 
frailspan would outweigh the costs of the technology needed to bring about this 
reduction. However, the expected characteristics of life extension render this claim 
dubious. Life extension will, most probably involve various types of new technologies 
being periodically applied from an early age until the final stages of one’s significantly 
extended lifespan.  
 
There is yet another way in which life extension would contribute to an intensified use 
of medical technology. This second route relates to the ‘complementarity’ effect of new 
medical technologies which we discussed in chapter 1. As noted above, we are here 
assuming that life extension will both increase the healthspan and reduce the frailspan. 
Obviously, a person incurs many different types of medical costs other than those 
related to old age. Thus, an increase in healthspan amounts to an increase in the 
number of years during which such other medical costs are incurred. A part of these 
‘extra’ medical costs will inevitably be related to the use of medical technology. In sum, 
life extension is likely to increase health care costs as both the increase in healthspan 
and the reduction in frailspan imply an intensified use of medical technology.   
2.3.4 Any negative effects of life extension are outweighed by the 
achieved health care savings (and other perceived benefits)  
Given the problematic nature of the above presuppositions, we currently have no 
reason to believe that anti-aging interventions constitute an effective means of 
containing health care costs. However, let us suppose for a moment that such 
interventions do have a (substantial) cost containing potential. If this potential is to be a 
compelling reason to increase funding for aging research, one must presuppose that 
these health care savings outweigh any negative effects of anti-aging interventions.  
It is obviously extremely difficult to predict how anti-aging will affect our lives. 
However, as we are here assuming a considerable uptake rate of life-extending 
interventions, we can reasonably expect a substantial population increase to occur. 
Projections of the US Census Bureau illustrate how profound the effects of increased 
longevity can be:  
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Each 10-year prolongation of life expectancy will increase the eventual population 
of Earth at stability by 1.3 billion persons […]. If world longevity follows the 
patterns that will be achieved first in the more developed countries and reaches 
115 years, 5 decades longer than the current worldwide longevity, that would 
mean a further increase of 6.5 billion persons. Instead of the current estimated 
final population at stability of about 10 billion persons, there would be almost 
three people for every one now living worldwide. (Louria 2005, 317)   
 
Marked population increases would have several detrimental effects. Biodiversity loss, 
deforestation, global warming, and depletion of resources (energy resources, food, 
water, and open space) are just a few of the expected problems.  
The severity of each of the above problems is undeniable. It is, therefore, not obvious 
that the positive effect of cost containment outweighs these negative effects. 
Proponents of the cost containment argument must argue why this is so. They can 
follow one of two strategies in making this argument.  
The first strategy consists in showing that the probability of overpopulation occurring is 
negligible. In this case, the obvious argument is that societies which adopt lifespan 
extension will most probably restrict the number of offspring people are allowed to 
have (Bostrom & Roache 2008). Such a policy is, however, problematic for several 
reasons. To begin with, ensuring compliance with any population control program will 
prove challenging. For example, fining people in case of non-compliance is likely to 
have not much of a deterrent effect. The very poor will rely on the fact that they are 
unable to pay the fine, while the very rich will gladly pay it. It seems that only the use of 
unethical means (e.g. forced sterilization) guarantees compliance. Furthermore, the 
question arises as to whether people who do not opt for lifespan extension should also 
be subjected to reproductive restrictions. If so, one would probably have a hard time 
justifying this. Finally, the introduction of reproductive restrictions could, by further 
lowering fertility rates, induce a further aging of the population. China’s one-child-
policy, having contributed to the dramatic aging of its population (Zhang & Goza 2006), 
is illustrative in this respect. Population aging could prove to be equally challenging in a 
world of extended life spans, even if we assume a reduction in frailspan. The 
sustainability of pension systems, for instance, might still be an issue as we cannot 
simply assume that people will be willing to work longer. 
A second strategy is to acknowledge the occurrence of overpopulation, while arguing 
that its negative effects can be remediated. For example, one might, following Mackey 
(2003), claim that societies facing food shortages would find methods for genetically 
engineering more nutritionally efficient food. However, it remains to be seen whether 
such methods will actually be developed. Nevertheless, even if we could rely on 
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remedies being developed for some problems, there would be little reason for optimism. 
After all, other problems, such as the loss of biodiversity, are amenable at the most to 
mitigation, not remediation.  
Given the problems with both of the outlined strategies, proponents of the cost 
containment argument will most probably be unable to successfully argue that health 
care savings outweigh the identified negative effects.  
 
Most proponents of the cost containment argument clearly posit the cost containing 
potential of anti-aging interventions as a sufficient reason for investing more in aging 
research. Other proponents (Farrelly 2008; Butler et al. 2008), however, mention several 
other benefits21 attached to anti-aging interventions, besides their cost containing 
potential. One of the additional perceived benefits, for example, is that longer lives 
contribute to a substantial growth of the national economy. The inclusion of these 
additional benefits could imply that, for this group of proponents, the cost containing 
potential of anti-aging interventions in conjunction with these other benefits constitute 
a sufficient reason for investing more in aging research. If this is so, they must 
presuppose that all of these benefits together outweigh the bad effects of 
overpopulation. Once again, however, an argument will need to be put forward in 
support of this presupposition – an arduous task, to say the least.  
2.4 Concluding remarks 
Health care costs are rising at an unsustainable rate. Proposed measures for tackling 
this problem include age-based rationing and Medicare reform. A more recent proposal 
is to rely on life extension as a means of containing health care costs. We have identified 
four presuppositions underlying this cost containment argument. Each of these 
presuppositions is problematic. They raise serious questions concerning both the 
morality (the last presupposition) and the efficacy (the other presuppositions) of life 
extension as a cost containment measure. Thus, life extension fares no better than 
‘older proposals’. The failure of all these proposals is mainly due to their misconstruing 
the problem of rising health care costs as one rooted in population aging. Society’s 
heavy reliance on medical technology is the main driver of health care cost growth. Cost 
 
                                                     
21
  The term ‘longevity dividend’ is generally used to refer to these other benefits as well as to the expected 
benefit of health care savings.  
  113 
containment policy should, therefore, redirect its focus away from population aging 
towards medical technology. 
 
There are many challenges involved in achieving a more responsible use of medical 
technology. A first challenge consists in specifying what constitutes the appropriate 
attitude towards medical technology. This attitude does not imply putting a stop to all 
technological innovation. Neither does it imply a reluctance to say ‘no’ to efficacious but 
overly expensive technologies. In sum, society stands for the difficult task of striking a 
balance between both extremes; between allowing too little and too much.  
A second challenge consists in overcoming the widespread opposition to the proposed 
shift towards a more limited use of medical technology. We can expect strong resistance 
from the many industries involved in the production and distribution of medical 
technologies. However, the public at large will also be reluctant to embrace the required 
changes. In fact, relative to age-based rationing and Medicare privatization proposals, 
our proposal will likely elicit even more public criticism. The former proposals ‘merely’ 
jeopardize the interests of the elderly population. However, our proposal jeopardizes an 
interest shared by everyone as both young and old can benefit from medical technology.    
A final challenge relates to the deeply ingrained nature of the attitude which needs 
turning around. Society’s attachment to medical technology has its roots in the 
Enlightenment idea of infinite progress. As such, it is part of our cultural heritage. It will 
prove difficult to change such a deeply rooted mindset.  
Despite the many challenges involved, we will need to find a way of putting the issue of 
medical technology at the top of the agenda. It is the only way out of the problem.  
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3.1 Introduction 
During the past century, the developed world has witnessed an important shift in 
disease patterns. Degenerative diseases have replaced infectious and parasitic diseases 
as a major cause of death. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the 
‘epidemiologic transition’. As degenerative diseases tend to occur at a much older age 
than infectious diseases, this transition amounts to a redistribution of diseases and 
deaths from the young to the old (Olshansky & Ault 1986). If we are to further increase 
the healthspan – i.e. the number of years spent in a disease-free state – we will have to 
devise means of combating age-related diseases. As we mentioned at the start of the 
previous chapter, there are two distinct approaches to tackling these pathologies. This 
chapter analyzes the views of deontologists with regard to these strategies. The impact 
of the latter on both healthspan and maximum lifespan, as we shall see, largely 
influences deontologists’ position on the matter. For this reason, it is useful to start out 
by briefly recapitulating the two approaches to tackling age-related diseases as this will 
allow us to draw attention to their effects on healthspan and maximum lifespan.   
     
A first approach consists of the traditional prevention and treatment of age-related 
diseases. This piecemeal strategy, in which the diseases of aging are addressed 
individually, is known as the ‘weak’ approach (Lucke & Hall 2006). This terminology 
refers to the latter’s limited impact on the healthspan and maximum lifespan22. As we 
saw in chapter 2, the last stage of life sees an exponential increase in the incidence of 
most age-related diseases. Consequently, once any one of the lethal diseases is 
eradicated, it is only a matter of time before its place is taken by yet another. Scientists, 
therefore, concur that, whereas this approach is likely to increase the healthspan, the 
increase will be of a small magnitude. Furthermore, they agree that an increase in the 
maximum lifespan is highly improbable (Carnes et al. 2002). Any such increase that would 
occur, would be only minimal.  
 
A second strategy, known as the ‘strong’ or ‘biogerontological’ approach (Lucke & Hall 
2006) is to intervene in the aging process itself – the underlying cause of age-related 
diseases. This strategy has the advantage of addressing all age-related pathologies 
simultaneously. Biogerontologists are currently exploring the merits of gene therapy, 
caloric restriction (CR) and CR mimetics (i.e. substances which mimic the beneficial 
effects of caloric restriction while avoiding the need for dietary restrictions) (Marques 
 
                                                     
22 The current maximum human lifespan is 122 years (Pamplona et al. 1998).  
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et al. 2010; Miller 2002; Barazzetti & Reichlin 2011). Recall that the diverging views 
concerning the outcomes of biogerontological research can be captured in four 
scenarios: prolonged senescence, compressed morbidity, decelerated aging, and 
arrested aging. For reasons that will become clear later on, the scope of this chapter is 
limited to the last two scenarios. Thus, whenever terms such as ‘biogerontology’ and 
‘intervening in aging’ are used throughout this chapter, they should be interpreted as 
referring merely to decelerated and arrested aging.  
The deceleration of the aging process would markedly postpone the development of 
old-age frailty and its accompanying diseases, thereby producing a substantial increase 
in both the healthspan and maximum lifespan (Gems 2009). Interventions such as caloric 
restriction appear to decelerate aging in animal models. Extrapolating from the findings 
of these experiments, Richard Miller (2002) anticipates that the deceleration of the 
human aging process will bring about an average life expectancy of 112 and a maximum 
lifespan of 140.  
The act of arresting the aging process would also increase both healthspan and maximum 
lifespan, albeit to a much greater extent. Recall that under this approach, which is 
strongly advocated by Aubrey de Grey (2003), the age-related diseases are postponed 
indefinitely. As these pathologies would no longer occur, a state of ‘virtual immortality’ 
would be attained in the sense that death would only result from accidents, suicide, 
wars and so forth (Binstock 2004).  
 
The biogerontological project is met with strong resistance, especially by deontologists. 
In a bid to convince the latter of the permissibility of intervening in aging, proponents 
of biogerontology appeal to the doctrine of double effect. Surprisingly, their argument 
has gone unnoticed. Our aim in this chapter is to expose and critically evaluate this 
argument. But before we embark on this mission, we should briefly give an account of 
the doctrine of double effect.  
3.2 Double effect in contemporary bioethical debate 
The doctrine of double effect (henceforth just ‘DDE’) was originally invoked as a solution 
to an action problem, where an absolute23 deontological principle prevents actions 
 
                                                     
23 Note that, despite its origin being absolutist, non-absolutist accounts of the DDE have also been put forward 
(see, for example, Quinn 1989).  
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which are good, or even morally required (Bica 1999). Such a problem occurs, for 
example, when an agent wishes to engage in self-defense so as to protect her own life, 
but cannot do so without killing her assailant (i.e., without infringing the prohibition 
against killing human beings). In short, the DDE has evolved as a means of resolving 
situations where an agent wishes to do good, but cannot do so without causing serious 
harm. The DDE attempts to solve this problem by stating that it is sometimes 
permissible to bring about such harm, provided that it is a foreseen, but unintended 
side-effect of promoting some good end.  
Focusing on action problems introduced by the prohibition against killing human 
beings, Bica (1999) describes the function of the DDE as follows: 
 
The DDE, then, “redefines” the scope of the absolute prohibition’s [the prohibition 
against killing human beings] application. That is, by focusing upon the moral 
significance of intention and its relevance to moral agency and responsibility, it 
morally distinguishes “accidental” killing from murder, claiming that only the 
latter is absolutely prohibited. Consequently, while alleging to preserve the 
absolute nature of the prohibition, with the application of the DDE, it is sometimes 
permissible to knowingly kill [...] human beings – if only one withholds intention. 
(Bica 1999, 131) 
  
Disagreement about the meaning and function of the DDE has resulted in various 
formulations of the doctrine. These formulations have in common the idea that the 
permissibility of bringing about certain kinds of harm hinges on a number of conditions 
being met. Since it is not our aim to discuss the validity of the DDE, we will simply use 
Joseph Mangan’s (1949) formulation24, a plausible and, in medical ethics, influential 
version of the doctrine. According to this formulation, for an action which has at least 
one good and one bad consequence to be permissible, four conditions need to be met:  
(1) That the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;  
(2) That the good effect and not the evil effect be intended;  
(3) That the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;  
(4) That there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect. 
(Mangan 1949, 43) 
Note that actions which satisfy all of these conditions are ‘merely’ permissible; the DDE 
imposes no moral obligation to perform such actions. The DDE only entails an obligation 
 
                                                     
24 Note that there exist newer versions of the DDE (see, for example, Quinn 1989; Boyle 1991; Sulmasy 2007; 
Nelkin & Rickless 2012). Our discussion throughout this chapter is relative to Mangan’s version. 
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when dealing with actions which do not meet at least one of the above conditions. The 
latter type of actions are impermissible, i.e. one has an obligation to refrain from such 
actions. Thus, the DDE has more force as a prohibitive principle than it has as a 
permissive principle (Raus et al. 2013). 
The DDE has important applications within medical ethics and clinical practice. One of 
the most common applications occurs in the abortion context, where its use is generally 
illustrated with a pair of contrasting cases: the hysterectomy and the craniotomy case. 
In the hysterectomy case, a pregnant woman has cancer of the uterus. A hysterectomy 
is required to save her life. The craniotomy case features an unborn child, whose head is 
lodged in the mother’s birth canal. If the head is not dislodged, the mother will die. The 
head can only be dislodged through a craniotomy (crushing of the unborn child’s head). 
Below, we present a commonly encountered approach to both cases. Alternative 
analyses are possible (Boyle 1991). However, it is not our intention to endorse one or 
other approach. The discussion of these cases merely serves the purpose of illustrating 
the use of the DDE.  
 
In both the craniotomy and hysterectomy case, the action under consideration has the 
same positive (the mother’s life is saved) and negative (fetal death) effect. However, 
important differences between these cases become apparent once we apply the four 
conditions specified by the DDE:  
(1) While performing a hysterectomy is in itself good or neutral, this does not hold true 
for the crushing of the unborn child’ s skull.  
(2) The assessment of this condition is generally approached in one of two ways. Some 
believe that this condition rarely poses a problem when dealing with medical 
applications of the DDE as we may reasonably assume that medical professionals are not 
malevolent (see, for example, Spielthenner 2008). Proponents of this view would, thus, 
argue that, in both the hysterectomy and the craniotomy case, only the good effect of 
preserving the mother’s life is intended. Others, however, reject this baseline 
assumption of benevolent intention. Beauchamp and Childress (2009), for example, 
argue that one cannot but intend the bad effect of fetal death when performing a 
craniotomy. They reason that fetal death is a means (see condition (3) below) to save the 
pregnant woman’s life. A means to one’s end, they argue, is always intended.25   
(3) The removal of the uterus, not the death of the child, is what saves the mother’s life 
in the hysterectomy case. Thus, the hysterectomy case satisfies the third condition. 
However, the craniotomy case does not. Since crushing the child’s skull amounts to 
 
                                                     
25 We analyze this line of reasoning in greater detail further on in this chapter.  
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killing the baby, the good effect of preserving the mother’s life is obtained through the 
bad effect.   
(4) The hysterectomy case satisfies the proportionality requirement in that saving the 
mother’s life constitutes a proportionate reason for allowing the child to die. Leaving 
aside the difficulty that killing could affect proportionality differently than allowing to 
die, we may suppose that the fourth condition is also met in the craniotomy case (Raus 
et al. 2013). 
The above analysis suggests that the hysterectomy case satisfies all four conditions of 
the DDE, whereas the craniotomy case does not. Thus, according to the generally held 
view, the hysterectomy is permissible, whereas the craniotomy is prohibited under the 
DDE.  
 
The DDE also plays an influential role in the debate about end-of–life decisions. It has 
been invoked to justify the administration of pain-relieving medication to terminally ill 
patients in doses which would most probably hasten death, but where the death is an 
unintended side-effect of administering the medication. It distinguishes such actions 
from euthanasia and assisted suicide, in which the death of the patient is a means to 
reduce suffering (Sulmasy & Pellegrino 1999).  
As mentioned earlier, the DDE is a controversial doctrine, and has been discussed 
extensively. The issues discussed range from the moral relevance of the 
intended/foresight distinction to the precise formulation of the principle (Spielthenner 
2008). However, these issues lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. We will only touch 
upon them insofar as they are relevant for the purpose of this chapter 
3.3 Double effect in the ethical debate on biogerontology 
In this section, we first examine three passages from the debate on the merit of various 
approaches to tackling age-related diseases. Next, we argue that the authors of these 
passages engage in double effect reasoning, albeit only implicitly. Finally, we analyze 
the role which the argument appealing to the DDE is meant to fulfil. We claim that the 
argument, which we will refer to as the ‘double effect argument’, is appealed to by 
proponents of biogerontology in order to reach out to some of their (deontological) 
opponents: those who adhere to double effect reasoning.  
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A first excerpt is from the work of John Harris (2002):  
 
Remember that immortality is not unconnected with preventing or curing a 
whole range of serious diseases. It is one thing to ask whether we should make 
people immortal and answer in the negative; quite another to ask whether we 
should make people immune to heart disease, cancer, dementia, and many other 
diseases and decide that we shouldn’t, because a “side effect” of the treatment 
would be an increase in life expectancy. We are then, unlikely ever to face the 
question, Should we make people immortal: Yes or no? We may rather be called 
upon to decide whether we should treat this disease when we know an effective 
treatment will extend lifespan. It might then be appropriate to think of 
immortality as the, possibly unwanted, side effect of treating or preventing a 
whole range of diseases. Could we really say to people, “You must die at the age of 
30 or 40 or 50, because the only way we can cure you is to make you immortal or 
let you live to be 200 or 300”?  (Harris 2002, 10) 
 
An implicit appeal to double effect is also present in the work of David Gems (2011):  
 
Decelerating human ageing would have two outcomes that are very different in 
ethical terms. Firstly, it would greatly reduce the frequency of ageing related 
illness at any given age. (…) Secondly, it would lead to extended lifespan – 
perhaps, eventually, of a large magnitude. (…) Yet, the possibility of very large 
increases in lifespan – let us say, for argument’s sake, to 150 years - is one that 
many find unnerving. (…) But given the health benefits of decelerated ageing, 
although we may not particularly want life extension (…), we may simply have to 
accept it as a side effect of a greater benefit. (Gems 2011, 111) 
 
Aubrey de Grey (2007) also implicitly refers to the DDE:  
 
(…) the only realistic approach to greatly postponing bad deaths is to combat 
aging itself, (…) thereby (…) greatly raising life expectancy, with all that that 
entails. The question that humanity must face up to is clear: is the prevention of 
the suffering currently associated with most deaths from old age valuable enough 
to justify the inevitable side-effect of radically increased lifespans? The question is 
not whether that side-effect is good or bad – a question on which opinions will 
surely remain divided for some time to come. The question, rather, is whether 
that side-effect is so bad as to outweigh the benefits of eliminating aging-related 
suffering. (de Grey 2007, 3) 
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The above passages exhibit a common structure in that they feature an action with a 
good and a bad effect. In each case, the identified bad effect is a (radically) increased 
maximum lifespan. Concerning the action at play, it is clear that both Gems and de Grey 
are discussing the ‘strong’ approach to tackling age-related diseases, i.e. the act of 
intervening in the aging process itself. After all, de Grey speaks of combating “aging 
itself”. Gems, on the other hand, refers to “decelerating human aging”, a recognized 
instance of intervening in aging. In Harris’ case, the reference to “treating or preventing 
a whole range of diseases” initially suggests that he is discussing the ‘weak’ approach. 
However, on closer inspection, he appears to be using the latter phrase as a misnomer 
for the ‘strong’ approach. Harris speaks of the bad effect in terms of “immortality”. As 
noted in the introduction, an increase in maximum lifespan of this magnitude can only 
be achieved through the ‘strong’ approach. Harris’ reference to the good effect as 
“immunity to age-related diseases” further supports our claim that he is indeed 
addressing interventions in the aging process. Such immunity after all, is only 
achievable through the ‘strong approach’. Let us now turn to the good effect identified 
by Gems and de Grey. They respectively speak of “greatly reducing the frequency of 
aging related illness at any given age” and “the prevention of the suffering associated 
with old age”. Despite the differences in the terminology employed by these authors in 
reference to the good effect, there appears to be a common denominator. All of the 
identified good effects amount – as these authors themselves acknowledge - to the 
(indefinite) postponement of age-related diseases. The common structure of the above 
passages is illustrated in Fig. 1.  
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Common structure of the passages 
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3.3.1 Establishing the presence of the DDE  
In featuring an action with a good and a bad effect, the quoted passages incorporate a 
basic characteristic of double effect reasoning. However, more is needed in order to 
establish the presence of the DDE. The key characteristic of double effect reasoning is 
the intended/unintended distinction. Below we argue that Gems, de Grey, and Harris 
appeal to this distinction, albeit implicitly.  
 
There is a broad consensus among proponents of biogerontology that the field’s goal or 
objective consists in increasing the human healthspan (see, for example, Farrelly 2012; 
Vincent 2007). Terms such as ‘goal’ and ‘objective’ undeniably denote intention. As they 
are ardent proponents of biogerontology, Gems, de Grey, and Harris very likely endorse 
the claim that interventions in aging are intended to increase the healthspan. The good 
effect which these authors refer to in the quoted passages amounts precisely to an 
increase in the healthspan. Thus, when Gems, de Grey and Harris mention this good 
effect, we may reasonably interpret them as saying that this is the intended effect of 
intervening in aging. The fact that they juxtapose the good effect with an unwanted bad 
effect further strengthens our claim that the good effect is what they consider to be the 
intended effect.  
 
We have established the presence of the first component of the intended/unintended 
distinction, i.e. the fact that the good effect is intended. Are there any grounds to 
interpret the bad effect as referring to an unintended effect? As suggested above, the 
term ‘unwanted’, which is used in reference to the bad effect, could be considered as 
denoting a lack of intention. However, there is another, much more sound basis for 
inferring the presence of the intended/unintended distinction. According to Cavanaugh 
(2006), the latter distinction can interchangeably be referred to as the ‘intended/side 
effect’ distinction. Gems, Harris, and de Grey each refer to the bad effect in terms of a 
side effect. This, combined with the already established presence of a good, intended 
effect, implies that the quoted passages contain the characteristic distinction of the DDE 
(see Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2 Structure of the ‘double effect argument’ 
3.3.2 The role of the ‘double effect argument’  
Advocates of biogerontology face strongest opposition from those whose beliefs are 
grounded in deontological arguments. Many deontologists consider the act of 
intervening in the aging process impermissible on the grounds that it brings about an 
extended maximum lifespan – a state of affairs which they deem intrinsically bad 
(Partridge & Hall 2007). 26 Most proponents of intervening in the human aging process 
do not themselves adhere to the DDE. Thus, in appealing to this deontological model, 
the latter seemingly attempt to win over their aforementioned opponents. In sum, 
advocates of biogerontology hope to convince their deontological opponents of the 
permissibility of intervening in aging by framing this act within the DDE. In light of its 
rhetorical purpose, how exactly should we understand the double effect argument? We 
should interpret those appealing to this argument as saying the following: Deontologists 
claim that an extended maximum lifespan is a bad state of affairs. Anyone would agree 
that there is much value in having age-related diseases postponed. The latter can be 
achieved by intervening in the aging process. Admittedly, such interventions would also 
bring about an extended maximum lifespan, thereby breaching a deontological 
prohibition. Does this imply that deontologists necessarily ought to condemn the act of 
intervening in the aging process? No. Once we frame this act within the DDE, it becomes 
permissible. After all, the act of intervening in aging is morally neutral. The extended 
maximum lifespan (the bad effect) is an unintended effect of intervening in aging. The 
 
                                                     
26 Note that, as we argue further on, deontologists do not (necessarily) consider the act of intervening in aging 
as bad in itself.  
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intention is merely to bring about the good effect, i.e. the postponement of the onset of 
age-related diseases. In addition, the bad effect is not a means to the good effect. Finally, 
there is a proportionately grave reason for permitting the bad effect.   
 
As noted above, many deontologists consider an extended maximum lifespan a bad state 
of affairs. When defending their position on this matter, deontologists differ somewhat 
in the aspects which they emphasize (Derkx 2009).  
A first group appeals to human nature (see, for example, Fukuyama 2002; Kass 2003). 
The good is that which conforms to human nature, whereas the bad is that which 
represents a perversion of the latter. Leon Kass is one of the most renowned proponents 
of this view. With regard to the issue at hand, he asks: “Is it really true that longer life 
for individuals is an unqualified good?” (Kass 2004, 309). His answer is a clear “no”. Not 
only is an extended life not an unqualified good. It is, according to Kass, an evil. He 
states his view of an increased lifespan being inconsistent with human nature as follows:  
 
For to argue that human life would be better without death is, I submit, to argue 
that human life would be better being something other than human. To be 
immortal would not be just to continue life as we mortals know it, only forever. 
The new immortals, in the decisive sense, would not be like us at all. (Kass 2004, 
311) 
 
As Kass himself acknowledges, when he speaks of “life without death”, he is not merely 
referring to immortality. The phrase also denotes modestly extended lifespans. Kass 
suggests that, for example, a lifespan only 20 years longer than the current one, may 
already constitute a deviation from human nature.  
A second group of deontologists appeals to the concept of the ‘life cycle’, the normative 
natural order present in life’s events and in their pacing in an individual’s life (Juengst 
et al. 2003). An extended lifespan, according to this view, represents an unacceptable 
disruption of this order. Life cycle traditionalism also appeals to the concept of human 
nature – albeit merely indirectly – in that it views the life cycle as an important 
characteristic of all living organisms. Thus, in breaking with the life cycle, an extended 
lifespan compromises the essential identity of human beings.  
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3.4 Testing the soundness of the ‘double effect argument’ 
The question remains whether those who appeal to the ‘double effect argument’ would 
succeed in winning over their deontological opponents. The argument will only be 
successful if these deontologists view the act of intervening in aging as satisfying each 
of the 4 conditions of the DDE. Below, we reconstruct the way in which deontological 
opponents of biogerontology are likely to assess interventions in aging against the 
standard of the DDE.  
 
Condition 1: is the action in itself morally good or neutral? 
  
Is intervening in the aging process a good or at least morally neutral action, 
independent of its consequences?  
Some deontologists will a priori reject interventions in the aging process on the grounds 
that aging is not a disease; it is a normal process that should not be intervened in. In 
short, on this view, interventions in the aging process are unacceptable as they 
constitute ‘enhancement’, not ‘therapy’ (Partridge & Hall 2007).   
Deontologists, such as Kass, who are primarily concerned with preserving human nature 
may accept natural interventions in the aging process. We have described the action to 
be justified as ‘intervening in the aging process’, but there are different ways of doing 
so. For example, one could do this by administering a drug that switches on a gene 
associated with longevity, or one could intervene in the aging process using caloric 
restriction. Whether a deontologist concerned with preserving human nature regards a 
certain intervention in the aging process as good or neutral will depend on how she 
understands ‘unnatural’. If ‘unnatural’ is understood as all that is human-made, then she 
may accept caloric restriction but reject all medical-technical interventions. However, 
given the radical implications of this view (i.e. the need to renounce medicine 
altogether), few deontologists would advocate this interpretation of ‘unnatural’. 
Another, for deontologists more plausible view, equates ‘unnatural’ with a significant 
deviation from ‘normal’ processes; in this case from ‘normal’ bodily functioning. Caloric 
restriction (mimetics) could then be accepted because it respects the normal bodily 
processes, whereas gene therapy would be rejected. When we deprive the body of food, 
as is the case in caloric restriction, we merely trigger a programmed reaction in the 
body. Obviously, caloric restriction mimetics would trigger the very same reaction. 
However, in the case of gene therapy, we are reprogramming the body’s normal 
reaction, rather than addressing its latent potential.  
‘Life cycle traditionalists’ will most probably reach the same verdict as those concerned 
with preserving human nature. After all, as noted above, they too draw upon the 
concept of human nature, albeit implicitly. 
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One may object to this analysis by pointing out that one can always redescribe the 
action to be justified in such a way that it is neutral or good, and, thus, always meets the 
first condition. This is the ‘re-description problem’ first mentioned by Philippa Foot 
(1978). The problem is that the first condition separates the action from its effects or 
consequences. It stipulates that the action in itself has to be good or neutral, 
independent of its effects or consequences. But if we have to consider the action 
independent of its effects, we can always describe it in a neutral way. For example, in 
the infamous craniotomy case, the action could be described as killing the fetus, but also 
as reducing the size of the fetus’s skull. Likewise, one could describe the action 
‘intervening in the aging process through genetic manipulation’ as ‘administering a 
drug’ with one side-effect that a gene associated with the aging process is switched off 
and another side-effect that an extended maximum lifespan is obtained. The action to 
be justified might then be considered good or neutral by deontologists. One proposed 
solution to this problem is to implement a criterion of closeness, linking intended 
actions to their closely related side-effects so that they are inseparable from the action. 
Since the drug works by switching off a gene that plays a crucial role in the aging 
process, it surely is more plausible to describe the action as ‘a genetic intervention in 
the aging process’. It is plausible that one cannot separate the means used (i.e. the drug) 
from the mechanism (i.e. switching off a gene) through which the means works.  
So depending on the mechanism involved, some deontologists will not consider the 
action to be justified as good or neutral. If condition 1 is not met, then the argument 
appealed to by defenders of biogerontology to convince some of their opponents will 
not hold. However, for those deontologists who regard the action as neutral or good, the 
argument could still work if the other conditions are met. 
 
Condition 2: is the bad effect unintended?  
 
Does the agent only intend the good effect? Is the bad effect – the extended maximum 
lifespan – merely a foreseen but unintended side-effect? Before answering these 
questions, we would like to address a common misconception. The DDE is sometimes 
interpreted as making the permissibility of an action turn on the actual intentions of a 
particular agent (see, for example, Rachels 1994; Thomson 1999; Scanlon 2008). 
According to this interpretation, the act is permissible when the individual performing 
it merely intends the good effect. Conversely, the act becomes impermissible when 
conducted by an individual who intends the bad effect. FitzPatrick (2012) has 
convincingly refuted this interpretation of the DDE. According to FitzPatrick, the 
requirement which needs to be met in order for condition 2 to be satisfied, is situated on 
an abstract, theoretical level – as opposed to the practical level of the particular 
individual and her intentions. All that is required for condition 2 to be met, is that it is 
theoretically conceivable that one acts without intending the bad effect. Thus, where a 
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particular agent acts with malevolent intentions, condition 2 could still be met. What 
matters for an act to be permissible is that one could act without intending the bad 
effect. Conversely, condition 2 is violated when, whatever the circumstances considered, 
one cannot but act with malevolent intentions.  
 
Controversy exists about how to determine whether an effect of an action is an intended 
effect  (Marquis 1991). A commonly applied test to account for the distinction between 
intended and merely foreseen effects is the counterfactual test (Donagan 1991). This test 
asks whether an agent would still do the act if she thought that the bad effect would not 
occur. If the non-occurrence of the bad effect would deter the agent from performing 
the relevant action, we may conclude that she intends the bad effect. In light of our 
abovementioned remark, the agent referred to in the counterfactual test should be 
interpreted as an agent ‘in the abstract’, rather than a particular agent. Applied to the 
question at hand, the counterfactual test goes as follows: can a doctor who intervenes in 
the aging process reasonably say that if she could do so without obtaining an extended 
maximum lifespan, she would? We believe that she could. Suppose that a patient has a 
genetic predisposition for developing an age-related disease, or a set of age-related 
diseases. Furthermore, suppose that a doctor knew that, if she intervened in the 
patient’s aging process, the onset of the age-related disease(s) would be postponed, but 
the patient’s life would not be extended beyond the maximum lifespan (say, because her 
patient is a Death Row inmate). It is plausible that the doctor would still perform the 
action – intervening in the aging process – if this is the most efficient, or the only way of 
postponing the (set of) age-related disease(s). Does our Death Row scenario provide 
sufficient grounds for concluding that condition 2 is met? Recall that condition 2 is 
violated when, whatever the circumstances considered, an agent intervening in the aging 
process necessarily intends the bad effect. Conversely, then, condition 2 is met when 
one can conceive of at least one case – set of circumstances – under which one could 
intervene in the aging process without intending the bad effect. Our Death Row scenario 
provides precisely such a counterexample.   
 
Condition 3: is the bad effect used as a means to the good effect?  
 
Is the extended maximum lifespan a means to the (indefinite) postponement of age-
related diseases? The general idea behind this condition is that a harm that might 
permissibly be brought about as a side-effect in promoting a good end could not be 
permissibly brought about as a means to the same good end.  
There are two ways of approaching the assessment of this third condition, depending on 
how one views its relationship to the second condition. While some consider both 
conditions as interchangeable, others regard them as separate conditions which cannot 
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be reduced to one another. Below, we determine, from each of these perspectives, 
whether the third condition is satisfied. 
Marquis (1991), who advocates the interrelatedness between the second and third 
condition, argues as follows:  
 
In general, if Mangan’s condition (3) is violated, then the good effect is produced 
by means of the evil effect. If we grant the doctrine that he who intends the end 
also intends the means, then the evil effect is intended. And if the evil effect is 
intended, then condition (2) is violated. Hence, if condition (2) is satisfied, then so 
is condition (3). (Marquis 1991, 520) 
 
Following this line of reasoning27, we can simply deduce whether or not the third 
condition is met from our findings regarding the second condition. In our analysis of 
condition 2, we have established, using the counterfactual test, that the bad effect, i.e. 
the extended maximum lifespan, is unintended. Therefore, since one’s means are always 
intended, the bad effect cannot be a means to the good effect (i.e. the (indefinite) 
postponement of age-related diseases). In sum, the third condition is met on this view.  
 
Is the third condition met from the perspective of those who repudiate its 
interconnectedness with the second condition? On this view, both conditions differ 
clearly in that the second asks whether the bad effect is intended as an end, whereas the 
third inquires whether it is intended as a means. How does ‘intending as an end’ differ 
from ‘intending as a means’? It has been argued that if an agent believes that her action 
has a certain direct effect and this belief is the rationale behind her action, the agent 
intends this effect as an end (Spielthenner 2008). For example, if I write a book because I 
believe it will make me famous, then I intend becoming famous as an end. The concept 
of ‘intending as a means’ amounts to the following: “If an agent believes that φ -ing 
[where φ stands for some verb of action] has a certain effect (E1) and believes that E1 is 
related (causally or otherwise) to another effect (E2) and the latter belief is a reason for 
her to φ, then the agent intends E1 as a means to E2 and she intends E2 as an end” 
(Spielthenner 2008, 468-469). Suppose that a murderer turns herself in. She believes that 
this will lead to her being executed, which in turn will relieve her of the remorse that 
haunts her. The murderer, then, intends her being executed as a means to ending her 
psychological suffering, which she intends as an end.  
 
                                                     
27 Note that Beauchamp and Childress (2009) appeal to this line of reasoning in their analysis of the 
craniotomy case. From the fact that the bad effect (the death of the fetus) constitutes a means to the good 
effect (preserving the mother’s life), they deduce that the bad effect must be intended.  
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On this view, the fact that the second condition is satisfied ‘merely’ tells us that the bad 
effect (the extended maximum lifespan) is unintended as an end. This, in itself, does not 
give anything away concerning the third condition as the bad effect may very well be 
unintended as an end, yet intended as a means. We, therefore, need a way of 
independently assessing whether or not the bad effect constitutes a means to the good 
effect. Several tests have been proposed. Below, we apply two widely applied tests to the 
case at hand. We show that, on both tests, the bad effect (extended maximum lifespan) 
is not a means to the good effect.  
 
A first test is the ‘inevitable connection test’ (Marquis 1991). According to this test, if the 
action is inevitably connected to the bad effect, we may conclude that the latter is used 
as a means to the good effect. The idea behind this test is that the presence of such an 
inevitable connection implies that the action and the bad effect merge into one another. 
Given that the action is necessarily a means to the good effect, the bad effect must, then, 
also be so. Note that the inevitable connection test is, for example, implicitly relied 
upon in the analysis of the craniotomy case. Here, crushing the fetus’ skull (the action) 
is considered identical to the fetus being killed (the bad effect). For this reason, the 
fetus’ death is taken to be a means to the good effect.  
Is the action of intervening in the aging process inevitably connected to the extended 
maximum lifespan? It seems that it is not. In being (temporarily) relieved from aging 
and its concomitants, one is not in any way protected against other potential causes of 
death, such as fatal non-aging-related diseases, suicide, murder, etc. One may not reach 
the current maximum lifespan, despite having undergone treatment to decelerate or 
arrest aging. Thus, according to the inevitable connection test, the extended maximum 
lifespan does not constitute a means to the good effect.  
 
A second test simply consists in applying another definition of ‘means’, one which 
better approximates the common-sense understanding of the concept. Dan Brock 
(1999), for example, offers such a definition: “The means are what an agent does because 
he believes them to be causally necessary or sufficient on the particular causal path 
taken to achieve his end” (Brock 1999, 532). The case for a prohibition against 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide under the DDE, for example, is built on an 
implicit use of this ‘causal criterion’. The reason why a doctor performs such actions is 
the belief that the patient’s death (the bad effect) will be causally sufficient for relieving 
the patient’s pain (the good effect), suggesting that the former is used as a means to the 
latter.  
Contrary to the euthanasia/assisted suicide case, our case does not appear to satisfy the 
above definition of a means. It seems incorrect to say that the extended maximum 
lifespan (the bad effect) is either causally sufficient or necessary for obtaining the good 
effect (the postponement of age-related diseases). Rather, the opposite seems to be the 
 134 
case. As mentioned before, our current scientific knowledge suggests that the most 
promising way of obtaining an extended maximum lifespan is to tackle all age-related 
diseases simultaneously. This implies that the good effect is causally necessary28 for 
obtaining an increased maximum lifespan, but not vice versa. In sum, the extended 
maximum lifespan represents the last stage in the causal chain and is, therefore, not a 
means to the good effect on the causal criterion test.  
 
On both positions concerning the relationship between the second and third condition 
of the DDE, the increased maximum lifespan is not a means to the postponed onset of 
age-related diseases. Therefore, the third condition is met. 
 
Condition 4: does the good effect outweigh the bad effect?  
 
In order for an action to be justified by the DDE, the bad effect must not only be 
unintended as an end or as a means, the good effect must also be proportionate to the 
bad effect. Alan Donagan (1977) explains the proportionality condition as follows:  
 
Whether or not the good effect is a proportionately serious reason is determined 
according to the principle that evil is to be avoided or prevented wherever 
possible, except at the cost of an equal or worse evil. If the nonoccurrence of the 
good effect would be as great an evil, or a worse evil, than the occurrence of the 
bad effect, then it is a proportionately serious reason for it. (Donagan 1977, 161) 
 
Thus, we need to determine, from a deontological perspective, how the non-occurrence 
of the postponed onset of age-related diseases compares to the evil of an extended 
maximum lifespan. In order to make this assessment, we consider two scenarios, one in 
which interventions aimed at decelerating/arresting the aging process are widely 
performed and one in which they are not. As we argue below, the outcome of the 
proportionality assessment differs in both scenarios. In this respect, the case at hand 
diverges from ‘classical’ applications of the DDE, where the frequency with which the 
actions are performed does not affect the outcome. For example, in the hysterectomy 
case, the good effect is considered proportionate to the bad effect, irrespective of 
whether such hysterectomies are performed on a small or large scale.  
 
                                                     
28 That the good effect is not causally sufficient for obtaining an increased maximum lifespan follows from the 
fact that in decelerating/arresting the aging process, one does not protect oneself against non-aging-related 
causes of death.  
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Let us start with the easiest scenario, where interventions in the aging process are 
performed on a small scale. Consider first a (rather implausible) situation in which only 
one person in the world requests her aging process to be decelerated/arrested. In 
granting the patient’s request, the doctor ensures the postponed onset of all age-related 
diseases (the good effect). Since these diseases are responsible for (premature) death, 
the good effect brought about by the doctor’s action may be redescribed as that of 
saving the patient’s life.29 Thus, the ‘evil’ that would be brought about by the doctor’s 
omission can be interpreted as that of letting the patient die. The doctor thereby 
breaches her duty of rescue or beneficence. Given that interventions in the aging 
process increase the number of healthy life years, continued life of a good quality is at 
stake here. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that deontologists would consider the 
evil of letting the patient die much worse than that of the patient obtaining an extended 
lifespan. Thus, in the simple case, the good effect is likely proportionate to the bad 
effect.  
 
Now suppose the number of patients requesting decelerated/arrested aging is, although 
still relatively small, greater than one. In denying these patients’ requests, the medical 
community is now letting various people die. Conversely, in granting these patients’ 
requests, it causes various people to obtain an extended lifespan. However, there is no 
reason why this (numerical) difference with the simple case should change the 
proportionality verdict. On the contrary, given that more lives are at stake, the case for 
proportionality between the good and bad effect might be stronger still.  
 
 
When advocates of decelerated/arrested aging label these interventions morally 
permissible, they do not do so with the proviso that they be performed on a small scale 
only. Thus, proponents of these interventions are committed to defending interventions 
in the aging process, irrespective of the scale on which these are performed. If they are 
to convince their opponents that the DDE can justify these interventions, then both the 
small and large scale performance of these interventions must satisfy the 
proportionality condition. As we have seen, the ‘small scale scenario’ passes the test. 
 
                                                     
29 de Grey (2005) also characterizes the ‘war on aging’ as a lifesaving act. He states that in (indefinitely) 
postponing age-related diseases, “we are giving the beneficiary a greater remaining healthy potential lifespan 
than they would have if we held back, which is the beginning and end of what we mean when we say we have 
saved their lives […]” (de Grey 2005, 622).  
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Below, we argue that this does not hold true for the ‘large scale scenario’. Therefore, the 
fourth condition is not met.30 
Consider a scenario in which a significant part of the population requests an 
intervention in their aging processes. Here, as is the case with the ‘small scale scenario’, 
omitting to bring about the good effect amounts to letting people die. The number of 
people that would die is much greater in the ‘large scale scenario’ than it is in the ‘small 
scale scenario’. At first sight, then, the case for proportionality appears still stronger in 
the former scenario, relative to the latter. Nevertheless, a closer look at the bad effect in 
both scenarios compels us to revise this initial assessment. In the ‘small scale scenario’ 
the bad effect ‘merely’ amounts to a breach of the prohibition on an extended maximum 
lifespan. However, in the ‘large scale scenario’, the ‘evil’ inherent in the bad effect may 
go well beyond a breach of this single prohibition. 
 
Many deontologists (see, for example, Kass 1985) fear that there is a serious threat of 
overpopulation when faced with a large scale use of anti-aging interventions. A marked 
increase in the world population could cause an array of adverse effects. Louria (2005), 
for example, expects an increase in the number of large urban centers with slums, the 
unhygienic conditions of which would give rise to infections and epidemics. Other 
potential harms include: “increased poverty and malnutrition; resource depletion that, 
together with ethnic, religious, and tribal animosities, leads to ferocious conflicts; 
population-related global warming that, in turn, could create hundreds of millions of 
refugees and political instability that could lead to more strife” (Louria 2005, 318).  
Deontologists with these concerns could argue that in breaching the prohibition on an 
extended maximum lifespan, the medical community may also be breaching its duty not 
to inflict harm upon people. For these deontologists, the harm inflicted as a result of 
providing interventions in the aging process will likely even amount to letting people 
die. After all, they view overpopulation as creating a situation in which people are 
inevitably deprived of basic needs for continued life. Ultimately then, they could 
reformulate the bad effect in terms of letting people die. Recall that the non-occurrence 
of the good effect also amounts to letting people die. From the perspective of the above 
deontologists, the proportionality condition will probably not be met in the ‘large scale 
 
                                                     
30 The high cost of interventions in aging, one might object, makes it highly unlikely that these will be 
performed on a large scale. Therefore, one might argue, we should only take into account the small scale 
scenario and, thus, conclude that the proportionality condition is met. However, the likelihood of the large 
scale scenario is irrelevant to our analysis. After all, proponents of interventions in aging argue that the DDE 
can justify both the small and large scale use of the latter. Therefore, if one of the scenarios (i.e. the large scale 
scenario) does not satisfy the proportionality condition, their argument no longer holds. The improbability of 
the large scale scenario does not change this. 
  137 
scenario’. First, in bringing about the bad effect we are breaching two prohibitions; we 
are both obtaining an extended maximum lifespan and letting people die. In refraining 
from intervening in the aging process, on the other hand, we are merely breaching one 
prohibition. Second, population-related global warming and other harms attached to 
overpopulation may affect people worldwide. As Billings (2011) argues, a harm affecting 
society generally carries more weight than one affecting merely an individual. 
Therefore, the globally felt effect of people dying likely constitutes too great an evil to 
justify interventions in the aging process. The latter holds true, regardless of the 
magnitude of the good effect.31   
One might object that the reformulation of the bad effect in terms of harm to others is 
only obtained through an ‘aggregative view’, i.e. through considering the numerous 
interventions in the aging process by many doctors together. More specifically, one 
might argue that on a ‘piecemeal view’, where every single intervention in the aging 
process is considered separately, the bad effect merely amounts to one person obtaining 
an extended lifespan. Is the ‘aggregative view’ then the correct one to take? We think it 
is. Adopting the ‘piecemeal view’ in a context where one’s action impacts not only upon 
the patient, but also on others, seems wrong. The ‘piecemeal view’ is oblivious to the 
potential effects of a large scale use of anti-aging interventions on society at large. 
Parfit’s ‘Harmless Torturers’ case (1984) supports the use of the aggregative view in the 
‘large scale scenario’. In this hypothetical scenario, a thousand people each push a 
button that turns the dial of a torture machine one click. Whereas a single click causes 
imperceptible pain to the victim, the pain associated with a thousand clicks is 
excruciating. According to the ‘piecemeal view’, none of these torturers ever acts 
wrongly given that a single turn of the dial merely causes imperceptible pain. This 
conclusion is absurd. What matters is that, taken together, these torturers’ acts inflict 
severe pain on the victim. Likewise, taken in aggregate, each doctor’s intervention in 
the aging process harms society at large. 
 
                                                     
31 One might object that this verdict of non-proportionality is based on a problematic assumption, i.e. the 
conviction that overpopulation and its detrimental effects will occur. However, whether or not we will 
actually be confronted with overpopulation and its detrimental effects is irrelevant. We are merely interested 
here in reconstructing the way in which deontological opponents of biogerontology may assess interventions 
in aging against the standard of the DDE. From this perspective, all that matters is that there are deontologists 
who fear overpopulation and who, on this basis, would reject the idea of the proportionality condition being 
met.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
Proponents and opponents of biogerontology have generally criticized each other’s 
arguments from within their own moral frameworks. Recently, however, we observe a 
departure from this trend, with advocates of biogerontology seemingly appealing to 
arguments tailored to their opponents’ normative theory. We have here examined one 
such argument, the ‘double effect argument’. Although this argument deserves credit 
for breaking with a long-lasting tendency, it stands little chance of winning over its 
target audience, i.e. deontologists who consider the act of intervening in the aging 
process impermissible. Our analysis suggests that deontologists may plausibly deem 
such interventions impermissible under the DDE. While it is plausible that interventions 
in the aging process satisfy the second (the bad effect is unintended) and third (the bad 
effect is not a means to the good effect) conditions of the DDE, the first (the act is good 
or neutral) and fourth (the good effect outweighs the bad effect) conditions are 
problematic. Many deontologists may find the act of intervening in the aging process 
not neutral or good in itself. Some may condemn it outright on the grounds that aging is 
a normal process that should not be intervened in. Others may deem such acts morally 
good or neutral on condition that they constitute natural interventions in the aging 
process. In any case, deontologists could plausibly argue that neither unnatural nor 
natural interventions satisfy the proportionality condition as both types of intervention 
involve an unacceptable trade-off between saving the lives of some (patients who 
undergo the interventions) and letting others die (those who suffer the consequences of 
large scale interventions in the aging process). The assessment of the proportionality 
condition brings to light an important difference between the case discussed here and 
classical medical applications of the DDE. In these classical cases, the bad effect of the 
agent’s act merely affects the patient (or the fetus, in cases where unborn life is at 
stake), never society at large. Therefore, the scale on which such ‘classical’ acts are 
executed does not impact upon the outcome of the proportionality assessment.  
 
In this chapter, we have tried to ‘reconstruct’ the way in which deontological opponents 
of biogerontology may assess interventions in aging against the standard of the DDE. 
One might contest the soundness of our reconstruction, arguing that interventions in 
aging are permissible under the DDE. However, even if the latter could be convincingly 
argued, it may not further the cause much of those appealing to the ‘double effect 
argument’. Presumably, the whole point of winning over deontological opponents 
consists in securing the much needed (public) funding for biogerontological research. 
Therefore, an argument is needed which provides these opponents with an incentive to 
act in a way which enables the development of interventions in aging. However, the 
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incentive provided by the DDE is not as strong as it could be, given that the DDE merely 
confers a permission to act, not an obligation. 
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4.1 Introduction  
As mentioned in the general introduction, the elderly represent the fastest growing 
group of patients on the kidney transplant waiting list. Where young and old compete 
for the same pool of organs, a steadily aging list implies that the young increasingly lose 
out in the competition for a donor kidney (Curtis 2006; Friedewald et al. 2013). This 
observation recently incentivized the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the 
US’s organ exchange organization, to formulate a new kidney allocation policy which, 
on average, has the effect of prioritizing young transplant candidates (<50 years) over 
older (>50 years) patients (Tso 2014).32 This policy proposal, which was officially 
approved in June 2013, constitutes a significant departure from the previous algorithm 
which prioritized patients mainly on the basis of waiting time. The implementation of 
the new kidney allocation policy is scheduled to take place in several stages throughout 
the course of this year (OPTN 2013).  
There is much controversy surrounding the new policy. A frequently cited concern is 
that age is a morally irrelevant criterion (Eidelson 2013). To our knowledge, UNOS policy 
makers have, so far, failed to address this criticism. In other words, they have not 
provided an account of the moral relevance of age in kidney allocation. This is 
disconcerting. The perception that the new kidney allocation policy is based upon an 
irrelevant criterion may, if widespread, damage public trust in organ exchange 
organizations. This, in turn, could have serious consequences, such as a decreased 
willingness to register as an organ donor. It is, therefore, important that the transplant 
community provide the public with a solid argument for the moral relevance of age. The 
fact that other countries, such as Australia, are already considering a policy change 
similar to the one recently approved by UNOS only adds urgency to this task (Pussell et 
al. 2012).  
In this chapter, we develop an argument in support of the moral relevance of age. In 
doing so, we do not merely limit ourselves to the role of age in kidney allocation. We 
also provide a moral account of the relevance of age in the allocation of other organs. 
Our argument is founded in a concern for minimizing harm. It draws on the concept of 
harm as conceived by Joel Feinberg (1984). We conclude that the new UNOS policy, 
when assessed against this harm minimizing framework, is not far reaching enough. In 
addition to penalizing the elderly, a concern for minimizing harm also calls for 
deprioritizing pediatric patients.  
 
                                                     
32 We gave a more detailed explanation of the new UNOS kidney allocation policy in the general introduction 
of this dissertation (see section 0.3.1.2.1).  
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4.2 Harm as a setback to one’s interests 
In Harm to Others (1984), Feinberg states that one is harmed when one’s interests are 
thwarted, set back, or defeated. In turn, one has an interest in something if one has a 
stake in its well-being. “In general, a person has a stake in X [...] when he stands to gain 
or lose depending on the nature or condition of X” (Feinberg 1984, 34). For example, if 
you own a share of a company’s stock, you have a stake in its well-being in that the 
better off the company is financially, the better off you are financially. Feinberg 
summarizes his account of interests as follows:  
 
One’s interests, then, taken as a miscellaneous collection, consist of all those 
things in which one has a stake, whereas one’s interest in the singular, one’s 
personal interest or self-interest, consists in the harmonious advancement of all 
one’s interests in the plural. These interests, or perhaps more accurately, the 
things these interests are in, are distinguishable components of a person’s well-
being: he flourishes or languishes as they flourish or languish. What promotes 
them is to his advantage or in his interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or 
against his interest. (Feinberg 1984, 34) 
 
Feinberg distinguishes two tests to determine whether or not harm has occurred. The 
‘worsening test’ states that a person is harmed if, due to another’s act, she is worse off 
than she was before the act. For example, a person is harmed in this sense if someone 
sets fire to her house. In order to include other cases of harm, not covered by this test, 
Feinberg added the ‘counterfactual test’. The latter states that a person is harmed if, due 
to another’s act, she is in a worse condition than she would have been in if the other had 
acted differently. Here, the reference point for deciding about harm is the state of 
affairs that would have obtained if the person had acted in accordance with a normative 
rule, rather than the actual state of affairs resulting from the person’s act. Suppose you 
are at the top of a college admissions waiting list. A college place becomes available. A 
person lower down on the waiting list is given the place as a result of bribery. Your 
interests have not actually been set back in that you are still ranked first on the waiting 
list. However, the normative rule dictates that the order of the waiting list be respected 
when assigning college places. Thus, compared to the situation that would have 
obtained had the normative rule been respected, you have been harmed by the bribery.   
 
In determining the interest at stake for patients awaiting an organ, we need to 
differentiate between organ transplants which are immediately lifesaving (e.g. liver, 
heart, and lung) and those which are not immediately lifesaving (e.g. kidney and 
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pancreas) (Desschans et al. 2008). Kidney transplants33 represent the prototype of the 
latter category, given that pancreas-alone transplants are rarely performed. It is the 
availability of dialysis as an (albeit less effective) alternative to kidney transplantation 
which renders the latter ‘not immediately lifesaving’. In other words, patients on the 
kidney transplant waiting list are generally not at risk of imminent death. Thus, kidney 
transplantation is more a matter of improving the patient’s quality of life than ensuring 
her immediate, continued survival (Segev 2009).34 However, in the case of liver, heart, 
and lung failure, there is no alternative to transplantation. Thus, transplantation of 
these organs is, although also a matter of improving quality of life, primarily a matter of 
ensuring immediate, continued survival.35 In sum, the primary interest at stake for 
patients on the transplant waiting list is that in continued life and/or a reasonable 
quality of life.  
We have an interest in continued life/reasonable quality of life because they enable us 
to (fully) pursue ‘life projects’. The latter include all those plans which people can 
reasonably be expected to pursue during a lifetime. Generally, for example, people wish 
to get an education, settle down with a partner, establish a career, a family, a social 
network, and so on. Given the link between the continuation of life/the attainment of a 
reasonable quality of life on the one hand and life projects on the other hand, we can 
redescribe the interest we have in the former in terms of an interest in life projects. 
Thus, the ultimate interest at stake for patients on the transplant waiting list is that in 
life projects.  
We are not the first to identify a close relationship between the continuation of life/the 
attainment of a reasonable quality of life and life projects. The connection between both 
has, for example, already been acknowledged by Daniels (1985), in his analysis 
concerning the status of health care. According to Daniels, health care is a special social 
good as it protects an individual’s share of the normal opportunity range. He defines the 
normal opportunity range for a given society as “the array of life plans reasonable 
persons in it are likely to construct for themselves” (Daniels 1985, 33). Once we consider 
that health care services enable the continuation of life/the attainment of a reasonable 
quality of life, the similarity between our account and Daniels’ becomes evident. The 
 
                                                     
33 Kidney transplants are lifesaving in the sense that they confer a survival advantage, relative to dialysis. 
However, they are not immediately lifesaving in that patients on the kidney transplant waiting list are 
generally not at risk of imminent death. Admittedly, there are certain exceptions to the latter observation – the 
so-called ‘high urgency’ status patients on the waiting list (Desschans et al. 2008).  
34 For this reason, we will refer to kidney transplantation throughout this chapter as a ‘non-lifesaving’ 
transplant. The latter term is shorthand for ‘not-immediately lifesaving’.  
35 For this reason, we will refer to liver, heart , and lung transplantation throughout this chapter as ‘lifesaving’ 
transplants.  
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interest in continued life is arguably the most fundamental human interest. The 
redescription of this interest in terms of an interest in life projects implies that the 
latter interest is equally important. One might argue that, in attributing such great 
importance to the interest in life projects, we are committed to too much of an 
instrumental view on life. Life, one might claim, ultimately revolves around the pursuit 
of happiness or self-realization, rather than the pursuit of life projects. Our view, 
however, does acknowledge the importance of the human interest in happiness and 
self-realization, albeit indirectly. The realization of life projects, after all, significantly 
contributes to a state of happiness and self-realization. 
4.3 The interest in life projects: a further specification 
Above, we have suggested that the interest in life projects is at stake for patients 
awaiting a transplant. In the following, we further specify this interest. First, we identify 
the various states in which a life project may find itself. Next, we attribute (a) specific 
interest(s) to each of these states. 
 
At any moment in time, a life project finds itself in one of 3 states: it has either not yet 
been started, is ongoing, or has been accomplished. Most life projects do not pass 
through all of these stages. The beginnings of our social networks (in the form of the 
presence of our parents) and our education (i.e., learning how to crawl, walk, speak) are 
part of our lives from the very start. Thus, these life projects are never really in a state 
of being unstarted. In the same way, only certain life projects go through the last stage. 
One’s education and one’s career, for example, are such that they reach the stage of 
accomplishment at a definite moment in time. The attainment of this stage is marked, 
respectively, by one’s graduation and one’s retirement. However, other life projects 
appear to hover in a state of ‘ongoingness’ quasi indefinitely, lacking such a clear-cut 
ending. It is, for example, difficult to pinpoint the exact moment during one’s lifetime, 
assuming such a moment exists, when life projects such as one’s family and one’s social 
networks come to an end.    
Ongoing life projects and accomplished ones have a common characteristic in that both 
were started at a certain point in time. Henceforth, we use the umbrella term ‘started 
life projects’ to include life projects in either of these states, thereby reducing the 3 
initially identified states of a life project to 2 main ones: unstarted and started life 
projects.  
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We can now further specify the interest one has in life projects. One may have one of 
two types of interests in a life project, depending on its current state (i.e. started or 
unstarted). In the next section, we discuss the interests one has in a started life project. 
Subsequently, we take a look at the interest one has in an unstarted life project. For 
both types of interest, we illustrate the changes they exhibit throughout a lifetime. 
4.3.1 The interest in a started life project 
If we are to define the interest one has in a started life project, we need to take a closer 
look at the value ascribed to the latter. A started life project has ‘final value’36, i.e. it is 
valuable as an end, for its own sake. For example, part of the value attributed to the 
higher education one is currently enjoying (ongoing life project) or to one’s higher 
education diploma (accomplished life project) relates to the mere fact of enjoying and 
having enjoyed a higher education, respectively. However, a started life project also has 
instrumental value, i.e. it is valuable as a means to securing other valued goods. For 
example, social networks imply that we have people whose help we can count on when 
faced with certain problems. An education, while it is ongoing, provides one with the 
skills and knowledge necessary for pursuing a career. Once accomplished, the education 
allows one to put to use the acquired skills and knowledge so as to successfully perform 
one’s job. A career, in turn, enables one to provide for oneself and for one’s family.  
The dual value of started life projects suggests that, for every started life project, one 
has two interests in it. First, one has an interest in being able to (continue) enjoy(ing) 
the life project for its own sake. Second, one has an interest in being able to (continue) 
us(e)(ing) the life project as a means to securing some other valued good. We shall use 
the terms ‘interest related to the final value of the life project’ and ‘interest related to 
the instrumental value of the life project’ to refer to the former and latter interest, 
respectively. For example, my education implies that I have an interest in being able to 
 
                                                     
36 Christine Korsgaard (1983) draws attention to 2 distinctions in goodness. On the one hand, there is the 
distinction between final goods (things valued as ends, for their own sakes) versus instrumental goods (things 
valued as means, for the sake of something else). On the other hand, there is the distinction between 
intrinsically good things (things which have their value in themselves) versus extrinsically good things (things 
which derive their value from some other source). The former distinction refers to the way we value a thing, 
whereas the latter refers to the location or source of the goodness. Korsgaard argues that these 2 distinctions 
are often wrongly perceived as collapsing into one another. Generally, it is believed that something that is 
valued as an end must necessarily be intrinsically valuable. Korsgaard argues that this need not necessarily be 
the case, i.e. there are final values that are extrinsic. She gives the example of something that is good as an 
end because of the interest someone takes in it or the desire someone has for it. Other philosophers (e.g. 
Kagan 1998; Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000) have endorsed Korsgaard’s claim of there being final 
values that are extrinsic.  
 154 
(continue) experienc(e)(ing) the satisfaction induced by the mere fact of enjoying (if my 
education is still ongoing)/having enjoyed (if my education is accomplished) an 
education.37 In addition, I also have an interest in being able to (continue) acquir(e)(ing) 
the skills and knowledge necessary for a career/in being able to (continue) put(ting) to 
use the skills and knowledge acquired during my education.  
 
How great a stake one has in started life projects depends on the number of interests 
one has. In turn, the number of interests one has obviously increases with the number 
of life projects one has initiated. The strength of one’s interests, besides their number, 
also determines how great a stake one has in started life projects. Below, we look into 
the way in which both the number and strength of one’s interests vary throughout a 
lifetime.  
During the early stages of life one generally has only a few started life projects. 
Typically, children and adolescents have established a social network and are in the 
midst of their education. All of the other important life projects – settling down with a 
partner, establishing a career and a family - are generally only started at a later stage. In 
the past, the latter life projects were typically initiated around one’s early 20s. Today, 
however, their initiation is most often postponed until one’s late 20s.  
In the period between one’s late 20s and one’s death, some started life projects might 
change ‘shape’ somewhat. For example, one’s social network tends to shrink in size 
when one reaches a more advanced age. Nevertheless, even at an old age, one generally 
does have at least one person – whether it be a friend or nursing staff – constituting 
one’s social network. Thus, social networks rarely, if ever, dissolve. The same holds for 
other started life projects. The only exception are partnerships, which obviously 
dissolve at the moment one’s partner dies. In sum, from one’s late 20s until one’s death, 
the number of started life projects roughly remains constant and is at its highest. 
Consequently, one has the most interests at stake during this specific period.  
 
Although one’s interests remain constant in number from one’s late 20s onwards, this 
does not hold true for their strength. Recall that for every started life project, there are 
two types of interest one has in it: an interest related to its final value and one related to 
its instrumental value. As we argue below, both types of interest diminish in strength 
after a certain age.  
 
                                                     
37 Notice that we are here implicitly stating that the started life project of an education is something that is 
valued as an end and extrinsically good (it is good as an end because of the satisfaction one derives from it). 
Although the characterization of something as a final value that is extrinsically good might sound odd, it is 
nevertheless unproblematic (see previous footnote).  
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Consider a pensioner. Although her career has come to an end, she may still see it as 
having final value, insofar as she values the mere fact of having enjoyed a career. 
However, the final value attributed to the career is likely to be smaller than that 
attributed to it when it was still ongoing. The latter implies that the pensioner’s interest 
related to the final value of her career is weaker than it was in the period preceding her 
retirement.  
The pensioner’s interest related to the instrumental value of certain started life projects 
is also diminished. Consider the pensioner’s past career and education. Despite the 
latter being accomplished, certain instrumental usages of these life projects (i.e. certain 
possibilities for using these life projects as a means to some end) are still available to the 
pensioner. For example, she might still be able to pass on to others the skills and 
knowledge acquired during her education and career. However, other instrumental 
usages of these life projects are now ruled out, both in theory and in practice. For 
example, the pensioner’s education no longer serves the purpose of securing a career, 
while her career no longer constitutes a means to ensuring her financial security. In 
sum, fewer instrumental usages of these life projects are available to the pensioner than 
was the case prior to her retirement. The latter implies that these life projects have less 
instrumental value than was previously the case. This, in turn, implies that the 
pensioner’s interest related to the instrumental value of these life projects is weaker 
than it was in the period preceding her retirement.  
The above suggests that there comes a moment in one’s life (around retirement age) 
when the instrumental and/or final value of certain started life projects – one’s 
education and career – become(s) weaker. Accordingly, one’s interest related to the 
instrumental value of these life projects and/or one’s interest related to their final value 
become(s) weaker. We will use the term ‘strength level B’ to refer to the diminished 
strength which the interest(s) in these life projects exhibit from retirement age 
onwards.38 The term ‘strength level A’ will henceforth refer to the higher strength these 
interests have in the period preceding retirement age.   
   
The above representation of variations in the number and strength of interests 
throughout a lifetime is a generic one in that it is applicable to the average person only. 
A specific individual might, contrary to the average person, not embark on all of the life 
projects mentioned here. Some people, for example, remain childless or single. Others 
initiate these life projects at an earlier or later age than the average one identified here. 
 
                                                     
38 Note that the final and/or instrumental value of the other started life projects (one’s family, social 
networks, and relationship with one’s partner) is/are unlikely to diminish in strength after a certain age. 
Therefore, we assume here that a person’s interests in the latter life projects retain the ‘strength A’ level 
throughout her entire life.   
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Still others might, contrary to the average person of their age, attribute no/little value 
to a certain life project so that they have no/little interest in it. However, we will ignore 
such deviations from the average in devising an allocation criterion aimed at 
minimizing harm. In sum, we will assume that everyone resembles the average person 
of their age (with regard to the number and strength of their interests). Any allocation 
scheme must do just that if it is not to collapse into a mere case-by-case analysis. The 
average person, then, has the greatest stake in started life projects in the period 
between her late 20s and mid 60s. It is then that one’s interests in these life projects are 
the greatest in both number and strength.   
4.3.2 The interest in an unstarted life project  
Besides having interests corresponding to started life projects, one also has an interest 
in unstarted life projects. Take the case of a 10-year-old girl. Like her peers, she has only 
a few started life projects. Assuming she develops into an average person, she will want 
to initiate all of the so far unstarted life projects at some point in her future. Once she 
initiates these, she will develop all of the aforementioned corresponding interests in 
them. However, there is a possibility of the development and/or exercise of these 
interests being undermined in advance, before she reaches the age at which she would 
be in a position to initiate these life projects – the age at which the average person 
initiates these life projects. For example, the girl might have a form of cancer, the 
treatment of which could impair her future fertility. If nothing is done to preserve her 
fertility, she might never be able to start a family and develop the corresponding 
interests. Thus, she has an interest now in her gonadal tissue being harvested and 
stored as this safeguards the development and the subsequent exercise of these 
interests.  
Alternatively, the girl might have a condition which hinders, not so much the initiation 
of a life project and the exercise of the corresponding interests, but their being 
exercised to a full extent. Suppose, for example, that she has a condition which, if left 
untreated, physically condemns her to a life of part-time work. Once started, the life 
project of a career entails an interest in being able to use one’s job as a source of income. 
Compared to an average person who is able to work full-time, she will have fewer means 
available to provide for herself and her family. Therefore, the girl now has an interest in 
seeking treatment as this will enable her to exercise the relevant interest more fully.  
In sum, as long as one has unstarted life projects, there are ‘future interests’ at stake -  
those interests which one ordinarily develops once these life projects are initiated. 
Thus, for every life project so far unstarted, one has an interest in safeguarding the 
development and full exercise of these ‘future interests’. Henceforth, we use the term 
‘interest in unstarted life project’ to refer to the latter type of interest.  
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In recognizing that people have an interest in unstarted life projects, we have followed a 
line of reasoning which is commonly adopted in the discussion of children’s rights. 
Feinberg (1992) distinguishes a group of rights called ‘rights in trust’. These are rights 
which a child cannot yet exercise, but which ought to be protected or ‘saved’ so that the 
child can exercise that right once she reaches adulthood. Feinberg points to the 
possibility of adults violating these rights in advance, before the child is even in a 
position to exercise these rights. According to Davis (1997), the right to reproduce is an 
example of such a ‘right in trust’:  
 
A young child cannot physically exercise that right, and a teenager might lack the 
legal and moral grounds on which to assert such a right. But clearly the child, 
when he or she attains adulthood, will have that right, and therefore the child 
now has the right not to be sterilized, so that the child may exercise that right in 
the future. Rights in this category include a long list: virtually all the important 
rights we believe adults have, but which must be protected now to be exercised 
later. (Davis 1997, 9) 
 
As is the case for one’s interests in started life projects, so do one’s interests in unstarted 
life projects also vary in strength throughout a lifetime. The closer one is to the age at 
which people, on average, initiate the life project, the stronger one’s interest in the 
unstarted life project. The phenomenon of time preference – the preference for 
immediate utility over delayed utility - accounts for this relationship between the 
strength of this interest and the proximity to the initiation of a life project.39 Consider a 
10-year-old and a 20-year old. The latter is closer to initiating certain life projects and, 
thus, to enjoying the associated utility. Consequently, the 20-year-old has a stronger 
 
                                                     
39 Jeff McMahan (2002) has also acknowledged the existence of this relationship, albeit without referring to 
life projects. According to McMahan, an interest becomes stronger the closer one is in time to the interest 
being satisfied. However, rather than relying on time preference, he relies on the concept of ‘psychological 
continuity’ when accounting for this relationship. The latter concept refers to those psychological 
connections that link ourselves over time. The psychological connections that link an individual at, for 
example, the current point in time and some future point can take on varying strengths. For example, a very 
young child has negligible levels of psychological continuity with her future self at age 40, whereas a 35-year-
old has strong continuity with herself as a 40-year-old. According to McMahan, the stronger the level of 
psychological continuity is between an individual now - and her current interest in a certain good - and the 
time when her interest in this good is satisfied, the stronger the individual’s interest in this good. Translated 
into the terminology of life projects, the latter amounts to the following: the stronger the level of 
psychological continuity between an individual now - and her interest in a certain unstarted life project - and 
the time when the relevant life project can be initiated, the stronger the individual’s interest in this unstarted 
life project.  
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preference for being able to initiate these life projects. Assuming a direct link between 
the strength of one’s preference for and the strength of one’s interest in something, the 
20-year-old, then, also has a stronger interest in these unstarted life projects.   
4.4 How being denied a transplant impacts upon one’s 
interests in life projects 
In the above, we have merely claimed that the harm involved in being denied a 
transplant is that of a setback to the interests corresponding to life projects. We have 
not yet demonstrated that these interests are indeed set back so that one is, thus, actually 
harmed in terms of one’s life projects. If we are to establish this, we need to show that, 
when denied a transplant, people’s interests in life projects either fare worse than 
before or fare worse than they would have done in the event of transplantation. In sum, 
we need to show that the conditions of either the ‘worsening test’ or the ‘counterfactual 
test’ are met. In the following, we demonstrate that the harm incurred when denied a 
transplant is that of a) a setback to the interests in started life projects and/or b) a 
setback to the interest in unstarted life projects.  
We argue that both types of setback are a case of being made worse off than before in 
the event of lifesaving transplants, whereas they generally constitute counterfactual 
harm in non-lifesaving transplants. For each type of harm, we identify the group of 
people for whom the setback is the greatest.  
 
4.4.1 Setback to the interests corresponding to started life projects 
4.4.1.1 Is the setback a case of actual harm or counterfactual harm?  
In practice, if a waitlisted patient is denied a specific lifesaving organ, there is 
uncertainty as to whether or not she will survive. Her survival is dependent on various 
factors, such as the urgency of her condition and how soon, if ever, another suitable 
organ becomes available. However, if in devising allocation criteria, we assume such 
uncertainty, we have nothing to go by. It is impossible to pass judgment in terms of 
harm, not knowing whether or not a patient will die if denied a certain organ. Thus, we 
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here assume a situation of true scarcity40: once a person is denied a lifesaving organ, no 
other organ will come along. Feinberg’s conditions for the ‘worsening test’ are, then, 
clearly met when a person is not given a lifesaving organ. Death sets back, once and for 
all, all interests a person had in started life projects.41  
 
In the case of non-lifesaving transplants, we assume, once again, a situation of true 
scarcity so that a person denied a kidney is condemned to dialysis for an indefinite 
length of time. Whether or not the conditions of the ‘worsening test’ are met in this 
case, depends on whether or not the waitlisted patient is on dialysis. If she is (which is 
the case for most waitlisted patients), she does not actually become worse off when 
denied a kidney. Thus, we need to determine whether this case passes the 
‘counterfactual test’. Do the interests corresponding to one’s started life projects fare 
worse when remaining on dialysis, compared to the situation which obtains after 
receiving a kidney? The many restrictions imposed by dialysis suggest that a kidney 
transplant allows one to exercise these interests more fully. 
Dialysis imposes irregular school attendance on children, thereby impeding the 
acquisition of the skills and knowledge required later on in life (Samhan et al. 2007). 
Adults on dialysis are unable to continue working full-time or even at all (Wadd et al. 
2011). As a result, they are hindered in applying their skills and knowledge to the 
everyday challenges faced in the workplace. In addition, they have to make do with 
fewer means of providing for themselves and for their families. Dialysis also impacts on 
family life. When on dialysis, a parent’s role in the family shifts from one of 
independence to one of dependence, prohibiting the full exercise of her role as a 
caretaker (White & Grenyer 1999). Furthermore, dialysis alters the dynamics of the 
relationship with one’s partner. Many couples’ sex lives become compromised, given 
the high prevalence of sexual dysfunctions among dialyzed patients (Leão et al. 2010). 
 
                                                     
40 The term ‘true scarcity’ is taken from Kamm’s work (1993).  
41 One might, along the lines of Epicurus, object that the view of death being a harm for the person who dies is 
untenable. The main difficulty with this view, according to Epicurus, is that the evil of death seems to lack a 
subject: death cannot harm one while one is still alive and neither can it harm one once one dies as one, then, 
no longer exists. In sum, if anything is to be bad for a person, it must be bad for that person at a certain time, 
yet there is no time at which death is bad for the one who dies. Feinberg (1984) , however, has convincingly 
argued that death does, in fact, constitute a harm for the person who dies. He summarizes his argument as 
follows: “Death can be a harm to the person who dies in virtue of the interests he had antemortem that are 
totally and irrevocably defeated by his death. The subject of the harm in death is the living person 
antemortem, whose interests are squelched. The fact of a person’s death “makes it true” that some of his 
antemortem interests were going to be defeated and to that extent the antemortem person was harmed too, 
though his impending death was still unknown to him” (Feinberg 1984, 93). Most scholars today share 
Feinberg’s view that death constitutes a harm for the person who dies.  
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Finally, the physical limitations imposed by dialysis bring about a decrease in social life 
(White & Grenyer 1999).   
4.4.1.2 Who suffers the greatest setback to their interests in started life 
projects?  
 
Above we have argued that, regardless of which life projects one has started, one’s 
interests in these started life projects are set back when one is denied a transplant. 
Everyone is, thus, harmed in this respect when denied a transplant. However, the 
magnitude of this harm (i.e. of the setback to one’s interests in started life projects) is 
not distributed equally across the population.  
 
Suppose we devise a scoring system for measuring the magnitude of the setback 
incurred to one’s interests in started life projects. As we have already seen, how great a 
stake one has in started life projects depends on both the number and strength level of 
one’s interests in these projects. Therefore, a person’s score is greater (1) the greater 
the number of interests she has in started life projects and (2) the greater the strength 
level of these interests. We use the terms ‘numerical factor’ and ‘strength factor’ in 
order to refer to the first and second factor, respectively.  
 
Besides these factors, there is yet another factor which is determinative of one’s score. 
As noted earlier, one’s interests in certain started life projects diminish in strength level 
around retirement age. The latter suggests that people will differ with regard to the 
number of years they have ahead of them during which their interests can be sustained 
at the highest strength level – strength level A. The greater the number of years during 
which each of one’s interests can be sustained at strength level A in the event of 
transplantation, the greater the setback incurred when denied a transplant (and, thus, 
the higher one’s score). We use the term ‘duration factor’ to refer to this third factor.  
 
If we are to determine the group of people which suffers the greatest setback to 
interests in started life projects, we must identify who scores highest on the product of 
these 3 factors. We do so below, using a 2-step method. First, we identify the group of 
people which scores highest on the product of the ‘numerical’ and the ‘strength’ factor. 
Next, we determine who scores highest on the third factor, the ‘duration factor’.     
 
As noted earlier, one’s interests in started life projects are the greatest both in number 
and strength (strength level A) from one’s late 20s until one’s mid 60s. Thus, waitlisted 
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patients in this age category score highest on the product of the ‘numerical’ and the 
‘strength factor’.42 Those who have not yet reached their late 20s, score significantly 
lower than the former age category given that they have fewer started life projects and, 
thus, fewer interests at stake (i.e. they score lower on the ‘numerical’ factor). Those 
beyond their mid 60s, on the other hand, score significantly lower, not because they 
have fewer interests at stake, but because their interests in certain started life projects 
are of a diminished strength (strength level B) – i.e. they score lower on the ‘strength’ 
factor.   
If we are to determine how the different age categories score on the ‘duration’ factor, 
we need to know how long a transplanted organ lasts. The term ‘graft half-life’ indicates 
the median lifespan of a graft, i.e. the number of years after which 50% of the grafts in a 
cohort fail (Ouellette et al. 2009). Deceased donor kidney transplants have a graft half-
life of 8.8 years (Lamb et al. 2011). Out of all the lifesaving organs, the liver’s half-life (8.5 
years) comes closest to that of the kidney.43 Therefore, we limit ourselves to these 2 
organs in discussing the implications of a harm minimizing framework for the 
allocation of both non-lifesaving and lifesaving transplants.  
As mentioned before, the strength of some interests in started life projects diminishes 
to level B around one’s mid 60s. Thus, assuming a median graft lifespan of 10 years44, all 
waitlisted patients up until their mid 50s would have all of their interests in started life 
projects sustained at a strength of level A throughout the whole duration of the graft. 
Patients between their late 50s and mid 60s score less well on this ‘duration’ factor. Only 
some of their interests – those that remain at the highest strength level throughout 
one’s whole life - would be sustained at strength level A throughout the whole lifespan 
of the graft. Their other interests – those of  which the strength diminishes to level B 
around retirement age - would be sustained at level A for fewer than 10 years. The 
 
                                                     
42 One might object that while the average person’s interests in started life projects are of strength level A 
from her late 20s until her mid 60s, this does not hold true for the interests of people in this age range 
awaiting transplantation. Specifically, one might argue that, like pensioners, these people’s interests are of 
strength level B, given that certain instrumental usages of started life projects are ruled out for them. For 
example, the application of one’s skills and knowledge to the everyday challenges of the workplace is ruled 
out for waitlisted patients who are unable to work. However, this instrumental usage of the person’s career 
would become possible again once the person has undergone a transplant. In other words, for waitlisted 
patients between their late 20s and mid 60s, any instrumental usages of their life projects that are ruled out, 
are so only in practice, not in theory. For pensioners, on the other hand, any instrumental usages that are 
ruled out are so both in theory and in practice. This difference between waitlisted patients of the specified age 
category and pensioners entails that the interests of the former are of strength level A, whereas the interests 
of the latter are of strength level B.    
43 Lungs, hearts, intestines, and pancreases have a graft half-life of 5.2, 11, 3.6, and 16.7 years, respectively (see 
Lodhi et al. 2011). 
44 For the sake of convenience, the graft half-lives of kidneys and livers are rounded off upwards here.   
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precise duration for which the latter are sustained at strength level A obviously depends 
on how far the person is removed from her mid 60s. Finally, waitlisted patients beyond 
their mid 60s obtain the poorest score, given that some of their interests have already 
reached strength level B. This contrasts with the previously mentioned age categories, 
for which all interests can be sustained at level A for at least a certain period of time.   
It is between one’s late 20s and mid 50s that 1) one has the greatest number of interests 
of strength level A and 2) that, if given a transplant, all of these interests would be 
sustained at this level throughout the whole duration of the graft. Thus, it is this age 
category for whom the setback to interests in started life projects is the greatest.45 
4.4.2 Setback to the interests corresponding to unstarted life projects 
4.4.2.1 Is the setback a case of actual harm or counterfactual harm?  
Just as it defeats one’s interests in started life projects, so is death also the ultimate 
setback to one’s interest in an unstarted life project. Thus, anyone who has unstarted 
life projects is made worse off than before when denied a lifesaving transplant. We 
assume here that a life project is unstarted for a person as long as she has not yet 
reached the age at which the specific project is, on average, initiated.  
 
One’s interest in an unstarted life project is also set back when denied a non-lifesaving 
transplant. Recall that, in general, there are two ways in which the interest in an 
unstarted life project might be set back. First, one may, now already – i.e., before having 
reached the age at which people usually start the life project - be hindered in the future 
initiation of the life project. In sum, one may be hindered in developing those interests 
people usually acquire once they have initiated the relevant life project. Second, one 
 
                                                     
45 Our analysis is based on the concept of graft half-life, a concept which does not reflect the effects of certain 
demographic characteristics on graft survival rates. UNOS data which take into account these effects, suggest 
that children up until the age of 11 have higher long-term kidney and liver graft survival rates, relative to 
other age categories (http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ar2009/508a_agecat_ki.htm and 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ar2009/908a_agecat_li.htm). Thus, on the basis of these data, children up 
until the age of 11, rather than merely everyone up until their mid 50s, would score highest on the duration 
factor. However, we would like to emphasize that these children have only slightly better long-term graft 
survival rates, relative to other age categories. The latter implies that the advantage they enjoy with regard to 
this duration factor is not big enough to compensate for their disadvantaged position regarding the numerical 
factor (i.e. the fact that they have very few started life projects and, thus, very few interests). In sum, even if 
we took into account the (slightly) better graft survival rates for children up until the age of 11, this would not 
affect the final outcome of our analysis in that the late 20s-mid 50s age category would still suffer the greatest 
setback to their interests.    
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may, now already, be hindered, not so much in developing, but in fully exercising these 
interests in the future. We argue below that, when denied a kidney transplant, one’s 
interest in the unstarted life project of a family is set back in the first way, whereas 
one’s interest in other unstarted life projects is set back in the second way. In either 
way, the setback is a case of counterfactual harm - of one’s interest faring worse under 
continued dialysis than it would have fared in the event of a kidney transplant.  
 
Take the case of a waitlisted person who has not yet reached the age at which one 
usually starts a family. Assuming she meets our definition of the average person, she 
will want to start a family once she reaches that age. However, given our assumption of 
true scarcity, the person will most likely be unable to do so if denied a kidney 
transplant. Both men and women with chronic kidney disease suffer from impaired 
reproductive function (Watnick & Rueda 2008). Transplantation can restore fertility in 
both men and women and thereby protects one’s interest in the unstarted life project of 
a family.46  
 
Note that everyone who has not yet started a family has their interest in this unstarted 
life project protected through transplantation. Thus, this interest is not only protected 
for those who would be in a position to start a family at some point within the (10-year) 
lifespan of the transplanted graft. In other words, it is not only those in their late teens 
for whom the interest in the unstarted life project of a family is protected through 
transplantation. The broadness of the term ‘safeguard’ accounts for this finding. Recall 
that we specified one’s interest in an unstarted life project as an interest in safeguarding 
the development and full exercise of future interests – those interests one acquires once 
the relevant life project is initiated. There are varying degrees in which the 
development of these future interests – i.e. the initiation of the life project – can be 
safeguarded. In its strongest sense, the term ‘safeguard’ implies that a person is 
guaranteed to be able to initiate the life project. Those who are in a position to start a 
family within the (10-year) lifespan of the transplanted graft, have their interest in the 
 
                                                     
46 One might object that the prospect of starting a family need not be ruled out when condemned to lifelong 
dialysis, given the availability of ‘backup options’ such as adoption and assisted reproductive technology 
(ART). However, pregnancy is not recommended for dialysed women, due to the risks involved for both 
mother and child (Hladunewich et al. 2011). Although ART is a theoretical option for dialysed men, it might 
not be a practically viable one. The conditions faced by dialysed patients (fatigue, physical limitations, limited 
or no employment prospects, etc.) are not exactly conducive to child-rearing. Thus, chances are that these 
limitations would deter male patients from turning to ART. For the same reason, dialysis patients would likely 
be reluctant to pursue adoption. However, even if they were not, they are unlikely to be found fit to adopt due 
to their decreased life expectancy (Moncrief 1982).    
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unstarted life project of a family protected in this sense. In a weaker sense, the term 
‘safeguard’  implies that, the possibility of starting a family at some point in the future is 
merely left untouched. Those who have not yet reached their late teens have their 
interest in the unstarted life project of a family protected in this weaker sense. For these 
people, a transplant merely ensures that the possibility of starting a family is not ruled 
out outright. It does not guarantee that they will actually be able to start a family at 
some point in the future. Whether or not they will actually be able to start a family, 
depends on whether or not they will receive (a) retransplant(s) once their initial graft 
fails.  
 
We now take a look at the way in which one’s interest in the other unstarted life 
projects is set back when denied a kidney. Earlier on, we discussed how dialysis 
prohibits the full exercise of the interests one has in these other life projects once they 
have been initiated. For example, dialysis impedes a healthy sex-life as well as the full 
application of one’s skills and knowledge in the workplace. Consider a waitlisted person 
who has not yet reached her late 20s, i.e. who has not yet settled down with a partner, 
initiated a career or a family. If she is denied a kidney transplant, the prospect of fully 
applying her skills in the workplace is already ruled out in advance, before she has even 
had the chance to initiate a career. In the same way, the prospect of a healthy sex-life is 
also precluded. The prospect of being unable to fully exercise these ‘future interests’ 
amounts to a setback to the interest in her unstarted life projects47 of a career and a 
stable relationship.48  
4.4.2.2 Who suffers the greatest setback to their interests in unstarted life 
projects?  
The magnitude of the setback to one’s interests in unstarted life projects is greater, (1) 
the greater the number of interests one has at stake in unstarted life projects and (2) the 
greater the strength of these interests. Below, we identify the group of people for whom 
the product of these two factors is the highest.  
Given that one’s education and social networks are built up from the very beginning of 
life, the only life projects that are ever unstarted include one’s career, family, and a 
stable relationship. The latter projects are all initiated at approximately the same stage 
 
                                                     
47 Obviously, the person’s interest in the unstarted life project of a family is also set back, in the manner 
previously discussed.  
48 Once again, this setback is not only endured by those who, if they received a transplant, would be in a 
position to start a career and a stable relationship at some point within the (10-year) lifespan of the graft. For 
the same reason as mentioned before, everyone who has not yet initiated a career and a stable relationship has 
their interest in these unstarted life projects protected through transplantation.  
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in one’s life – one’s late 20s. Thus, all those with unstarted life projects, have the same 
number of unstarted life projects and, thus, the same number of corresponding interests 
at stake. However, as mentioned before, time preference suggests that the strength of 
their interests will differ depending on how close they are to initiating these life 
projects. Consequently, those approaching their late 20s will suffer the greatest setback 
to their interests in unstarted life projects.  
4.5 Minimizing harm: practical implications for organ 
allocation 
Age is a morally relevant factor in that it serves as a proxy for the magnitude of the 
setback incurred to the interests in unstarted/started life projects when denied an 
organ transplant. Therefore, we suggest introducing ‘age’ as a criterion alongside the 
existing allocation criteria. Current allocation criteria vary depending on the type of 
organ. The allocation of donor kidneys, for example, proceeds on the basis of the 
following factors within Eurotransplant: waiting time (i.e. time on dialysis), distance 
between donor/transplantation center, balance between import/export of the 
participating countries, HLA typing, and mismatch probability (Persijn 2006). For each 
of these factors, there is a scoring system in place. When a donor kidney becomes 
available, transplant candidates are rank ordered based on their total number of points. 
Thus, if we are to introduce age as an additional allocation criterion, we need to devise a 
scoring system for this item. We limit ourselves below to presenting the basic outline of 
such a scoring system.  
Those at the very beginning of life receive very few points for the criterion ‘age’, given 
the small amount of started life projects and the weak interest in their unstarted life 
projects. As one’s interests in unstarted life projects grow stronger throughout the 
years, one’s points gradually increase. One’s score reaches its peak around one’s 
mid/late 20s, when one’s interest in one’s unstarted life projects are highest in strength 
due to the fact that one is very close to initiating these projects. From that moment 
onwards, one’s score plateaus out until one’s mid 50s. The period across which this 
plateau stretches itself (mid/late 20s – mid 50s) represents the age category which has 
most at stake, in terms of the interests in unstarted and/or started life projects. After 
one’s mid 50s, one’s score drops, reflecting the fact that one’s interests in started life 
projects can no longer all be sustained at strength level A throughout the whole lifespan 
of the transplanted graft. As one has fewer interests of strength level A in started life 
projects after one’s mid 60s, one’s score decreases further from this point onwards.  
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There are two remarks we would like to make with regard to our scoring system. A first 
remark concerns the series of rather specific cut-off points (mid 20s, mid 50s, etc.) 
introduced here. We urge readers not to take the specified boundaries too literally. 
These cut-off points are culturally specific and may change in the long run.  
A second remark concerns our reliance on age as a proxy for harm as opposed to 
assessing harm on a case-by-case basis. The fact that age functions as a proxy for harm 
implies that a person’s age is a reliable predictor of the magnitude of harm suffered 
insofar as we assume that this person resembles the ‘average’ individual of her age. One 
might argue that the use of age as a proxy for harm is unfair to those who represent a 
deviation from the ‘average’. Consider a rather extreme case: a 40-year-old person who 
is adamant about remaining unemployed, single and childless. She, therefore, has no 
interest in being able to settle down with a partner, establish a career or a family. Now 
consider a 20-year-old with a thriving career, a partner, and children. Both are in need 
of a transplant. Our proposal dictates giving the 40-year-old a higher score on the ‘age’ 
criterion, despite the 20-year-old actually having more interests at stake. In sum, 
assuming all other things are equal, our proposal commands the prioritization of the 40-
year-old, despite her suffering less harm. Thus, one might argue that we ought to 
modify our proposal so as to assess harm on a case-by-case basis, rather than use age as 
a proxy for the harm incurred. However, such a modification would come at too high a 
price, for two reasons. First, if our proposal were to be implemented in a case-by-case 
fashion, one would consistently disadvantage those who are (likely) unable to start 
certain life projects, such as the (mentally) handicapped and the infertile. Second, there 
would be various practical obstacles to implementing the aforementioned modification. 
If we were to assess harm on a case-by-case basis, we would need to determine the 
number of started/unstarted life projects an individual has. The process involved in 
obtaining this information would likely be intrusive and highly bureaucratic. For these 
reasons, we do not support the assessment of harm on a case-by-case basis.  
4.6 Concluding remarks 
The aging of the transplant waiting list pushes the question concerning the morality of 
age-based rationing to the forefront. We have put forward a novel (utilitarian) 
argument for the moral relevance of age, one situated in a harm-minimizing framework. 
Our argument supports the prioritization of those (roughly) between their mid/late 20s 
and mid 50s. From the perspective of this framework, the new UNOS policy is 
sufficiently restrictive at the end of life, i.e. it rightly deprioritizes the elderly and 
middle aged (>50 years of age). However, it is insufficiently restrictive at the other end 
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of the spectrum, i.e. it ought to also deprioritize pediatric patients and those in their 
early 20s.  
Admittedly, the account we have put forward in this chapter has its limitations. We 
have not analyzed whether the numerous arguments49 contra age-based rationing are 
valid. Strictly speaking, these arguments must be proven invalid in order for our 
account to be truly convincing. Although an assessment of such arguments lies beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, our account nevertheless represents an important first 
step towards filling the argumentative void left by UNOS officials. 
Our account is undoubtedly controversial. This especially holds true for its claim that 
pediatric patients should also be deprioritized in kidney allocation. This aspect of our 
account, therefore, warrants further consideration. We take on this task in the next 
chapter.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
49 For an overview of these arguments, see sections 0.3.1.2.2 and 1.3 of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 5                                                            
Pediatric priority in kidney allocation: 
challenging its acceptability 
Based on accepted, forthcoming journal article: 
 
Capitaine, L., Van Assche, K., Pennings, G. and Steckx, S. (2014) “Pediatric priority in 
kidney allocation: challenging its acceptability”. Transplant International (forthcoming). 
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5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, we established that, from a harm minimizing perspective, there 
are reasons to grant pediatric patients lower priority in the allocation of kidneys, 
relative to those in the +/-25 to +/-55 age group. This argument, however, goes against 
current practice. Various organ sharing organizations have kidney allocation policies in 
place which accord pediatric patients (some) priority. Within Eurotransplant, pediatric 
priority consists in the attribution of bonus points. For example, relative to adults, 
pediatric patients’ points for HLA antigen mismatches are doubled. In addition, children 
also receive bonus points for waiting time (Eurotransplant 2013). Within the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), kidneys from donors less than 35 years old – i.e. the 
‘qualitatively better organs’- are offered preferentially to pediatric patients (Smith et al. 
2012).50,51 This policy is referred to as ‘Share 35’. It was instituted in 2005, after the 
observed failure of a previously implemented, ‘milder’ pediatric priority policy (Gritsch 
et al. 2008). Along the same lines as UNOS, Scandiatransplant prioritizes pediatric 
recipients when a suitable HLA matched kidney is available from a donor less than 40 
years old (Grunnet et al. 2005). Other organ sharing organizations which accord priority 
to children include France Transplant and the NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) 
(Hoyer 2008; Johnson et al. 2010).   
Official policy documents offer no arguments in support of pediatric priority. However, 
such arguments can be found dispersed across the academic literature on pediatric 
renal transplantation. If valid, these arguments would substantially weaken our claim 
that pediatric patients ought to receive lower priority than certain other age groups in 
kidney allocation. It is, therefore, crucial that we examine their soundness. This chapter 
brings together and critically analyzes these arguments for the first time. We show that 
none of these succeed in justifying pediatric prioritization. In addition, we point to some 
inadvertent consequences of this practice. We argue that these effects may further 
undermine the legitimacy of pediatric priority policies.   
 
                                                     
50 Note that the pediatric priority accorded by UNOS comes with a qualification. If a highly sensitized adult or 
an adult with no HLA mismatches is waitlisted, she receives priority for kidneys from donors less than 35 
years of age (Pape & Ehrich 2008).  
51 Share 35 will soon undergo a slight change. Rather than receiving priority for kidneys from donors aged <35 
years, children will be prioritized for kidneys from donors with a KDPI (kidney donor profile index) score 
<35%. This change was recommended by the OPTN Pediatric Committee after simulation modeling forecasted 
that it would not alter the level of access of pediatric candidates. It is estimated that the new pediatric kidney 
allocation policy will be implemented by the end of 2014 (personal communication with Gena Boyle, liaison to 
the Kidney Transplantation Committee at UNOS).   
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5.2 Critical analysis of arguments for pediatric priority 
In analyzing the arguments put forward in support of pediatric priority, we make two 
distinctions. A first distinction is that between arguments grounded in the principle of 
utility and those based on the principle of equity. A second distinction pertains to the 
type of pediatric priority which the arguments aim to justify. Some arguments are put 
forward in support of Share 35-like policies, where children are prioritized for the 
‘qualitatively better organs’. Other arguments merely justify Eurotransplant-like 
policies, where priority is granted to pediatric patients, irrespective of the quality of the 
organ.  
5.2.1 Utility-based arguments 
The growth and development argument 
The most common utility-based argument in support of pediatric priority points to 
various complications of end-stage renal disease (ESRD) that are unique to the pediatric 
population. To begin with, the demands of ongoing treatment, combined with fatigue 
and unexpected medical problems (e.g. infection) severely limit children’s school 
attendance (Tong et al. 2013). In addition, children with ESRD have great difficulty 
attaining normal adult height. According to an analysis of the North American Pediatric 
Renal Transplant Cooperative Studies, 47% of children on dialysis exhibit severe short 
stature (Seikaly et al. 2006). Finally, children with ESRD are also at risk of 
neurodevelopmental delays and deficits. Compared to the general population, children 
with ESRD have lower IQ levels and academic achievement. Furthermore, they score 
lower on tests assessing functioning in specific cognitive domains such as language, 
visuo-spatial perception, attention, memory, and executive function (Icard et al. 2010).  
Growth failure and neurodevelopmental delay are aggravated by increased duration of 
renal insufficiency (Hoyer 2008). Moreover, while both types of deficits may somewhat 
improve following renal transplantation, the latter does not appear to normalize 
statural growth and developmental status (Icard et al. 2010; Nissel et al. 2004).52 It is 
 
                                                     
52 Although transplantation, in itself, does not usually result in normal adult height, the latter can sometimes 
be achieved through additional measures. For example, steroid withdrawal has been associated with 
attainment of adult height within the normal range (see, for example, Klare et al. 2012). Nevertheless, it 
remains important to prevent growth retardation in the pre-transplant period. After all, a lower degree of 
stunting at the time of kidney transplantation increases the chance of attaining normal adult height under 
steroid avoidance protocols. 
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argued that expedited transplantation, in preventing the aforementioned complications 
from taking on a full-blown form, minimizes their adverse impact on quality of life 
(QoL). Children are also expected to derive additional QoL benefits from early 
transplantation through the restored ability for regular school attendance (Pape & 
Ehrich 2008). In short, this argument supports prioritization of pediatric patients on the 
basis that they stand to gain considerable QoL from timely transplantation (Pape & 
Ehrich 2008; Bratton et al. 2006).  
 
The abovementioned argument, which we shall label the ‘growth and development 
argument’, presupposes that the deficits in growth and development take on a 
substantial magnitude in the absence of expedited transplantation. There is relatively 
strong evidence in support of major disruptions in growth after long-term dialysis 
(Gorman et al. 2008). However, in the case of neurodevelopmental problems, the quality 
of the evidence is low to moderate. For example, across the various studies pointing 
towards significant developmental deficits in the absence of pediatric prioritization, 
there is no uniform assessment of neurocognitive functioning. Cross-study comparison 
is further hampered by the fact that, in the majority of studies, the samples are of mixed 
age, mixed gender, and mixed severity of kidney failure (Gerson et al. 2006). In addition, 
most of the studies are cross-sectional and use only a small sample size. However, in 
pediatric research, it is difficult to overcome such problems.53 Despite the limitations of 
the evidence, the large number of studies pointing towards important developmental 
deficits in the presence of long-term dialysis suggests that it is reasonable to assume 
that delayed transplantation significantly affects (neuro)cognitive development.  
 
Another presupposition of the growth and development argument is that the various 
deficits encountered by children on dialysis significantly affect QoL. However, contrary 
to widespread belief, severe short stature does not impair QoL (see, for example, Downie 
et al. 1997; Kranzler et al. 2000). The same applies to deficits in (neuro)cognitive 
development. The reasoning underlying the presumed link between the latter type of 
deficit and impaired QoL is that (neuro)cognitive delays lead to a lower education level, 
thereby thwarting job opportunities. The high level of unemployment, in turn, is said to 
adversely affect QoL (Haavisto et al. 2012). However, follow-up studies of children 
 
                                                     
53 There are several reasons why these limitations are difficult to overcome in pediatric research. First, 
various diseases, including ESRD, affect only a small number of children. Second, investigators are often 
reluctant to enroll children in randomized clinical trials. Third, in the absence of such reluctance, 
investigators face the challenging task of obtaining agreement for enrollment from both the child and the 
guardian. Finally, study instruments, including those to measure cognition, must be tailored to specific 
pediatric age groups. 
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transplanted prior to the introduction of a (full-blown) pediatric priority point towards 
an employment level similar to that of the general population, despite a lower 
education level (see, for example, Broyer et al. 2004; Offner et al. 1999). One might argue 
that a lower education level adversely affects QoL via a route other than that of 
(un)employment. However, the available studies suggest that there is no correlation 
between education level and QoL (see, for example, Veenhoven 2008).  
Contrary to growth/developmental deficits, the limitations imposed by ESRD on 
everyday school life significantly affect children’s QoL. When confronted with their lack 
of freedom to engage in school activities, pediatric patients receiving in-center 
hemodialysis reported an array of negative feelings. The latter ranged from a sense of 
failure to meet expectations to a feeling of being ‘trapped’ and ‘stuck’. Anger and 
frustration were the most commonly described experiences (Tong et al. 2013). 
Besides the mere constraints it imposes on full-time education, dialysis exerts yet 
another negative effect on children’s school experiences. A recurrent theme in 
interviews with ESRD-children is the inability to focus on homework in the overbusy 
hospital environment (Tong et al. 2013). Strongly related to this is the commonly cited 
struggle to perform well academically. These difficulties elicit feelings of inferiority, 
incompetence, depression, and school phobia.  
The inability to engage in certain extracurricular activities, such as contact sports and 
swimming, further compounds children’s negative school experience. Generally, 
children cite a sense of abnormality and a failure to fit in as a result of these social 
restrictions (Tjaden et al. 2012).  
 
As deficits in growth and development do not impact upon QoL, proponents of the 
growth and development argument overestimate the impact of delayed transplantation 
on children. Nevertheless, pediatric patients still stand to gain considerable QoL benefits 
from expedited transplantation, as illustrated by their adverse experience of school and 
extracurricular activities. However, the growth and development argument seems to 
ignore that the adult population also faces unique complications which are reversed or 
significantly improved following transplantation (Pourmand et al. 2007; Filocamo et al. 
2009; Richman & Gohh 2012; Eng et al. 2012). For example, adults with ESRD experience 
sexual dysfunctions (Leão et al. 2010), infertility (McKay & Josephson 2006) and high 
levels of unemployment (Matas et al. 1996). Below, we show that each of these problems 
is both highly prevalent and substantially damaging to QoL.  
Erectile dysfunction affects approximately 82% of patients on hemodialysis (Pourmand 
et al. 2007). Over 50% of women on chronic dialysis report decreased libido and reduced 
ability to reach orgasm (Basok et al. 2009). Unsurprisingly, these sexual dysfunctions 
result in a marked decrease in the frequency of intercourse. In 33% of patients on 
hemodialysis, there is no sexual activity at all (Rathi & Ramachandran 2012). Sexual 
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dysfunction elicits anxiety, psychological depression, marital problems and loss of self-
esteem, all of which severely impair QoL (Moriyama 2011). 
The unemployment rate among long-term dialysis patients varies from 70% to 90% 
(Helanterä et al. 2012). The regained ability for (full-time) employment post-
transplantation is a clinically relevant index of improved QoL (Russell et al. 1992). 
Depression, which affects over 60% of adult hemodialysis patients, is strongly correlated 
with unemployment (Panagopoulou et al. 2009).    
Both men and women with end-stage renal disease suffer from impaired reproductive 
function (Watnick & Rueda 2008). Over 50% of men on hemodialysis encounter 
impotence, due to spermatogenic abnormalities and impaired testosterone production 
(Zeyneloglu et al. 2005). Women exhibit disturbances in menstruation and fertility, 
generally resulting in amenorrhea and anovulation (Bahadi et al. 2010). Early 
menopause has also been reported. Moreover, pregnancy is contraindicated for the very 
few fertile women on dialysis, given the risks involved for both mother and child 
(Hladunewich et al. 2011). Infertility is associated with grief and depression, a sense of 
worthlessness, inadequacy, isolation, and feelings of anger and resentment (Greil et al. 
2009). 
 
Evidently, prioritization of one group over another, on the basis of QoL considerations, 
is only warranted if transplantation provides the former with a greater gain in QoL. Can 
we conclude that children stand to gain more QoL from transplantation than adults (or 
vice versa)? The above discussion suggests that, in terms of QoL, both children and 
adults stand to gain substantially from transplantation. Of course, from this, it does not 
necessarily follow that children and adults stand to gain equally. However, whereas one 
group may stand to gain (significantly) more QoL, the current evidence does not allow 
one to determine whether this is, in fact, the case. In the absence of evidence pointing 
either way, it seems unjustifiable to side with either children or adults. Thus, in 
choosing the side of pediatric patients, proponents of the growth and development 
argument shoulder themselves with the burden of proof. In other words, they will have 
to gather evidence substantiating the claim that children stand to gain more QoL, 
relative to adults. This may prove to be a challenging task. Although further 
confirmation is required, preliminary studies suggest that an earlier onset of ESRD is 
associated with better coping mechanisms (Tong et al. 2013).  
 
The life expectancy argument 
 
Another utility-based argument in support of pediatric priority states that children, 
given their longer life expectancy, stand to benefit more from transplantation than 
adults (Horslen et al. 2007; Veatch 2000). This argument, however, is problematic in that 
it relies on an incongruous use of the term ‘medical benefit’.  
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When assessing medical benefit, we generally focus on the gain brought about by one 
single intervention. For certain types of treatment, the medical benefit so understood, is 
that of restoring the patient’s life expectancy back to the average for her age. Examples 
include a mastectomy and the closure of an atrial septal defect54. Such treatments may 
confer lifelong relief from the underlying condition.  
In the case of an organ transplant, the medical benefit does not amount to life 
expectancy being restored to normal. A graft does not last a lifetime. For example, 
deceased donor kidney transplants have a half-life of 8.8 years (Lamb et al. 2011). A child 
will, therefore, often need several retransplants if we are to even come close to 
normalizing her life expectancy. Thus, in equating the benefit children derive from 
kidney transplantation with restoration of life expectancy, proponents of the life 
expectancy argument take into account the gain associated with several retransplants, 
rather than a single transplant. As such, the argument is at odds with the customary 
understanding of ‘medical benefit’. Factors such as organ scarcity imply that there is no 
guarantee that a child will receive the number of retransplants needed to approximate 
normal life expectancy. In the absence of such a guarantee, why equate medical benefit 
with the gains incurred by several transplants, i.e. with normalization of life 
expectancy? In sum, it makes good sense to adhere to the common usage of ‘medical 
benefit’. It, therefore, seems advisable to abandon life expectancy as a criterion of 
medical benefit in the context of organ transplantation. The medical benefit incurred by 
receiving a transplant at a certain age is more accurately represented by the graft 
survival rates for that specific age group.  
When switching to the criterion of graft survival rates, the pediatric priority rule comes 
under fire. Of all age groups, those between 0 and 11 years of age have the best 10-year-
graft survival rate for deceased donor kidney transplants. In contrast, adolescents (12-
17 years of age), who represent the largest group of kidney transplant recipients in the 
group of children, have the poorest allograft outcome of all age groups except for 
recipients aged 65 and older (OPTN/SRTR 2009). This finding is largely explained by 
widespread non-compliance with the immunosuppressive regimen among adolescents 
(Rees 2009).55 Given that there is a subgroup of adults with better outcomes than a 
subgroup of children, the prioritization of all pediatric age groups seems untenable. One 
 
                                                     
54 An abnormal opening in the wall separating the chambers of the heart. 
55 Non-compliance in adolescents is, amongst others, related to the cosmetic side-effects of corticosteroids, 
such as acne, a swollen face, and increased BMI. Therefore, it has been hypothesized that steroid withdrawal 
protocols can be relied upon as a means of decreasing the risk of non-compliance. There exists preliminary 
evidence in support of this assumption (see, for example, Chandraker 2005). If steroid withdrawal protocols 
increase the adherence to the immunosuppressive regimen, they offer the prospect of improved graft survival 
rates in adolescents.   
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might object that, despite the criterion of life expectancy relying on an incongruous use 
of ‘medical benefit’, it nevertheless represents a preferable alternative to the use of the 
graft survival rates criterion. Ladin and Hanto (2011), for example, argue that in 
disadvantaging adolescents in kidney allocation, as the reliance on the criterion of graft 
survival rates seemingly compels us to do, we are punishing them for their tendency to 
non-compliance. This, they claim, is problematic as it goes against current practice 
which, at most, penalizes actual non-compliance, not a mere tendency to non-
compliance. However, there are several problems with this objection. An allocation 
based on graft survival rates is indifferent towards the underlying cause of allograft 
outcomes. Thus, what the criterion of graft survival penalizes are adolescents’ bad 
outcomes, not their tendency to non-compliance. Moreover, even if the latter were 
being penalized, the objection remains problematic since there might be compelling 
reasons for starting to penalize certain tendencies towards non-compliance. For 
example, we may thereby prevent an inefficient usage of organs. Moreover, such a 
penalization scheme might succeed in winning over those currently reluctant to donate 
out of fear of their organs going to waste. One might still object that this scheme is 
unfair for those adolescents who, when given an organ, would be compliant. However, 
this is a problem faced by any policy of prioritization. For instance, a policy emphasizing 
the criterion of life expectancy implies that, even though some adults may turn out to 
outlive children, they are nevertheless penalized.  
 
The cost argument 
 
The final utility-based argument defends pediatric prioritization on the basis that it 
enables financial savings. Proponents of this argument make two distinct claims. They 
foresee a reduction in both social welfare costs and health care costs.  
The expected reduction in social welfare costs is premised on the same assumption as 
the growth and development argument. Pediatric prioritization, it is argued, enables a 
better psychosocial rehabilitation which, in turn, enhances employment prospects 
(Pape & Ehrich 2008). As noted earlier, however, adults transplanted in childhood prior 
to the introduction of a (full-blown) pediatric priority rule have employment levels 
close to that of the general population. Pediatric prioritization, therefore, offers only 
little room for improvement. Admittedly, any cost reduction, regardless of its 
magnitude, might be worth pursuing. Nevertheless, the cost argument ignores the 
strain which the adult ESRD population puts on the social welfare system. Adults are 
likely to represent a much greater burden than the pediatric population, for two 
reasons. First, unemployment rates in dialysis patients with adult-onset ESRD are 
substantially higher than in those with childhood-onset ESRD (Groothoff 2005). Second, 
whereas adults already strain the social welfare system, children will do so only in the 
future. This difference in timing is relevant in terms of ‘discounting’, an economic 
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theory according to which a certain cost X represents a greater financial burden when 
incurred now than when incurred in the future. Thus, even if unemployment for 
childhood-onset ESRD were as high as that for adulthood-onset ESRD, the latter would 
still put more strain on the social welfare system. Taking this into account and given 
that a significant proportion of the adult ESRD population resumes work after 
transplantation, expedited transplantation for adults is likely to achieve greater 
financial savings than pediatric prioritization (Russell et al. 1992; Helanterä 2012).  
 
The appeal to social welfare costs serves to support pediatric prioritization policies of any 
kind. The prospect of a reduction in health care costs, on the other hand, is put forward 
specifically in defense of Share 35-like policies, where children are prioritized for the 
‘qualitatively better’ organs. The idea behind this argument is that such policies ensure 
better graft survival rates for children, thereby reducing the number of retransplants as 
well as the number of expensive dialysis days (Pape & Ehrich 2008; Hoyer 2008). 
However, this argument too is problematic. In improving pediatric graft survival rates, 
one is likely to merely reduce costs associated with pediatric care, rather than overall 
costs.  
In reducing the number of qualitatively better organs going to adults, Share 35-like 
policies might not reduce the total number of retransplants performed. Any reduction in 
the number of pediatric retransplants might merely be met by a comparable increase in 
the number of retransplants among adults. Moreover, even if such policies do reduce the 
total number of retransplants, the argument still fails. A reduction in the demand for 
organs (i.e. a reduction in the total number of retransplants) only decreases overall 
transplant costs in an ideal world, where supply meets demand. Under conditions of 
organ scarcity, however, total costs are determined by the supply of, not the demand 
for, donor kidneys.  
The same zero-sum logic applies to the claimed reduction in the number of pediatric 
dialysis days. Adults faring worse under Share 35 than they otherwise would have, 
might experience an increase in the number of dialysis days of a comparable magnitude 
to the decrease enjoyed by children. One might object that this is an unlikely scenario. It 
presupposes that, relative to children, adults stand to gain an equal number of graft 
years in receiving organs from donors under 35 years as opposed to organs from donors 
over 35. There are no data available which allow us to verify this assumption. However, 
data do exist comparing the graft years gained by both adults and children for other 
types of qualitatively better and worse organs. For example, data of the 2009 OPTN/SRTR 
Annual Report suggest that adults and children stand to gain more or less equally in 
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receiving a living donor kidney as opposed to a deceased donor kidney.56 If these data 
are anything to go by, Share 35 will merely shift all the dialysis costs previously 
incurred by children to adults.    
5.2.2 Equity-based arguments 
The fair innings argument  
 
A first equity-based argument for pediatric prioritization appeals to the idea of a fair 
innings. The latter is a well-known justification for age-based rationing of health care 
services. The fair innings refers to some normal span of years, for example the 
traditional three-score and ten, to which everyone is entitled. Anyone who fails to live 
out this number of years has been cheated of a reasonable length of life (Williams 1997). 
Therefore, the fair innings argument grants all those who have yet to attain the 
threshold age equal entitlement to health care. Beyond that point, however, one is 
living on borrowed time, an idea which is reflected in the very low priority accorded to 
patients from that moment onwards (Harris 1999).  
 
The concept of a fair innings is appealed to in two different ways in the debate on 
pediatric prioritization. Some invoke the concept in support of a pediatric priority for 
the ‘qualitatively’ better organs. Others use it to justify Eurotransplant-like policies, 
where pediatric priority is granted regardless of the quality of the donor kidney. We 
refer to the former and latter reliance on fair innings, respectively, with the terms FI1 
and FI2. In both cases, the fair innings is equated with life expectancy at birth.  
FI1 is similar to the traditional fair innings argument in that it seems to recognize that 
everyone (both children and adults) under the threshold age has an equal right to a fair 
innings. However, it departs from the traditional fair innings argument in that it views 
children and adults as having different needs in order to secure their fair innings. 
Children have many more years to bridge before reaching a reasonable lifespan. 
Therefore, proponents of FI1 argue, they are in need of a greater number of ‘graft years’ 
(Gulati & Sarwal 2010). The latter, in turn, implies that children have a greater need for 
better functioning grafts. According to FI1, then, the magnitude of one’s need for a 
‘qualitatively’ better organ is a function of the distance one is removed from a fair 
 
                                                     
56 Compare the data in Table 5.8a (http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ar2009/508a_agecat_ki.htm) with the data 
in Table 5.8d (http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ar2009/508d_agecat_ki.htm).   
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innings. However, this formula is plausible to a certain extent only. Admittedly, a 
kidney of a lesser quality will suffice to bring a 73-year-old up to the average human life 
expectancy. Therefore, this person has no need for a better functioning kidney. But 
what about those adults for whom the number of years left to bridge is greater than or 
equal to the number of graft years to be gained from a qualitatively better organ? 
Consider, for example, a 25-year-old with ESRD. Assuming that this person has as much 
right to attain her fair innings as a child, she needs a better functioning kidney just as 
much as a child does. As the latter observation illustrates, Share-35-like policies do not 
merely affect the chances of those with adult-onset ESRD of attaining a fair innings. 
Ironically enough, such policies do not do much to further the chances of those with 
childhood-onset ESRD either. After all, if one receives a transplant in childhood, one is 
still likely to need one (or more) retransplants during adulthood (Levine et al. 2012). At 
that point, however, one would obviously no longer belong to the group receiving 
priority for the ‘qualitatively’ better kidneys. In sum, if one is truly committed to the 
goal of granting everyone a fair innings, a policy which restricts priority for the better 
kidneys to children is not far-reaching enough. A better approximation of the fair 
innings goal would be obtained by extending the priority for better quality kidneys to 
young adults.      
 
Can the notion of a fair innings plausibly be appealed to in defense of a broad pediatric 
prioritization, i.e. one which is independent of donor kidney quality? FI2 defends this 
type of policy on the basis that children have not yet had a fair innings (Ladin & Hanto 
2011). Although proponents of FI2 use the term ‘fair innings’ in reference to their 
argument, this is clearly a misnomer. The fair innings argument is merely concerned 
with whether or not one has had a fair innings. How much of a fair innings one has had is 
irrelevant.57 If FI2 does not amount to a fair innings-based line of reasoning, how should 
it be understood? The claim appears to be the following: the fewer life years one has 
had, the greater one’s entitlement to an organ. Veatch (2000), an advocate of this view, 
argues that the younger one is, the fewer opportunities for medical well-being one has 
enjoyed. A concern for equalizing such opportunities, he argues, calls for prioritizing 
children over adults. This argument uses age as a proxy for opportunities for medical 
well-being. However, as we argue below, this is unwarranted. 
Age is not the only determinant of opportunities for medical well-being. More 
specifically, the critical role of social determinants of health, such as working 
 
                                                     
57 As noted above, the fair innings idea commits us to an equal treatment of all those below the threshold age, 
children and adults alike. Thus, one cannot coherently appeal to the notion of a fair innings in support of a 
policy which merely prioritizes pediatric patients.  
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conditions, income and education level, is well-documented. A recent report from the 
WHO (2008) indicates that such factors are responsible for a major part of health 
inequities within and between countries. A child, therefore, need not necessarily have 
had fewer opportunities for medical well-being than an adult. For example, a 10-year-
old growing up in a rich, well-educated family may well have had more of such 
opportunities, relative to a 25-year-old deprived of these privileges. In invoking this 
example, we are not claiming that kidney allocation ought to take into account the 
candidate recipient’s social class, working conditions, education level, etc. With our 
example, we merely intend to demonstrate that mistaken judgments concerning a 
patient’s opportunities for medical well-being cannot be ruled out when using age as a 
proxy for such opportunities. Admittedly, this need not necessarily imply that the use of 
age as a proxy for opportunities for medical well-being is unwarranted. After all, any 
allocation criterion is likely to be subject to a certain degree of error. What matters is 
whether age is a sufficiently reliable predictor of opportunities for medical well-being. 
However, it is, at present, unclear how much of the variance in opportunities for 
medical well-being is accounted for by the factor ‘age’. Given the high stakes involved in 
kidney allocation, it seems unwarranted to employ a factor the predictive strength of 
which is unknown. In short, a person’s age should not be relied upon in an effort to 
determine the number of opportunities for medical well-being. 
 
The minority argument 
 
The other equity-based argument is grounded in the observation that children 
represent a numerical minority (1-4%) on the kidney transplant waiting list. According 
to proponents of this argument, this reality implies that, absent a priority rule, children 
stand less chance of receiving a kidney, relative to adults (McDiarmid 2001). Moreover, 
children’s chances will deteriorate, given that the adult ESRD population continues to 
rise, whereas the pediatric population remains relatively stable. The pediatric priority 
rule, it is argued, serves to rectify children’s disadvantaged position. As we argue below, 
there are several problems with this argument.  
 
The view that children are disadvantaged in the competition for an organ results from a 
focus on children as a group, rather than on the individual members of this group. As a 
group, children only stand a 1-4% chance of receiving a kidney. However, this focus on 
group-level chances is misguided since children have an interest in acquiring an organ 
as individuals rather than as a group. Consequently, it makes much more sense to 
concentrate on an individual child’s chances for an organ. How does an individual child 
fare, relative to an adult, in this respect? Absent a pediatric priority rule, and all other 
things being equal, an individual child and adult have an equal chance of obtaining a 
kidney. Admittedly, all other things are not equal. The kidney donor pool to which 
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pediatric kidney transplant candidates have access is smaller than that available to 
adults. Due to higher rates of graft thrombosis and technical failures, kidneys from 
pediatric deceased donors younger than 5 years are rarely, if ever, allocated to pediatric 
recipients (Sharma et al. 2013). The majority of such kidneys is transplanted into adult 
recipients, either as single or en bloc grafts. However, the disadvantage experienced as a 
result of this restriction in the donor pool is minimal, given that only 4% of all donors 
originate from donors under 5 years of age (OPTN 2013). More importantly, this setback 
is more than made up for in practice. After all, both in Europe and the United States, 
pediatric candidates have always had significantly shorter waiting times compared to 
adults (Magee et al. 2008; Offner et al. 1988; Van der Vliet et al. 1982). In short, despite 
being a numerical minority on the waiting list, children are not disadvantaged in the 
competition for a kidney. 
 
Even if the group-level perspective were the correct view to take, the disadvantaged 
position of children, as a group, may not necessitate their prioritization. The minority 
argument appears to be premised on the assumption that we ought to prioritize the 
numerically smallest group. If we accept this premise, the argument only holds if, as a 
group, children satisfy this numerical requirement. However, we can easily define 
categories of possible recipients which are likely to be numerically smaller. For 
example, within the adult population, the 18-22 age category might count fewer 
waitlisted patients, relative to the pediatric population. If so, we would have to 
prioritize the former group. Moreover, the minority argument remains problematic 
even if the pediatric waitlisted population would indeed represent the numerically 
smallest group. Proponents of the minority argument need to justify why the 
numerically smallest group ought to be accorded special consideration. After all, in the 
case at hand the small size of the pediatric population might just as well be an 
indication that this group has a smaller need for organs, relative to the adult 
population. Following this interpretation, it is fitting that those with a smaller need 
stand a smaller chance of obtaining an organ. 
5.3 Unexpected effects of pediatric priority policies  
The above discussion raises a number of important concerns regarding the legitimacy of 
pediatric priority rules. Unfortunately, the problems do not end here. Pediatric priority 
rules have had some inadvertent consequences. Since the introduction of Share 35, the 
number of living donor (LD) kidney transplants for pediatric recipients has declined 
(Axelrod et al. 2010). Thus, in reducing pediatric patients’ waiting time for deceased 
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donor (DD) kidneys to just a few months, Share 35 appears to have created a 
disincentive to identify living donors for children. Admittedly, living donation rates for 
both adult and pediatric recipients have been declining over the past several years in 
the United States (OPTN 2013). One might, therefore, object that it is difficult to verify 
the extent, if any, to which Share 35 has contributed to the observed decline. However, 
the living kidney donation rate for pediatric recipients has seen a much more 
substantial decline over the past years than that for adult recipients (Abraham et al. 
2009).58 Thus, while Share 35 might not be the sole cause of the observed trend, it has 
most probably contributed to it. 
As we argue below, the decline in living donation rates for pediatric recipients may 
further undermine the legitimacy of Share 35. We have not come across any literature 
discussing living donation rates in the wake of the introduction of other pediatric 
priority policies. However, this does not necessarily rule out the possibility of such 
other policies having had a similar effect on living donation rates as Share 35. Thus, 
while the considerations outlined below are undoubtedly relevant for Share 35, they 
may also apply to other pediatric priority policies.  
 
A first consideration pertains to a condition to which many pediatric priority policies 
were subjected. During discussions leading up to their introduction, it was widely 
agreed upon that such policies would only be acceptable if they did not heavily penalize 
adult patients (Loirat et al. 2001). This condition was deemed to be clearly met, given 
that pediatric patients represented only a very small proportion of all waitlisted 
candidates. In view of the limited information available at that time, this was a 
reasonable assessment. However, in light of our current knowledge, it is perhaps less 
clear whether this condition is still met. The decrease in the number of children 
receiving a living donor kidney implies that the overall deceased donor pool is 
increasingly being tapped for a waitlisted child (Abraham et al. 2009). Thus, the 
availability of deceased donor kidneys for adult patients is compromised to a greater 
extent than initially expected. It will be important to monitor the effect on adult 
transplant candidates in the long term. In the meantime, however, we should ask 
ourselves how much of an adverse effect on adults we are willing to accept in turn for 
reduced pediatric waiting times. 
 
 
                                                     
58 Between 2004 (i.e. the last full year before the introduction of Share 35) and 2007, the number of living 
donor kidney transplants for pediatric recipients dropped by over 20%. In the same time period, the number 
of living donor kidney transplants for adult recipients decreased by less than 10% (Abraham et al. 2009).  
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A second consideration is that the unexpected effect of Share 35 may further weaken 
the growth and development argument as well as the fair innings argument. Recall that 
the former argument rests on the assumption that children suffer a significant loss in 
quality of life following long-term dialysis. We have already established that this 
argument fails to acknowledge the problems faced by adult patients with ESRD. 
However, despite having called attention to these problems, we are still likely to have 
somewhat underestimated the loss in quality of life incurred by such adults. After all, we 
have thereby not yet taken into account the implications of the observed decrease in 
pediatric living donor kidney transplant rates. The latter trend entails a further increase 
in the average waiting time for adult recipients of DD kidneys. Any loss in quality of life 
which adults experience in the absence of expedited transplantation will hereby be 
magnified. Thus, while there is currently insufficient empirical evidence to determine 
whether the loss in quality of life incurred by children is greater than that for adults, 
the above does add weight to the adults’ side of the scale.  
As we have already argued, it is problematic to appeal to the fair innings idea in support 
of policies which prioritize children for the ‘qualitatively’ better organs. One of our 
criticisms was that such policies fail to give those with childhood-onset ESRD the best 
possible chance of attaining a fair innings. In making this criticism, we went along with 
FI1’s underlying assumption, i.e. the idea that Share 35-like policies do somewhat increase 
the chances of those with childhood-onset ESRD of attaining a fair innings. At first sight, 
this appears to be a reasonable assumption. After all, Share 35-like policies have 
significantly shortened pediatric waiting times (Abraham et al. 2009). Time on dialysis is 
negatively correlated with kidney graft survival (Meier-Kriesche & Kaplan 2002). One 
would, therefore, expect Share 35-like policies to have improved pediatric graft survival 
rates, thereby having increased children’s chances of attaining a fair innings. However, 
some of the recently observed implications of Share 35 may nullify the latter effect. 
First,  recent data show that children receiving a kidney from a LD have a superior 7-
year graft survival rate than recipients of a DD kidney (80.5% versus 67.9% respectively) 
(NAPRTCS 2010). Thus, in increasing pediatric recipients’ reliance on DD kidneys, Share 
35 could adversely affect long-term pediatric graft survival rates. Experience with 2-
year graft survival rates in certain centers already suggests an adverse impact of Share 
35 (Abraham et al. 2009). Second, Share 35 has reduced the degree of human leukocyte 
antigen (HLA) matching between pediatric recipients and their allografts (Levine et al. 
2012). As such, the policy may exert a further adverse effect on pediatric graft survival 
rates. Although some maintain that the impact of HLA matching on graft survival has 
diminished in recent years, others argue that it remains highly significant (Opelz & 
Döhler 2007). Third, the chances of children with ESRD of attaining a fair innings are not 
only dependent upon graft survival, but also on the likelihood of receiving a 
retransplant later on in life. A decreased degree of HLA matching in primary pediatric 
transplants may contribute to greater sensitization (Levine et al. 2012). As a result, those 
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with childhood-onset ESRD may have more difficulty finding a compatible second 
transplant. In sum, rather than merely failing to give children the best possible chance 
of attaining a fair innings, Share 35-like policies may actually be reducing their chances.          
 
Finally, besides further weakening arguments in support of pediatric priority policies, 
the adverse effects of Share 35 may even provide us with a positive argument for 
condemning such policies. One may arrive at such an argument by appealing to the 
utilitarian criterion ‘life years obtained by the donor pool’. This criterion dictates that 
we ought to allocate kidneys such as to maximize the number of life years which the 
kidney pool may produce. Thus, it would, for example, prohibit us from allocating a 
good quality organ to a 75-year-old as such an organ would have a longer functioning 
time in a young adult.  
Share 35-like policies have three effects which are relevant to the life years criterion. 
First, the decrease in living donation rates for pediatric recipients has not been met by 
an increased rate of this type of donation for adults (Abraham et al. 2009). Share 35, 
therefore, has decreased the size of the kidney donor pool, thereby reducing the 
number of life years we are able to allocate. Second, Share 35 allocates a proportion of 
the ‘qualitatively better’ organs to adolescents. Given that the latter have very bad graft 
survival rates, the policy makes suboptimal use of these organs. Admittedly, both of 
these effects are moderated by a third effect, i.e. the fact that Share 35 allocates some of 
the ‘qualitatively better’ organs to the 0-11 age group which has the best graft survival 
rates. However, while serving as a moderating factor, the latter effect is unlikely to 
offset the abovementioned negative effects. After all, adolescents represent the largest 
group of kidney transplant recipients (Horslen et al. 2007). In sum, Share 35 is likely to 
have reduced the number of total life years gained from the kidney pool.        
5.4 Conclusion 
Any organ which is allocated to one individual represents a missed opportunity for 
someone else. Given the important repercussions which organ allocation policies 
inevitably have for certain people, any prioritization policy should be solidly rooted. In 
our view, none of the arguments put forward in support of pediatric prioritization 
succeed. However, even if a compelling argument exists, questions may still arise 
concerning the future sustainability of pediatric priority policies. Specifically, one 
would need to determine whether pediatric prioritization is still reconcilable with 
minimal harm to adults. In addition, research is needed to establish whether the decline 
in adult-to-child living donation adversely affects pediatric graft survival rates in the 
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long run. In the event of an adverse effect, the latter must be balanced against the 
positive outcomes of pediatric prioritization. If we are unwilling to accept shorter graft 
survival rates in return for reduced waiting times, the question arises as to whether it is 
feasible to increase living donation rates while maintaining pediatric prioritization 
policies.    
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6.1 Introduction 
The discrepancy between the supply of and demand for donor organs remains a major 
challenge. The problem is greatest for renal transplantation. As of February 14, 2014, 
there were 99,339 patients waitlisted for kidney transplantation in the United States 
(OPTN 2014). Records spanning the last decade suggest that annually only 
approximately 16,000 patients receive a kidney transplant, whereas more than 30,000 
patients are added to the waiting list each year (OPTN 2013).59 Unfortunately, these 
figures merely represent the tip of a much bigger iceberg. Population aging and the 
obesity epidemic are contributing to an ever increasing prevalence of diabetes, the 
leading cause of end-stage renal disease (ESRD). Therefore, despite a recent stabilization 
in ESRD incidence rates in western countries, the total ESRD population will (continue 
to) grow dramatically in the coming decades (Eggers 2011). According to the latest 
projections, the prevalence of ESRD patients in the US will approach 785,000 by the year 
2020, an increase of more than 60% from 2005 levels (Finn 2008). Forecasts for the 
current decade, however, do not yet capture the full extent of the problem, as 
population aging is only expected to reach its peak by 2030. The few available estimates 
indicate that the ESRD population could reach 2 million in the US by that time (Bayliss 
et al. 2011; Szczech & Lazar 2004).  
The predominant response to the current gap between supply and demand is to tackle 
the supply-side of the problem. In this chapter, we argue that strategies aimed at 
enlarging the donor pool are shortsighted in that they are not well-suited to addressing 
the projected surge in demand, for 3 reasons. First, it would not be financially viable to 
fully utilize any significantly expanded kidney pool. We show that, as a result of this 
financial limitation, supply-oriented strategies are likely to necessitate rationing of both 
transplantation and dialysis. Second, leaving aside budgetary constraints, there are 
formidable ethical and scientific obstacles to implementing these strategies in a timely 
fashion. Third, supply-focused proposals fail to acknowledge the global reach of the 
ESRD ‘crisis’.   
 
                                                     
59 Eurotransplant statistics show that, during 2013, only 2,959 of the 10,757 waitlisted patients received a 
transplant (Eurotransplant 2014). 
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6.2 Overview of supply-oriented proposals 
Before developing our arguments, we provide a concise overview of proposals for 
increasing the kidney supply. For ease of reference, we subdivide these into two 
categories: radical and conservative approaches. We use these terms to distinguish 
between strategies which aim to optimize the procurement of organs from currently 
available sources (conservative) and those which tap novel organ sources (radical).  
 
Radical strategies  
 
Xenotransplantation, the transplantation of organs from nonhuman species into 
humans, is an example of a radical supply strategy. Swine are generally considered a 
suitable source species for xenografts. Relative to nonhuman primates, the use of 
porcine grafts is less fraught with ethical issues. In addition, swine are easier to breed 
and their organs provide a better size match for humans (Yang & Sykes 2007).  
Renal regeneration constitutes a second radical supply strategy. There are currently 3 
investigational approaches to the development of functional, self-sustaining renal 
substitutes: tissue engineering, development biology and stem cell research (Orlando et 
al. 2011a). Tissue engineers aim to manufacture tissue and organs ex vivo from 
biological materials, such as stem cells. Specifically, the goal consists in seeding cells on 
or into a supporting scaffold and reimplanting the latter into the patient in an attempt 
to replace or restore damaged tissues (Ghosh & Ingber 2007). Development biology 
approaches are being used to engineer kidneys from embryologic precursors of the 
urinary tract. A primordial kidney structure has been obtained through in vitro 
culturing of such precursors in the presence of specific growth factors (Orlando et al. 
2011b). With a view to tapping into the kidney’s intrinsic capability for injury repair, 
stem cell researchers are currently identifying niches within the kidney where cells 
with regenerative capacities may reside (Orlando et al. 2011b).   
Both xenotransplantation and renal regeneration, if successful, offer the prospect of a 
limitless kidney supply (Cooper & Ayares 2011; Chapekar 2000). Renal regeneration may 
help overcome an additional hurdle facing current transplantation practice. In the 
presence of an autologous cellular component, the creation of a bioengineered kidney 
would solve the problem of toxicity deriving from lifelong immunosuppression (Orlando 
et al. 2011a).   
 
Conservative strategies 
 
Rather than relying on the development of novel organ sources, proponents of 
conservative supply strategies devise various means of increasing procurement rates 
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from deceased and/or living kidney donors. Some advocate a shift to a presumed 
consent regime for countries currently operating an opt-in system (see, for example, 
English 2007). Others defend the adoption of organ conscription, i.e. the routine 
removal of usable organs from all cadavers. Under this plan, exemption from donation 
would only be granted to religious objectors (Spital 2005). Another proposed route to 
increasing donation rates is the introduction of financial incentives. Often, a distinction 
is made between direct and indirect payments. The former refers to actual monetary 
compensations in the form of cash payments, whereas the latter involves the trading of 
organs for goods or services of cash value (Rodrigue et al. 2009). Indirect payments may 
take on various forms, ranging from a funeral expense voucher to reductions in health 
care premiums. Direct payments are most often associated with a living donor market. 
Proponents of the latter usually envisage a government-regulated organ trade where 
vendors are paid a fixed price and kidneys are allocated by an algorithm similar to the 
current point system for deceased donation. In addition, some advocates of a living 
donor market stress the need for strict donor evaluation criteria and donor protection 
safeguards (Matas 2004). Although it generally receives less attention in the literature, a 
system of direct payment has also been proposed for deceased donation. In this case, the 
options include either a cash payment to the donor’s family or a futures market. The 
latter implies that individuals receive a payment, while alive, in return for agreeing to 
have their organs removed for transplantation after death (Howard 2007).  
 
This overview of supply strategies is not exhaustive. However, the arguments we 
develop in this chapter generally hold for any proposed means of increasing the kidney 
supply. Therefore, when assessing the merit of such means, we limit ourselves to 
referring to the supply strategies outlined above.  
 
In the section below, we assess the financial viability of both radical and conservative 
supply-oriented proposals. Next, we examine whether these strategies can be 
implemented in a timely manner, i.e. well before population aging reaches its peak. In a 
final section, we make the case for a preventative approach as a means of addressing the 
projected rise in the number of ESRD cases.  
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6.3 Financial viability of supply-oriented proposals 
6.3.1 Financial viability of radical supply strategies 
Due to their ability to generate an unlimited kidney supply, radical supply strategies are 
generally portrayed as a silver bullet, capable of eradicating, rather than merely 
mitigating the organ shortage problem. Assuming that these strategies will be 
implementable in the near future, we concede that they may well succeed in eradicating 
kidney shortages of the current magnitude. However, as we argue below, it is financially 
prohibitive to rely on such approaches as a means of eliminating the projected, future 
gap between supply and demand. Several reasons account for this finding. First, the 
number of transplants required to satisfy future levels of demand is exceedingly high. 
Second, adding to this exorbitant aggregate cost of transplantation, are the high 
expenses related to the procedures of xenografting and renal regeneration. Third, the 
aggregate cost of bridging therapy prior to transplantation is also likely to reach high 
levels. We discuss each of these reasons in more detail below. 
 
High number of transplants required to satisfy future levels of demand  
 
As noted earlier, the ESRD population will expand to approximately 2 million by 2030. 
Presumably, a (small) portion hereof will be medically unfit for transplantation. At first 
sight, then, this figure appears to somewhat overestimate (true) demand. However, 
further considerations suggest that the number of transplants required to accommodate 
future levels of demand, in fact, exceeds 2 million. To begin with, demand is not merely 
a function of the need for a first transplant. It is also determined by the need for 
retransplants. A graft does not last a lifetime. Deceased donor kidney grafts, for 
example, have a half-life of 8.8 years (Lamb et al. 2011). Patients, therefore, often 
require one or more retransplants during a lifetime - a need which, in many cases, goes 
unmet due to the limited kidney supply. The need for retransplantation is likely to 
persist under radical supply strategies. Xenografts are likely to succumb to the major 
causes of graft failure witnessed in human allografts (Ekser & Cooper 2010). It is, 
therefore, doubtful that half-lives would be (any much) longer than under current 
circumstances. Some even foresee significantly reduced half-lives. For example, 
Bhattacharya and Stubblefield (2013) anticipate that chronic rejection will be more 
aggressive in xenografts, relative to allografts. This, coupled with the sheer size of the 
future ESRD population, suggests that the implementation of xenotransplantation 
would be accompanied by a substantial demand for retransplantation. Relative to 
xenotransplantation, the use of autologous bioengineered kidney grafts (if successful) is 
likely to induce lower levels of need for retransplantation. This practice addresses the 
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problem of rejection, thereby enabling longer lived grafts. However, other relatively 
prevalent causes of graft failure, such as recurrent kidney disease, would probably still 
occur under the scenario of kidney bioengineering. Thus, whereas the latter would 
constitute an improvement upon xenotransplantation, it may nevertheless still 
engender significant demand for retransplantation. As their goal consists in eradicating 
the gap between supply and demand, proponents of radical supply strategies are 
committed to meeting all needs for retransplantation. 
In assessing future levels of need for transplantation, we must also take into account the 
highly elastic nature of demand. Since the inception of kidney transplantation, the pool 
of patients deemed medically eligible for transplantation has steadily grown. This 
development is largely attributable to technological advances, sophisticated surgical 
skills, and progressive improvements in immunosuppressive regimens (Jafarey & 
Moazam 2009). Radical supply strategies represent the epitome of scientific progress in 
that they promise the prospect of a limitless kidney supply. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to assume that xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering would trigger a similar, 
if not magnified, increase in demand. For example, whereas ‘need for a transplant’ is 
currently attributed to the ESRD population, the concept might be widened so as to 
include those in advanced stages of chronic kidney disease (CKD), the precursor of 
ESRD.60 The rationale behind this specific reinterpretation of the transplantable 
population would be twofold. First, the burden of symptoms and loss of quality of life in 
patients with advanced CKD is comparable to that experienced by the ESRD population 
(Abdel-Kader et al. 2009). Second, the risk of cardiovascular events increases with 
ascending stages of CKD (Go et al. 2004). If radical supply strategies are to eradicate the 
kidney shortage problem, the inclusion of advanced-stage CKD patients into the 
transplantable population commits one to an additional 30 million transplants (Davids 
2007).  
 
High expenses related to the procedures of xenografting and renal regeneration 
 
The financial burden of accommodating high levels of future demand becomes heavier 
still once we consider the cost of a single transplant. The specific features of radical 
supply strategies suggest that the latter would render transplantation much more 
expensive than it currently is. For example, kidney bioengineering would most probably 
involve a long, complicated cultivation procedure. In addition, it necessitates specific 
 
                                                     
60 This broadening of the patient group is a perfect illustration of the ‘complementarity’ effect of new medical 
technologies. Recall that this effect refers to the tendency of technological innovations to increase the 
reliance upon an already existing technology (in this case transplantation). This effect was discussed in 
chapter 1. 
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storage conditions (Berthiaume et al. 2011). These factors point towards the need for 
considerable investments in highly qualified personnel and instrumental assets 
(Orlando et al. 2010). Xenotransplantation is unlikely to fare any better, for several 
reasons. First, it requires the production of transgenic source animals in order to reduce 
rejection. Genetic manipulation of pigs is inefficient, time and labor consuming and 
reliant upon advanced techniques in biochemistry, reproductive biology, molecular 
biology, and cell culture (Niemann et al. 2012). Second, breeding of source animals 
would need to take place in an infection-free environment. Finally, xenotransplantation 
puts human recipients and the wider population at risk of xenozoonoses, i.e. infections 
by a porcine microorganism (Ekser & Cooper 2010). Clinical applications of 
xenotransplantation, therefore, warrant the implementation of screening programs 
(Fishman et al. 2012).  
 
High aggregate cost of bridging therapy prior to transplantation 
 
Expenditures related to radical supply strategies are not limited to transplantation. It is 
often assumed that xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering would obviate the 
need for dialysis. However, this assumption only holds to a certain extent. Presumably, 
some time would elapse between the diagnosis of ‘need for a transplant’ and receipt of a 
graft. First, as we have seen, the cultivation process for a bioengineered kidney is likely 
to span a significant period of time. Second, initially, production capacity is likely to be 
limited, with only a few centers possessing the instruments and technology required for 
xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering. Thus, whereas radical supply strategies 
render long-term dialysis redundant, patients with ESRD would still be dependent upon 
short-term dialysis. The financial burden of the latter is considerable, given both the 
high monthly cost of dialysis61 and the projected size of the ESRD population.    
6.3.2 Financial viability of conservative supply strategies 
Proponents of conservative supply strategies generally fall into one of two categories. 
Some hold that implementation of this type of proposal would fully close the gap 
between supply and demand (see, for example, Gaston et al. 2006). This claim is made 
with regard to the introduction of financial incentives and conscription. Others argue 
that conservative strategies, while unable to eliminate the kidney shortage, would 
reduce the latter to a minimum (see, for example, Kerstein 2009). Unlike the former 
claim, this argument is not merely invoked by proponents of financial incentives and 
 
                                                     
61 See footnote 64. 
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conscription. It is also appealed to in defense of presumed consent. Below, we analyze 
both claims in this respective order. We argue that these assumptions are shortsighted 
in that they do not hold for kidney shortages of the magnitude projected for the future.  
 
Conservative strategies as a means of eliminating kidney shortage 
 
In assessing their potential to eliminate the gap between supply and demand, we make a 
number of presuppositions with regard to conscription and financial incentives. To 
begin with, we assume, for the sake of argument, that these conservative supply 
strategies are able to eradicate kidney shortages of the current magnitude. If we are to 
determine whether full closure of the future gap is attainable, we need to estimate the 
magnitude of future demand under these strategies. However, this is a challenging task. 
Specifically, it is not clear whether conscription and financial incentives would induce a 
shift towards inclusion of advanced-stage CKD patients into the transplantable 
population. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we presume that, under these 
strategies, ‘need for a transplant’ will merely be attributed to ESRD patients requiring a 
first transplant or a retransplant. We hereby grant proponents of conservative supply 
strategies the best case scenario.62 Finally, we also presuppose that enough kidneys will 
be available to, at least, accommodate future demand in the previously defined sense.  
 
Do conservative supply strategies represent a financially viable means of fully satisfying 
future levels of demand? As we argue below, it appears that they do not.  
Despite the (presumed) absence of any commitment to transplantation of late-stage CKD 
patients, the number of transplants required to fully close the future gap between 
supply and demand remains substantial. In significantly reducing (or even eliminating) 
the reliance upon living donation, conscription and financial incentives for deceased 
donation are likely to cause grafts to fail earlier, relative to current circumstances. 
Financial incentives for living donation would have the opposite effect. Nevertheless, 
given that the half-life of a living donor kidney amounts to ‘a mere’ 11.9 years (Lamb et 
al. 2011), need for (frequent) retransplantation is likely to persist.  
The financial burden of transplanting and frequently retransplanting approximately 2 
million people is further aggravated due to the high cost of a single transplant. The 
estimated equilibrium price63 for a cadaveric kidney amounts to $150,000 (Wellington & 
Whitmire 2007). Due to the potential risks involved, the equilibrium price for a living 
 
                                                     
62  Transplantation is more expensive than care for advanced-stage CKD (see Smith et al. 2004; Rocha et al. 
2012).  
63 The equilibrium price is the price under which the number of people willing to sell their kidney matches the 
number of people demanding a kidney.  
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donor kidney is likely to be higher still. Moreover, a regulated market would most 
probably necessitate the establishment of a national agency overseeing transactions in 
order to prevent abuse (Voo et al. 2009). Admittedly, conscription does not run into 
these problems. In fact, in eliminating the need for donor registries and educational 
campaigns aimed at incentivizing donation, the cost of a single transplant may decrease 
under organ conscription (Spital 2005).  
Despite the presumption of a sufficient kidney supply to meet future demand, there 
would still be a need for short-term dialysis under conservative supply strategies. After 
all, it could take a while for a well-matched organ to become available.   
 
We have assumed that conscription and financial incentives would provide a supply 
sufficient to meet future demand. However, as we argue below, this is a highly 
unrealistic scenario. In reality, a substantial kidney shortage would obtain. As a result, 
the financial outlook becomes even more dim for conservative supply strategies. 
Whereas a sufficient kidney supply obviates all need for long-term dialysis, a 
considerable number of patients become reliant upon the latter in the event of a 
significant shortfall in kidneys. As a mode of treatment, dialysis is more expensive than 
transplantation.64  
 
Only 2% of the deceased satisfy the medical requirements for donation (Kahan 2009). At 
the current rate of 2,468,435 annual deaths65, conscription would provide 74,05366 renal 
transplants in the US per year. Thus, even under the most favorable assumption of 
future demand for transplantation reaching ‘only’ two million, the shortfall in kidneys 
would assume alarming proportions.  
Financial incentives for deceased donation encounter the same natural constraint on 
the number of retrievable organs as conscription. However, the former is likely to score 
even worse than the latter in that it does not guarantee 100% efficiency in converting 
potential donors to actual donors. Indeed, population surveys suggest that a system of 
payment for deceased donation would yield (significantly) fewer kidneys still. For 
example, a 2005 Gallup poll assessing respondents’ willingness to donate their own and 
 
                                                     
64 Note that, despite the highly inflated cost of transplantation under a financial market in kidneys, 
transplantation remains the cheaper option. A single transplant, on average, replaces 8.8 years on dialysis (in 
the case of a deceased donor kidney). At a yearly cost of €28,000, 8.8 years of dialysis amounts to € 246,400. 
Under current circumstances, a transplant costs, on average, €12,000 per year, bringing the total cost of 
transplantation to €105,600 (Rocha et al. 2012). The equilibrium price of a transplant in a financial market is $ 
150,000 (i.e. approximately €112,000) (Wellington & Whitmire 2007).  
65 This is the US death rate for 2010 (Hoyert & Xu 2012).   
66 Cadaveric donation supplies, on average, 1.5 kidneys (Wellington & Whitmire 2007).  
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family members’ organs after death found that 17% and 19%, respectively, were more 
inclined to do so when offered some kind of payment (The Gallup Organization 2005). 
These figures may still overestimate the potential for kidney retrieval under a scheme 
of financial incentives. We must consider the possibility of a ‘crowding out’ of altruistic 
organ donation. This phenomenon, whereby financial incentives weaken one’s sense of 
moral obligation, has been documented in several experimental settings (Rippon 2012). 
If applicable to organ donation, people currently willing to donate (i.e., altruistically 
motivated donors) may view financial incentives as tainting the value of donation. As a 
result, they may refrain from donation altogether in the presence of a system of 
payment (Rothman & Rothman 2006).  
Obviously, a system of financial incentives for living donation is not constrained by the 
requirement that death occur under circumstances conducive to donation. In partly 
escaping the limitations inherent in proposals for increasing deceased donation, this 
system appears more promising. Nevertheless, the prospect of fully satisfying future 
demand remains remote under this scenario. In a Dutch population survey, a mere 5% of 
respondents rated the likelihood of donating a kidney in return for payment as high 
(Kranenburg et al. 2008). Results from a survey among Swiss medical students suggest 
that 27% would consider selling a kidney in a regulated market (Rid et al. 2009). However, 
66% of the latter would only actually sell their kidney under certain, well-defined 
circumstances, such as financial hardship. Various factors may bring the potential for 
kidney retrieval below the rate suggested by these attitudinal assessments. To begin 
with, living altruistic donation may also be susceptible to ‘crowding out’, a phenomenon 
described in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, while the requirement for ‘donation-
conducive deaths’ does not apply to financial incentives for living donation, other 
constraining factors still obtain. In short, a portion of individuals willing to donate in 
return for payment will be medically unfit to do so. Moreover, the obesity epidemic 
suggests that an increasing number of altruistically motivated candidates is likely to be 
medically ineligible for donation. Donation by obese individuals may pose an increased 
risk for both donors and recipients (Espinoza et al. 2006; Nogueira et al. 20120). 
Therefore, there is widespread consensus that only carefully selected obese individuals 
should be allowed to donate.  
 
Conservative strategies as a means of reducing kidney shortage to a minimum 
 
Recall that proponents of conservative supply strategies make one of two claims. In the 
previous section, we discussed the first claim, i.e. that conservative strategies can 
eliminate the kidney shortage. We now turn our attention towards the second claim, i.e. 
that conservative supply strategies can reduce the gap between supply and demand to a 
minimum. Assuming that this claim holds true with regard to the current gap, it 
inevitably fails when it comes to the future, projected disparity between supply and 
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demand. After all, our analysis suggests that conservative supply strategies have a very 
limited kidney retrieving potential. Thus, this second claim runs into the same financial 
problems as the first.     
6.3.3 Implications of the financial non-viability of supply strategies 
As argued above, supply strategies cannot succeed in substantially tackling, let alone 
fully closing, the future, projected gap between demand for and supply of donor 
kidneys. Admittedly, in theory, radical supply strategies provide the amount of kidneys 
required to fully close the gap. However, it is not financially viable to satisfy all future 
demand for kidney transplantation. In short, radical supply strategies merely transform 
the problem of kidney scarcity from one of commodity scarcity into one of scarcity of 
financial resources. Consequently, radical supply strategies cannot obviate the need for 
rationing of kidneys. The sheer magnitude of future demand for renal replacement 
therapy, combined with the high cost of dialysis, suggests that provision of the latter 
mode of treatment would also encounter financial constraints. 
Conservative supply strategies fail to substantially reduce the future gap between 
supply and demand in that they are likely to only marginally increase the number of 
donor kidneys. Thus, under these strategies, kidney scarcity would retain its current 
form of ‘commodity scarcity’. The resulting large need for dialysis implies that, whereas 
provision of organs would most likely escape budgetary constraints, dialysis would not.   
6.4 Timeliness 
The prevalence of ESRD is already growing rapidly, with its peak projected to occur 
around 2030. Thus, if it is to avert a large part of the burden, any proposed solution to 
the ESRD ‘crisis’ ought to be implementable in the foreseeable future. Below, we argue 
that supply strategies, even if financially viable, do not meet this criterion.   
6.4.1 Timeliness of radical supply strategies 
Timeliness of xenotransplantation  
 
Demonstrated safety and efficacy of xenotransplantation in nonhuman primates is a 
prerequisite for initiation of clinical trials in humans. These standards are likely to be 
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much more strict for renal xenotransplantation, relative to other organs, due to the 
ready availability of dialysis.  
The understanding of xeno-immunobiology has progressed substantially over the past 
decades. This is largely attributable to the increasing availability of transgenic pigs, a 
development which, to a certain extent, protects transplantable tissues from the human 
immune response (Pierson et al. 2009). As a result, hyperacute, acute antibody-
mediated, or cellular rejection no longer appear to represent a substantial barrier to 
xenotransplantation in nonhuman primates (Ekser et al. 2012). Despite these advances, 
there are still numerous impediments to attaining the required safety and efficacy 
thresholds. A major remaining problem is the development of life-threatening 
consumptive coagulopathy (the formation of small blood clots throughout the body) at 
an early stage following pig kidney xenotransplantation (Ekser et al. 2012). Besides 
immunologic and coagulation barriers, it remains unclear whether a pig organ can carry 
out all of the required functions in the primate bodily environment. At present, pig 
kidney transplantation in nonhuman primates is accompanied by the development of 
proteinuria (an abnormally large amount of protein in the urine). The latter induces 
hypoalbuminemia (an abnormally low concentration of albumin in the blood) which, in 
turn, leads to complications such as peripheral edema67 (Ekser & Cooper 2010). While 
continuous intravenous infusion of human albumin is theoretically able to remediate 
this problem, it does not represent a practically feasible option.  
 
Even if the abovementioned problems could be solved within a reasonable timeframe, 
the potential for the development of a xenozoonosis may prove to be an 
insurmountable obstacle. While the occurrence of a xenozoonosis is now considered to 
be much less likely than previously thought,  it cannot, at present, be excluded (Hunter 
2009). Admittedly, the small magnitude of this risk does not constitute a contraindication 
to the initiation of clinical trials. However, its potential widespread reach may very well 
do so. If cases of xenozoonosis were to occur, unknown and undetected infectious 
agents could easily and quickly spread beyond national borders. As the risks of infection 
would not be confined to those nations undertaking clinical trials, the global population 
should arguably be involved in the decision-making process about whether or not to 
proceed with experimentation in humans. In short, a process of global consent would be 
required (Sparrow 2009). Given the many practical difficulties with a requirement of 
obtaining actual consent from the global population, hypothetical consent would ‘merely’ 
need to be sought. Such global hypothetical consent is obtained “when it is reasonable 
 
                                                     
67 Peripheral edema is defined as “an abnormal increase in the volume of fluid 
within a defined tissue space” (Jaffe et al. 1999, 308). 
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to believe that the procedure would receive majority support from a fully informed 
global community, if such a debate and vote were possible” (Sparrow 2009, 124). The 
distribution pattern of risks and benefits of xenotransplantation suggests that majority 
support is unlikely to be forthcoming. As noted above, xenotransplantation will not be 
accessible to Third World countries. At the same time, the latter will bear most of the 
risks as their health care systems are much less suited to coping with an infectious 
pandemic. A similar risk-benefit distribution is also likely to apply to the poor in 
developed nations lacking universal health care. Thus, the poor in both developed and 
developing countries do not have an interest in consenting to xenotransplantation trials 
(Sparrow 2009). 
 
Timeliness of kidney bioengineering 
 
Recently, the field of kidney bioengineering has witnessed some interesting 
developments. Most noteworthy are the advances, achieved through whole organ 
decellularization techniques, in the production of scaffolds for organ engineering 
(Arenas-Herrera et al. 2013). In enabling one to obtain a scaffold from a readily available 
organ by stripping it of functional cells, such techniques obviate the need to build an 
organ from scratch. Relying on this methodology, scientists succeeded in producing a 
functional rat kidney earlier last year. Song et al. (2013) used a detergent perfusion to 
wash away the native cells of a healthy donor rat kidney. The resulting scaffold did not 
run the risk of being rejected by the recipient as it consisted of collagen, a biologically 
inert material. The rat kidney scaffold was seeded with epithelial and endothelial cells. 
Next, this cell-seeded construct was perfused in a whole-organ bioreactor. Finally, the 
team transplanted the organ into a living rat. The graft provided urine production and 
clearance of metabolites. Nevertheless, it displayed a much lower level of functional 
maturity, relative to a non-bioengineered donor kidney. For example, the bioengineered 
kidney performed significantly worse in terms of the glomerular filtration rate (GFR)68.  
Although the abovementioned experiment provides proof of principle, many hurdles 
remain to be overcome in the process of translating this technology into the clinic 
(Arenas-Herrera et al. 2013). To begin with, a better understanding of the way in which 
the scaffold drives cell fate determination is required in order to obtain functional 
integration of the former into the surrounding tissue (Orlando et al. 2010). In addition, 
the optimal organ donor source from which to obtain a kidney scaffold needs to be 
identified. In this respect, some have suggested using porcine acellular matrices. The 
latter provide a number of advantages. As noted above, porcine tissues provide a good 
 
                                                     
68 This refers to how well kidneys filter blood. 
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size match for humans. Moreover, the use of acellular porcine tissue is not 
unprecedented. Heart valves, for example, have already been used in the clinic. 
Nevertheless, ‘semi-xenotransplantation’ – the repopulation of acellular porcine organ 
matrix with autologous human cells – is not unproblematic in that it involves ethical 
and unknown safety issues (Arenas-Herrera et al. 2013).  
Besides problems associated with the scaffold, kidney bioengineering also faces 
difficulties concerning repopulation. Specifically, the task of obtaining a sufficient 
number of cells which maintain function over time appears challenging (Orlando et al. 
2010). The average patient requiring a kidney transplant is relatively old. This renders 
seeding with the recipient’s differentiated cells suboptimal as the latter are likely to 
have entered replicative senescence – a state in which a cell has lost its ability to divide. 
Advanced age is also associated with reduced cell functionality. In order to obtain a 
more functional, longer-lived cell population, researchers are examining the use of stem 
cells (Orlando et al. 2010). However, renal stem/progenitor cells may also be less than 
ideal candidates for kidney bioengineering due to their restricted growth and 
differentiation potential as well as their low prevalence (Yokote et al. 2012). 
Identification of the most suitable source of stem cells for de novo kidney regeneration 
remains an important research goal (Feil et al. 2011; Yokote et al. 2012). In any case, the 
production of a bioengineered kidney is likely to prove a challenging endeavor as the 
human kidney is a complex tissue, consisting of more than 20 cell types (Franquesa et al. 
2013).   
   
The use of stem cells for in vivo renal repair also faces major challenges. For example, it 
is unclear whether or not kidneys of patients with ESRD are beyond repair. Some argue 
that the total disruption of the kidney’s sophisticated structure as a result of ESRD 
renders stem-cell based therapy unable to entirely regenerate the damaged tissue 
(Yokote et al. 2012; Harari-Steinberg et al. 2011). They maintain that stem cell therapy 
for rejuvenation or regeneration of individual cell types is only a viable option for 
patients in the slow progression route from CKD to ESRD. Others, however, suggest that 
in vivo renal repair may also prove feasible for ESRD patients (Perin et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, the latter admit that there are many obstacles to overcome, ranging from 
the delivery of stem cells into solid organs to the functioning of these cells in an in vivo 
environment. 
6.4.2 Timeliness of conservative supply strategies       
The timely implementation of conservative supply strategies does not hinge on 
scientific advancements. However, any change in organ procurement policy should only 
be introduced when considerable public support exists for it. The unsuccessful law 
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change in Brazil is illustrative in this respect. In 1997, the Brazilian government 
implemented a presumed consent regime under circumstances of deep public distrust of 
the health care system. Reported cases of difficulties in opting-out aggravated public 
fears (Ammann 2010). A year later, the presumed consent statute was repealed (Liddy 
2000). As this example suggests, trust in the medical community is not ubiquitous. As a 
result of the multicultural make-up of many societies, levels of trust are likely to vary, 
not only between countries, but also within a country. So far, little or no effort has been 
made to gauge levels of trust and other determinants of public support for the various 
conservative supply strategies. Moreover, the few available studies point towards a 
considerable variation in the level of support (see, for example, UK Organ Donation 
Taskforce 2008). Therefore, it is, at present, unclear whether any of these strategies will 
gather sufficient support for it to be implementable in an effective way.     
 
Recently, various expert advisory committees have assessed the merit of conservative 
supply strategies. If their reports are anything to go by, implementation of this type of 
strategies is far from imminent.  
In 2008, the UK Organ Donation Taskforce was asked to investigate whether the 
introduction of a presumed consent regime would be advisable. The panel, consisting of, 
amongst others, ethicists, medical lawyers and clinicians, advised negatively (UK Organ 
Donation Taskforce 2008) – although it should be noted that Wales has recently decided 
to bring a system of presumed consent into law by 2015 (Welbourn 2014). A similar 
inquiry was conducted in the US in 2004 on behalf of the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) and The Greenwall Foundation (Institute of Medicine 2006). The 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), commissioned with this task, also opposed the introduction 
of a presumed consent regime.  
 
Proposals for paid organ donation have met with strong resistance from various 
international groups, such as the World Health Organization, the Council of Europe, the 
Asian Taskforce, and the Declaration of Istanbul (Moazam et al. 2009). The latter, which 
was drawn up in 2008, documents the consensus view obtained throughout meetings 
with leading organ transplant organizations, bioethicists, and social scientists (Moazam 
et al. 2009). The Declaration approves payments which merely cover costs incurred 
through donation (e.g. lost income, medical expenses incurred for post-discharge care). 
In short, it sanctions the removal of socio-economic disincentives to donation. However, 
it strongly condemns any form of payment which renders donors or their families 
better off postoperatively– financially or otherwise (Voo et al. 2009). Numerous 
professional and governmental groups have endorsed these guidelines (Moazam et al. 
2009).  
In the case of financial incentives, layman and expert opinions may not be the only 
factor hindering (timely) implementation. Recall that the introduction of payments for 
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donation is potentially subject to the ‘crowding out’ phenomenon. The most reliable 
means of testing the occurrence hereof consists in a provisional implementation of 
financial incentives. However, such a dry run may not be feasible in practice. Some 
studies suggest that the effects of crowding out are irreversible. For example, in 
response to parents being late to pick up their children, an Israeli day care center 
decided to impose a fine for lateness (Rothman & Rothman 2006). Contrary to 
expectations, the number of late pickups increased. This higher level of lateness 
persisted after the abolition of the fines. Consequently, it may be argued that the 
introduction of financial incentives for organ donation will always be prohibitively risky.      
6.5 Exploring the other option: reducing demand  
We have identified two reasons why strategies aimed at increasing kidney supply will 
fail to satisfactorily accommodate future levels of demand. Below, we examine whether 
the alternative approach to kidney scarcity – strategies aimed at reducing demand – 
fares any better. More specifically, we assess the merits of preventative strategies. We 
argue that the latter are both implementable in a timely manner and less costly than 
supply strategies, thereby reducing the need for rationing of dialysis and donor organs. 
Prevention has the added advantage of offering a global solution to a global problem.  
6.5.1 Timeliness of preventative strategies  
There are two reasons to believe that a substantial reduction in the burden of ESRD is 
attainable. First, we possess the knowledge to prevent or delay the onset of CKD 
(Schoolwerth et al. 2006).  Second, we are equally capable of slowing the progression of 
diabetic and non-diabetic CKD. In the case of non-diabetic patients, sustained remission 
or regression of CKD has even been documented (Perico & Remuzzi 2012). Primary 
prevention is concerned with forestalling the development of risk factors for CKD, such 
as diabetes and hypertension. In addition, it involves treating those at increased risk of 
developing CKD. Lifestyle changes, such as moderate weight loss and regular physical 
activity, can reduce the incidence of diabetes in high-risk individuals (American 
Diabetes Association 2013). A decrease in blood pressure and the incidence of 
hypertension is, for example, obtainable through reductions in dietary salt intake. Strict 
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glucose control or use of angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors69 prevent or 
delay the development of albuminuria (an abnormally large amount of the protein 
‘albumin’ in the urine)70 in diabetics (Levey et al. 2009).   
Secondary prevention consists in detection and treatment of CKD. Two simple tests are 
available for detection of CKD: a urine test for albumin and a blood test for serum 
creatinine to estimate GFR (Levey et al. 2009). The progression of diabetic and non-
diabetic CKD can be slowed through control of hypertension and proteinuria, using 
inhibitors of the renin-angiotensin system (Perico & Remuzzi 2012; Gansevoort et al. 
2013). By contrast, management of late-stage CKD is likely to require a multifactorial 
approach, including strict glucose control, angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors, 
other hypertensive agents, aspirin and lifestyle interventions. Such a strategy has 
proven successful in normalizing albuminuria and preventing loss of kidney function in 
patients otherwise condemned to rapid progression to kidney failure (Gansevoort et al. 
2013).  
 
Despite the availability of simple preventative measures, the major, modifiable risk 
factors for CKD are under-treated. CKD, in turn, is both under-treated and under-
diagnosed. In short, although the knowledge for successful prevention of CKD/ESRD is 
at hand, the extent to which it has been applied is disappointing. Thus, if we are to 
tackle the problem lying ahead, a comprehensive public health approach is needed 
(Schoolwerth et al. 2006). A major component hereof will consist in the large-scale 
implementation of detection and prevention programs, such as screening for CKD. The 
leadership of nephrologists will prove a key factor in achieving this (Bello et al. 2005).  
The problem of under-treatment and under-diagnosis is not merely attributable to the 
lack of a uniform application of simple tests for detection. There is also a problem of 
‘under-education’. Diabetics and hypertensive patients are often unaware that they are 
at increased risk of developing CKD. Moreover, most CKD patients are oblivious of their 
condition (Schoolwerth et al. 2006). It is imperative to communicate the seriousness of 
CKD, its risk factors, and opportunities for screening to both health care providers and 
the general public. Educational materials, informing patients identified with CKD of the 
treatment regimens and benefits of therapy, should be drawn up (Schoolwerth et al. 
2006). World Kidney Day, which aims to convey the common, harmful, and treatable 
nature of CKD to a broad range of stakeholders, represents a laudable educational 
initiative (Levey et al. 2009).  
 
 
                                                     
69 A drug primarily used for the treatment of hypertension. 
70 Albuminuria is usually a symptom of kidney disease. 
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The success of a preventative approach to the CKD/ESRD burden hinges on a concerted 
effort from and collaboration between government agencies, lay organizations, health 
professionals, and professional societies. Moreover, an international collaborative 
response is needed. In the presence of a strong commitment to taking the necessary 
measures, a significant reduction in the societal impact of CKD/ESRD should be 
attainable within the next two decades (Alebiosu & Ayodele 2005). 
6.5.2 Financial viability of preventative strategies 
The easiest way of determining whether prevention represents a cheaper option than 
supply strategies is to assess the merit of both against the standard of the baseline 
scenario. The latter refers to the situation which obtains in the coming decades when 
neither preventative nor supply strategies are pursued. In short, it is the outcome that 
would be achieved if current policies for dealing with kidney scarcity were to be 
maintained. Below, we first assess whether, relative to the baseline scenario, 
preventative strategies produce cost savings and, if so, how substantial these are. Next, 
we do the same for supply strategies.  
 
Preventative approaches to health care usually increase expenditures (Russell 2009). 
However, both primary and secondary prevention of CKD/ESRD constitute an exception 
to the rule, at least when specific high-risk populations are targeted. In a Dutch setting, 
administration of ACE inhibitors to newly diagnosed type 2 diabetics was cost-effective 
and reduced health care expenditures. This finding proved robust to a variety of 
different assumptions of uncertainty (Adarkwah et al. 2011). A major 5-year study, 
funded by the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council, evaluated 150 
preventative health interventions. It demonstrated that screening for CKD in diabetics 
and subsequent treatment with ACE inhibitors has a large cost saving potential. In 
addition, such a preventative approach was shown to provide a greater health gain than 
dialysis and transplantation combined (Vos et al. 2010). Another Australian study 
researched the cost saving potential of screening for CKD in men and women aged 50 
years and older. For every 20,000 people screened, a net cost saving of $A 70,000 was 
obtained (Craig et al. 2002). In a French study, screening for CKD in patients with type 2 
diabetes and hypertension, followed by adjusted therapy, resulted in a €4,812 reduction in 
ESRD-related costs per patient (Postma & de Zeeuw 2009). A similar result was achieved 
in a US setting (Postma & de Zeeuw 2009). Finally, a US study on screening for CKD in 
diabetics demonstrated cost savings of $217 per person (Boulware et al. 2003).     
As the above figures illustrate, the cost savings obtained through prevention vary 
according to the population screened. In the case of screening for CKD in diabetics, the 
projected number of diabetics in 2030 (around 36 million in the US), combined with the 
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abovementioned cost saving of $217 per person, roughly suggest a $8 billion reduction 
in costs, relative to the baseline scenario (Shaw et al. 2010). Similar to most research on 
screening for CKD, the study by Boulware et al. (2003) merely takes into account cost 
reductions obtained through averting new cases of ESRD. However, administration of 
ACE inhibitors subsequent to detection of CKD would also help avert cardiovascular 
disease (CVD) – a prevalent comorbidity in CKD patients (de Jong et al. 2008; Adarkwah 
et al. 2011). Costs related to treatment of CVD are high (Heidenreich et al. 2011). Thus, 
the $8 billion finding substantially underestimates the cost saving potential of screening 
for CKD in diabetic patients.  
 
 It is impossible to reach a definitive verdict with regard to the cost saving potential, if 
any, of supply strategies, relative to the baseline scenario. There is a multitude of 
unknown variables, such as the exact cost of transplantation under radical supply 
strategies (and under a financial market in kidneys), the exact magnitude of the 
increase in kidney donors following implementation of conservative strategies, etc. 
Given these constraints, one can, at best, make an educated guess when assessing how 
supply strategies fare, relative to the baseline scenario. In doing so, we assume that the 
implementation of supply strategies will work out cheaper than the continued pursuit 
of current organ donation policies.71  
The characteristics of supply strategies suggest that neither conservative nor radical 
interventions are likely to bring about substantial cost saving. As noted above, 
conservative strategies are likely to produce a negligible increase in donor kidneys. 
Therefore, relative to the baseline scenario, they avert only a minimal number of 
expensive dialysis cases. At first sight, the infinite supply of kidneys (i.e. the lack of need 
for all long-term dialysis) under radical strategies suggests that the latter produce 
substantial cost savings, relative to the baseline case. However, the high cost of 
xenotransplantation/transplantation of bioengineered kidneys suggests that, even if 
these modes of transplantation were to remain cheaper than dialysis, the difference in 
cost would only be marginal.   
 
 
                                                     
71 Note that conservative supply strategies (with the exception of a financial market) will most likely save 
costs, relative to the baseline scenario. After all, in increasing the kidney supply, conservative supply 
strategies ensure that a part of the group requiring dialysis under the baseline scenario now receive the 
cheaper mode of treatment. In contrast to conservative strategies, radical supply strategies do not necessarily 
reduce costs, relative to the baseline scenario. They will only do so if transplantation remains cheaper than 
dialysis. Thus, in assuming that radical supply strategies have cost saving potential, relative to the baseline 
scenario, we devise a line of reasoning based on the best case scenario.  
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In sum, relative to the baseline scenario, prevention is likely to produce greater cost 
savings than supply strategies. Consequently, compared to supply strategies (and the 
baseline scenario), a preventative approach to CKD/ESRD would better attenuate the 
need for rationing of dialysis and transplantation.  
6.5.3 Prevention: a global solution to a global problem 
Besides providing a more affordable and timely solution to the ESRD pandemic, 
prevention has yet another advantage. It is amenable to implementation, not only in 
developed, but also in developing countries.72 This is an important consideration, for 2 
reasons. First, whereas ESRD mostly affects the elderly in the developed world, its 
prevalence generally peaks between the third and the fifth decade of life in developing 
countries. The latter disease pattern causes manpower shortage and economic waste 
(Alebiosu et al. 2005). Second, the prevalence of ESRD is also projected to rise 
significantly in developing countries. Although a high number of ESRD cases in 
developing countries is currently infection-related, diabetic nephropathy is becoming 
increasingly common due to changes in food intake and lifestyle. By 2025, diabetes 
prevalence is expected to reach 228 million, a 170% increase from current levels (Kaul et 
al. 2013).   
 
Experience suggests that inexpensive, successful prevention programs are feasible in 
low-income settings. For example, in India, social health officers measured blood 
pressure and carried out simple urine tests in a rural community of 25,000. The 
screening identified 6% of the population as hypertensive and 4% as diabetic (Mani 
2003). Using the cheapest preventative agents available, blood pressure lower than 
140/90 mm Hg was achieved in 96% of hypertensive patients. In addition, a hemoglobin 
A1c level lower than 7% was obtained in 52% of the diabetics (Couser et al. 2011). The 
annual per-capita cost of the program was a mere $0.27. A similar success story was 
 
                                                     
72 Obviously, there is little point in implementing supply strategies in developing countries. First, supply 
strategies which rely upon deceased donation would face religious and cultural opposition in many countries 
(Garcia-Garcia et al. 2012).  Second, access to renal replacement therapy (RRT) is highly limited in developing 
countries. Many dialysis centers are located in urban areas and, therefore, require a long commute for most 
patients (Naicker 2013). The high costs of RRT services, the shortage of skilled personnel and inadequate 
facilities, funding and support further limit access to both dialysis and transplantation. For example, in Sub-
Saharan Africa, only seven countries provide kidney transplantation (Naicker 2013). In India and Pakistan, a 
mere 5% of ESRD patients undergo transplantation. The high costs of hemodialysis compel most patients to 
cease treatment within the first three months (Schieppati et al. 2005).    
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recently observed in Nepal. A serum creatinine test73 was performed in 1000 
participants. 10.4% of the population was subsequently diagnosed with CKD. Cheap ACE 
inhibitors were administered to these patients in order to stabilize their proteinuria. 
Follow-up indicated regression or stabilization of proteinuria in 52% of patients (Kirby 
2010). 
 
Despite the abovementioned successes, challenges remain for the widespread 
implementation of preventative programs in developing countries. The lack of donor 
funds threatens to limit the long-term success of such programs. International donor 
funds earmarked for health tend to favor infectious diseases, at the detriment of chronic 
diseases, such as CKD and ESRD. Nevertheless, a slight turnaround in this tendency has 
recently been observed. For example, between 2004 and 2008, global donor funding for 
chronic diseases tripled (Nugent et al. 2011). The lack of donor funding, combined with 
the low priority assigned to CKD/ESRD prevention by local governments, render follow-
up of patients a challenging task (Codreanu et al. 2006). The obtainment of government 
support will hinge on lobbying efforts from nongovernmental and charitable 
organizations (Bello et al. 2005).    
The continuing ‘brain drain’ of health care workers from developing to developed 
countries represents an additional barrier to prevention. Whereas there are 16.7 
nephrologists pmp in the United States, the numbers in Sub-Saharan Africa vary from 
0.5 pmp in Kenya to 0.6 pmp in Nigeria, 0.7 pmp in Sudan, and 1.1 pmp in South Africa 
(Naicker 2013). Possible measures to address the ‘brain drain’ include a higher 
remuneration in the public health sector, penalization of departing professionals, and 
the establishment of compulsory service as a means of delaying departures. Another 
possible solution consists in training paramedics, whose skills would go unrecognized 
abroad, with a view to fulfilling roles otherwise performed by doctors. However, 
funding agencies also have an important role to play in tackling the ‘brain drain’ in that 
they can improve the educational services for health care professionals in developing 
countries (Pang et al. 2002).  
 
                                                     
73 This test measures the level of creatinine in the blood. The latter, in turn, indicates how well the kidneys 
filter. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Currently, the burden of ESRD presents itself as a problem of commodity scarcity (i.e. 
scarcity of donor kidneys). For this reason, the solution is generally sought in increasing 
kidney supply. However, the increasing prevalence of ESRD, combined with the already 
high costs of renal replacement therapies (RRT), suggest that we are heading towards a 
situation wherein RRT faces both commodity scarcity and scarcity of financial 
resources. Supply strategies are shortsighted in that they are oblivious to the financial 
reality lying ahead. By contrast, a preventative approach provides a more financially 
viable and readily available solution. Moreover, it is implementable on a global scale.  
We are not the first to promote a preventative approach to CKD/ESRD. The merit of the 
latter is increasingly being recognized by nephrologists. However, their advocacy makes 
no reference to (the flaws of) supply strategies. It merely consists in quoting the 
platitude that prevention is better than cure. The argumentative void wherein 
prevention is currently advocated allows the importance of a preventative approach to 
fall on deaf ears. In exposing supply strategies as dead-end solutions, we hope to incite 
the long overdue shift in the approach to ESRD.  
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Background to chapters 7 and 8 
Part two of this dissertation has, so far, largely concentrated on the implications of 
population aging for long-standing ‘coping mechanisms’ and ‘solutions’ in the context 
of kidney scarcity. Chapters 7 and 8 shift the focus away from population aging and 
kidney scarcity. Nevertheless, they continue along the same path as chapter 6 in that 
they provide an ethical analysis of currently proposed solutions to a particular type of 
commodity scarcity in health care. Chapter 7 focuses on the shortage of donor livers, 
whereas chapter 8 is devoted to the scarcity of human body material for research 
purposes. Recent amendments to the Belgian law in these two contexts motivate this 
shift away from kidney scarcity. We believe that an ethical analysis of supply-oriented 
proposals in the realm of commodity scarcity would not be complete without a 
discussion of these highly topical developments.  
Chapter 7 relates to the tendency – described in the general introduction – towards an 
increased reliance upon living donation as a means of increasing organ supply. Donor 
eligibility criteria for living donation are becoming ever more lenient. A recent 
amendment of the Belgian transplantation law represents a radical move in the 
liberalization of these criteria in that it allows children as young as 12 to donate a liver 
segment or lobe to a sibling under certain circumstances. In chapter 7, we analyze 
whether living liver donation by minors is ethically acceptable.      
Research on human biological material holds great promise for developing better means 
of preventing, diagnosing, and treating diseases. Biological material removed post 
mortem is a particularly valuable resource for research as some tissues only become 
available after death. In order to obtain such tissues more easily, Belgium has recently 
extended its presumed consent regime for post mortem removal of organs for 
transplantation to post mortem removal of body material for research purposes. In 
chapter 8, we examine whether this extension is ethically sound.  
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Chapter 7                                                                 
Should  minors be considered as potential living 
liver donors? 
Based on published journal article: 
 
Capitaine, L., Thys, K., Van Assche, K., Sterckx, S. and Pennings, G. (2013) “Should minors 
be considered as potential living liver donors?”. Liver Transplantation 19: 649-655. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Living donor liver transplantation was successfully introduced in 1989 as a response to 
the exceptionally high waiting list mortality for small children (Renz et al. 2003). Soon 
the procedure was expanded to large adolescents and adults and it has since become a 
widespread medical treatment for end-stage liver disease and genetic metabolic 
disorders. However, living liver donation involves a very complicated surgical 
procedure, with a significant risk of mortality and morbidity. In the absence of 
worldwide registration and mandatory reporting, exact estimation of donor mortality is 
extremely difficult. According to the most frequently cited estimates, mortality 
approaches 0.1% for left lobe donation and 0.5% for right lobe donation (Barr et al. 2006; 
Kousoulas et al. 2011; Otte 2003). As a result of widely diverging definitions, the 
incidence of donor morbidity is also of uncertain magnitude (Middleton et al. 2006; 
Gradiadei 2007). Apart from the risk of general anesthesia, potentially serious 
morbidities include surgical site infections, biliary complications, portal vein 
thrombosis, intra-abdominal bleeding, pulmonary embolus and incisional hernia. 
Studies focusing on such serious complications report an overall incidence rate of 15% 
to 20% (Kousoulas et al. 2011; Middleton et al. 2006; Dutkowski et al. 2010; Brown et al. 
2003; Renz & Roberts 2003).  
 
Confronted with these risks, the enormous benefit to the recipient is, presumably, the 
reason why living donor liver transplantation is still being performed. Obtaining an 
organ from a living donor may be the last resort for patients suffering from life-
threatening liver disease. The need for a liver transplantation is often more urgent than 
for a kidney transplantation, as the annual mortality rate for patients awaiting a liver 
graft is almost double that recorded for patients awaiting a kidney. In addition, liver 
donation cannot be postponed in the same way as kidney donation since there is no 
substitute treatment similar to hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis that can sustain 
functions until an organ becomes available (Weisberg & Brown 2007). Moreover, 
deceased liver donation has its technical limits. Admittedly, the practices of reduced-
size and split-graft liver transplantation have increased the availability of donor grafts, 
yet these grafts may not be suitable for all patients.  
 
Despite the availability of living donor liver transplantation as a lifesaving procedure, 
only a fairly small percentage of potential living donors may be suitable (Trotter et al. 
2002). People suffering from common medical conditions such as cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes or hypertension will be ruled out, while smoking and obesity may also be 
considered relative contraindications to living donation. Sometimes, a minor may be the 
only suitable donor, especially in cases of acute liver failure (Ladd 2004). Although this 
 232 
circumstance will be very rare, living liver donations by minors have been reported. 
Specifically, there have been 13 such cases in the US (OPTN 2012). Other countries, such 
as Japan and Brazil, have also recorded cases of minor living liver donors (Honda et al. 
2009; Tannuri et al. 2011). When deemed to involve acceptable risks to the health of the 
donor, living liver donation by minors is allowed in several other countries, for example 
Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Moreover, in countries that currently allow minors to 
donate only hematopoietic stem cells, a tendency could be developing to interpret the 
possibility for minors to donate regenerative tissue/body material as also including 
liver segments or lobes. An indication hereof can be found in the August 2012 
amendment of the Belgian transplantation law. The possibility for minors to donate 
regenerative tissue or organs/body material, which had previously been interpreted as 
only pertaining to hematopoietic stem cells, has now been reinterpreted as also 
referring to liver segments or lobes.74 This law allows minors as young as 12 to donate to 
their brother or sister, on condition that they are capable of expressing their will and 
have given prior consent. 
 
In the academic literature and professional guidelines, little attention is paid to 
developing a specific ethical framework for living liver donation by minors. The focus is 
frequently limited to donation of regenerative tissues and kidneys. However, due to the 
increased medical risks of liver donation and the lack of substitute therapies, the 
considerations that are relevant to this context may differ in important respects from 
those pertaining to kidney and regenerative tissue donation. Thus, there is an urgent 
need for more profound reflection on the ethical aspects of living liver donation by 
minors. In this chapter, we try to assess whether living liver donation by minors can be 
ethically appropriate. We occasionally refer to the new Belgian law as a starting point 
for our ethical reflection. 
 
                                                     
74 The amendment of the Belgian transplantation law was published in the Official Journal of Belgium on 24 
August 2012. Available at: 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn=1986061337&table_name=wet 
(Dutch) and  
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1986061337&table_name=loi 
(French). [last accessed 14 October 2012]. 
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7.2 Living liver donation and decisional capacity 
The imposition of risks to the living liver donor may be warranted when the donor 
decides that they are worth taking. In other words, a potential living donor has a moral 
right to accept a considerable health risk in order to help a patient in need of an organ 
(Veatch 2000; Gutmann & Land 2008). However, the primacy of the donor’s right to 
donate is not absolute. Most importantly, the decision to donate should be an 
autonomous one, implying that the potential donor demonstrates decisional capacity. 
One possesses this capacity when one is able to comprehend and to make a judgment 
about the information concerning a medical intervention, to intend a certain outcome, 
and to communicate freely one’s wishes (Beauchamp & Childress 2009).  
 
For subjects possessing decisional capacity, their prior, free and informed consent is a 
necessary condition of morally permissible living liver donation. ‘Disclosure’, 
‘understanding’, and ‘voluntariness’ are generally recognized as the necessary 
components of informed consent (Beauchamp & Childress 2009). The ‘disclosure’ factor 
implies that complete, objective and intelligible information should be provided in 
order to allow the potential living liver donor to arrive at a well-reasoned conclusion. 
The ‘understanding’ component requires one to ensure that the potential donor has an 
accurate understanding of the purpose and nature of the procedure, the possible 
consequences to her health and emotional well-being, the expected health impact on 
the recipient and the availability and efficacy of possible alternative therapies. Finally, 
the ‘voluntariness’ element requires screening aimed at verifying that potential living 
liver donors are not influenced by undue pressure, deception or financial incentives 
(Veatch 2000; Gutmann & Land 2008).  
 
Except for adults who have been judicially declared mentally incompetent, the law 
operates under the rebuttable presumption that adults are competent to make their 
own decisions about living liver donation. However, even when deemed sufficiently 
competent and free and informed consent to donate is obtained, the autonomy of the 
potential adult donor is still bound by legal restrictions and standards of reasonable 
medical practice. Donation will not be allowed when the transplant team is of the 
opinion that the overall risk-benefit balance of the procedure is clearly negative or that 
the absolute level of risk to the donor is too high. In addition, in most countries living 
liver donation is subject to additional requirements, such as authorization by an 
independent body and restriction to recipients with whom a close personal relationship 
exists. These provisions are intended to prevent undue pressure or improper 
inducement to donate (Veatch 2000; Gutmann & Land 2008).  
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If we are to determine whether minors should be allowed to donate a liver lobe, we must 
ascertain whether they possess sufficient capacity to make this decision. Therefore, in 
the following sections we take a closer look at minors’ decision-making capacity. First, 
we discuss the (exceptional) circumstances under which minors are considered legally 
competent to make their own health care decisions. Next, we develop a moral 
framework which provides a means of distinguishing those health care decisions which 
minors (of a certain age) are capable of making from those which they are incapable of 
making. Finally, we apply this moral framework to the specific context of living liver 
donation.  
7.2.1 Assessing minors’ competence to consent to medical interventions  
Legal framework 
 
Minors are legally considered as incompetents, lacking the necessary capacity to make 
fully informed medical decisions (Boonstra & Nash 2000). There is a general, legal 
presumption that parents have their children’s best interests at heart (Derish & Vanden 
Heuvel 2000). Parents, therefore, are granted the right to make health care decisions on 
their minor children’s behalf.  
 
The requirement for parental consent in the medical care of minors is subject to four 
possible exceptions. First, in emergency situations, when there is no time to obtain 
parental consent, medical personnel are allowed to treat a minor. The rationale behind 
this exception is the idea that parents, if present, would consent to treatment. In 
addition, the emergency exception serves to protect the physician from liability (Driggs 
2001). Second, minors who are emancipated by marriage or other circumstances have 
the right to make decisions on their own behalf. Third, many jurisdictions explicitly 
authorize minors to consent to certain specific medical interventions, such as prenatal 
care, drug treatment, contraception, mental health care, and testing and treatment for 
sexually transmitted diseases. This authorization aims to encourage minors to seek care 
which, under a parental consent requirement, might not be sought for fear of parental 
punishment. As such, this third exception primarily constitutes a protective measure 
for minors (Boonstra & Nash 2000). A final exception to the parental consent 
requirement is the ‘mature minor doctrine’. The latter permits a minor to consent to or 
refuse treatment provided that she has the capacity to understand the nature and 
consequences of the medical decision at hand. Many countries appear to have adopted a 
‘mature minor doctrine’ of some sort (Stultiëns et al. 2007; Sanci et al. 2004). In the 
United States, however, only a few states have enacted statutes allowing mature minors 
to consent to their own medical treatment (Driggs 2001). In assessing a minor’s level of 
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maturity, courts take into account the nature and gravity of the treatment. Adolescents 
are generally found competent to consent to or refuse low risk procedures (e.g. 
tonsillectomies, vaccinations, and treatments for back pain), whereas they are seldom 
deemed sufficiently mature to consent to high-risk or life-altering procedures (e.g. 
gender reassignment, sterilization) (Sanci et al. 2004). Moreover, with the exception of 
blood donation, courts do not generally sanction adolescent consent to non-
therapeutic75 procedures benefiting a third party, such as skin graft donations (Schlam 
& Wood 2000). Courts vary with regard to the standard of proof used for determining 
maturity. Some have favored a case-by-case approach. Others have applied the ‘Rule of 
Sevens’, a standard derived from English common law. Under this rule, children under 
age 7 do not have the capacity to consent, children aged 7 to 14 are presumed not to 
have this capacity (until proven otherwise in individual cases), and children aged 14 and 
above are presumed to have the capacity to make their own decisions, unless proven 
otherwise (Toner & Schwartz 2003).  
 
Moral framework 
 
According to Steinberg and Scott (2003), when discussing decisional capacity, we should 
distinguish cognitive maturity from its psychosocial counterpart. Studies suggest that 
adolescents beyond the age of 14 demonstrate a level of cognitive maturity similar to 
that of adults, i.e. they possess adult-like capacities for logical reasoning about moral, 
social, and interpersonal matters. For example, a study by Weithorn and Campbell 
(1982) showed that 14-year-olds did not differ significantly from 18-and 21-year-old 
adults with regard to their ability to reason or understand treatment information 
presented to them in medical dilemmas. Subsequent research into the development of 
cognitive capacities found similarly high levels of adolescent maturity (see, for example, 
Hale 1990; Belter & Grisso 1984). Those who advocate granting adolescents a higher 
degree of self-determination in medical decision-making often cite this type of research. 
The American Psychological Association, for example, has argued for a recognition of 
adolescents’ right to consent to abortion on the basis of their having decision-making 
skills comparable to those of adults (Steinberg et al. 2009).  
 
Whereas adolescents display cognitive capacities which come close to those of adults, 
they do not yet exhibit adult-like levels of psychosocial maturity. There are four 
psychosocial factors which are specifically relevant to decision-making outcomes 
(Steinberg et al. 2009).  
 
                                                     
75 ‘Non-therapeutic’ refers to a procedure which does not provide a medical benefit to the adolescent. 
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A first factor is ‘susceptibility to social coercion’. Research supports the common-sense 
view that adolescents are more susceptible to coercive influences than adults (Gardner 
& Steinberg 2005). In some contexts, adolescents’ choices are made in response to direct 
peer pressure. However, adolescents’ desire for peer approval or fear of rejection may 
also affect their choices indirectly, i.e. in the absence of direct coercion.  
‘Risk perception’ constitutes a second psychosocial factor. Relative to adults, 
adolescents place less weight on risk, in relation to reward (Pontoon 1997). They often 
consider themselves invulnerable to harm (Schlam 2000). This factor, for example, 
explains why adolescents engage in unprotected sex more often than adults. The fact 
that adolescents demonstrate adult-like cognitive capacities implies that they are fully 
aware of and understand the potential risks involved. However, as a result of their 
distorted risk-reward calculus, they see the potential benefits of unprotected sex as 
outweighing the potential risks (Cauffman & Steinberg 2000).    
A third psychosocial factor is known as ‘future orientation’, a term which refers to the 
extent to which one anticipates future consequences. Adolescents tend to focus mainly 
on short-term consequences – both risks and benefits – of their choices, whereas adults 
also take into account long-term impacts (see, for example, Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman 
2001). The limited life experience of adolescents may account for their greater 
inclination to discount the future: a consequence 10 years away from now is likely to 
appear more remote the shorter one’s experienced lifespan (Larson et al. 1980).  
A final psychosocial factor relates to ‘impulsivity’. Research indicates that adolescents 
are prone to more extreme mood swings and have more difficulty in controlling their 
impulses and behavior (see, for example, Farrington 2003).  
 
The distinction between cognitive and psychosocial maturity provides us with a 
standard for identifying the type of decision to which the ‘mature minor doctrine’ 
should be held applicable. In sum, it tells us which decisions we may allow adolescents 
to consent to or refuse. The established cognitive maturity of adolescents suggests that 
we should regard them as having sufficient decisional capacity to make health care 
decisions which are generally not strongly influenced by any of the abovementioned 
psychosocial factors. By contrast, their psychosocial immaturity implies that we ought 
to consider them as lacking the decisional capacity to make health care decisions with a 
strong psychosocial component, i.e. decisions which typically elicit impulsivity, involve 
high levels of social coercion or significant immediate risks/long term consequences. 
Note that it will not always be clear-cut whether one is dealing with a health care 
decision of the former or the latter type.  
One might argue that our approach is problematic in that it is based on findings of 
(in)sufficient decisional capacity in the average adolescent, thereby ignoring possible 
deviations from the average. Admittedly, our approach runs the risk of assuming 
cognitive maturity where there is none, and vice versa for psychosocial maturity. 
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However, we currently lack the instruments to reliably assess maturity on an 
individualized basis (Wendler 2006). In the absence of such instruments, it seems 
unproblematic to presume that sufficient decisional capacity is present in the case of 
health care decisions where psychosocial factors are not strongly at play. The latter, 
after all, tend to be low-risk decisions. In the same vein, the typically high-risk nature of 
health care decisions with a strong psychosocial component suggests that, in such cases, 
we do well to err on the side of insufficient decisional capacity.  
7.2.2 Assessing minors’ capacity to consent to living liver donation  
If we are to determine whether we should consider adolescents as having the capacity 
to consent to living liver donation, we must identify the type of decision-making 
process involved. Therefore, this section will examine, for each of the psychosocial 
factors, the extent to which they are relevant to the context of living liver donation by 
minors. 
 
With regard to ‘susceptibility to social coercion’, it should be noted that the context of 
living donation exhibits certain features which increase the chances of coercive 
pressures occurring. One such feature is that donation typically takes place between 
family members. In the case of living liver donation, there is the added element of the 
lack of any substitute therapy. Parents, regardless of whether they themselves or one of 
their children are in need of a liver, may pressurize their minor child into donation. The 
minor is likely to succumb to such pressure given that she is socially dependent on her 
parents. If the candidate recipient is a sibling, the latter may exert an additional source 
of coercion, especially if she is an adult.   
 
The psychosocial factor ‘risk perception’ is also highly relevant to the context of living 
liver donation by minors. As noted earlier on, living liver donation involves a significant 
risk of mortality and morbidity. Data concerning morbidity and mortality risks, 
however, generally focus on adult donors. Due to the extremely small number of cases 
involving minor donors, very little is known about the risks for this specific population. 
Thus, we cannot, at present, exclude the possibility of the risks being still higher for 
minor donors.   
 
‘Future orientation’, the third psychosocial factor, also comes into play in living liver 
donation by minors. Although the regenerative capacity of the liver is often invoked as 
a reason for dismissing the possibility of any significant future health risks to the donor, 
such dismissal, at present, seems highly premature. First, living liver donation is too 
recent a practice for long-term data to have been established. Second, whereas the 
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donor’s liver regains normal metabolic function within a matter of weeks after 
donation, it only regenerates to about 89% of its preoperative volume (Middleton et al. 
2006; Haga et al. 2008). Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility of the incomplete 
restoration of initial liver volume having serious long-term consequences (Pomfret 
2003). Where little is known about the long-term consequences for adult living liver 
donors, still less is known about the more recent (and extremely small scale) practice of 
using minors as living donors. In any case, however, minors are likely to suffer more 
from any adverse long-term effects as they have a greater number of life years ahead of 
them. 
 
Most often, ‘impulsivity’ will not be a salient psychosocial feature of an adolescent’s 
decision to consent to living liver donation. However, in exceptional circumstances, 
impulsivity might come into play. For example, if the candidate recipient suffers from 
acute liver failure, she might have a life expectancy of less than a week without 
transplantation (Stravitz & Kramer 2009). Under such time pressure, there is an 
increased chance of the adolescent’s impulses getting the upper hand over deliberative, 
reasoned decision-making.   
 
Based upon the above analysis, we may reasonably conclude that many, if not all, of the 
psychosocial factors feature in the living liver donation decision. We should, therefore, 
subject this decision to a heightened standard of decisional capacity, i.e. one requiring 
the presence of psychosocial maturity in addition to cognitive maturity. In demanding 
such a high  level of decisional capacity, our proposal satisfies the widely accepted 
‘proportionality requirement’. The latter refers to a sliding scale, implying that the level 
of decisional capacity required ought to increase in accordance with the level of risk 
involved in the decision (Doig & Burgess 2000).  
 
As a result of their psychosocial immaturity, adolescents considering living liver 
donation run the risk of giving in to coercive pressures as well as placing too little 
weight on possible immediate and long-term risks. Moreover, under circumstances 
requiring expedited transplantation, adolescents’ decisions are more likely to be rash, 
rather than well-thought through. Adolescents should, therefore, be considered 
incapable of consenting to living liver donation. Thus, in presuming that minors as 
young as 12 are able to consent to such a procedure, the Belgian transplantation law is 
far too permissive.     
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7.3 Is living liver donation in the best interests of minors?   
Given a minor’s insufficient decisional capacity to consent to living liver donation, the 
harm involved in such a procedure cannot be justified on the basis of her autonomous 
decision. However, the acceptability of living liver donation by minors need not 
necessarily be ruled out. As noted earlier, parents are generally granted the right to 
make health care decisions on their minor children’s behalf. Whereas this practice of 
proxy consent is generally undisputed in cases where the decision relates to the minor’s 
own health, it is less clear whether it should extend to interventions on minors for the 
benefit of a third party (Schenberg 2007). In sum, there may, in the case of living liver 
donation, still be grounds to allow parents (or other surrogate decision makers) to give 
proxy consent.  
 
Those advocating the right of surrogate decision makers to consent to living donation 
on a minor’s behalf disagree as to which party is best suited to act as a proxy. While 
some argue that the proxy decision should be left to the parents’ discretion, others 
believe that parents might have a conflict of interest. The latter, therefore, recommend 
transferring the decision making right to either a judge, the minor’s physician, or an 
ethics committee (Nygren 2006).  
 
When making medical decisions for their ward, surrogates are bound by certain 
standards. There are two widely used standards for making decisions on the part of 
incompetents: ‘the substituted judgment’ standard and the ‘best interests’ standard. The 
former standard dictates that the surrogate act in the way the patient would do if 
competent to make the decision. Use of the ‘substituted judgment’ standard is restricted 
to those cases where there is reliable evidence as to the patient’s preferences for 
treatment under the circumstances (Nygren 2006). We inevitably lack such evidence 
when dealing with patients who have never been competent, such as minors. The ‘best 
interests’ standard governs surrogate decision-making for this category of 
incompetents. It requires that the surrogate “determine the highest net benefit among 
the available options, assigning different weights to interests the patient has in each 
option and discounting or subtracting inherent risks or costs” (Beauchamp & Childress 
2009, 138).  
 
As the above suggests, the ‘best interests of the incompetent person’ is the appropriate 
decision-making standard in the context of living liver donation by minors. Thus, if we 
grant surrogate decision makers the right to issue proxy consent to donation, their 
decision must be based on an analysis of the risks and benefits incurred by the minor 
donor. However, the question remains as to whether we ought to grant surrogate 
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decision makers this right. After all, it would be foolish to do so, and thus to allow living 
liver donation by minors, if we have ample reason to believe that this type of donation 
is generally not in a minor’s best interests. Therefore, we now proceed to assess whether, 
generally speaking, living liver donation is in a minor’s best interests.   
 
Although living donor liver transplantation provides no therapeutic benefit to the 
donor and carries a high risk of morbidity and mortality, it can still be in the donor’s 
overall best interests if she is likely to expect significant psychological benefits. Living 
organ donors have reported heightened self-esteem, enhanced feelings of autonomy, 
renewed meaning in life and other positive feelings associated with important altruistic 
acts (Johnson et al. 1999; Patenaude 1990). Combined with the emotional benefits that 
are more immediately derived from preventing the loss of a loved one, these elements 
may encourage donation even when considerable health risks are involved. The same 
type of risk-benefit calculation has been applied to kidney donation by minors to family 
members. It is argued that minors may already experience the positive effects of 
altruism and will clearly benefit from the continued companionship of the recipient and 
from growing up in a family untouched by tragic loss (see Hart v Brown 1972; Little v 
Little 1979). 
 
However, this risk-benefit calculation is problematic when applied to minors. For 
instance, it remains unclear to what extent minors can indeed experience these 
psychological benefits, especially when their cognitive and emotional capacities are still 
developing (Schenberg 2007; Crouch & Elliott 1999). Furthermore, donation may also 
have severe negative psychological effects, such as lower self-esteem, feelings of abuse, 
a strained relationship with the recipient, a sense of neglect and lack of appreciation 
and, where the transplantation fails, feelings of anger, guilt, and blame (Cheyette 2000; 
Packman et al. 1997). Specifically in liver donation, additional psychological problems 
have been reported, including cosmetic issues due to significant scar formation, anxiety 
regarding one’s future health and, remarkably, a significantly higher rate of psychiatric 
complications (Barr et al. 2006; Renz & Roberts 2000; Cipe et al. 2011; Erim et al. 2006; 
Trotter et al. 2007).  Finally, there is yet another sense in which a living liver donor 
might experience adverse psychological effects. As minors have generally not yet 
started a family of their own, they may, later on in life, come to regret their decision to 
donate. After all, despite its regenerative capacity, a liver lobe can only be donated once 
in a lifetime, pre-empting the opportunity of subsequent donation to people with whom 
a more intimate bond might exist (Holm 2004).  
 
In view of the high mortality and morbidity risk, rather speculative psychological 
benefits and potentially important psychological risks, we may conclude that living 
liver donation is generally not in a minor’s best interests. Thus, we have no grounds to 
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grant surrogate decision makers the right to consent to living liver donation on a 
minor’s behalf. This, in turn, suggests that we ought to prohibit living liver donation by 
minors.   
 
The best interests standard has been criticized for its narrow construal of interests. This 
criticism draws upon the distinction between self-regarding interests and other-
regarding interests. The former category includes those interests which bear exclusively 
upon the agent’s own well-being. Other-regarding interests refer to an agent’s desire for 
another’s well-being. Whereas the fulfillment of this desire may partly serve as a means 
to the agent’s own well-being, the agent generally also pursues the other’s well-being as 
an end in itself (Crouch & Elliott 1999). In focusing exclusively on the donor’s well-being, 
the best interests standard, it is argued, wrongly presumes that agents are motivated 
merely by self-regarding interests. This disregard for altruistic motives is said to be 
especially problematic in the family context – a context which is obviously highly 
relevant to living donation. According to these critics, the depiction of donors as mere 
self-interest maximizers fundamentally misconstrues the nature of familial 
relationships (Morley 2002). They stress that family members cherish each other simply 
for each other’s sake. We do things for family members which we would not do for 
‘outsiders’ (Crouch & Elliott 1999). Stronger still, we have a moral obligation to make 
sacrifices for our family. In acting as if incompetents should not be called upon to do so, 
the best interests standard is said to disregard their integral role within the family 
(Morley 2002). A true recognition of the reality of family life and of the moral 
obligations it entails, according to these critics, suggests that parents should base their 
decision to issue proxy consent on the interests of the family as a whole. Thus, it is 
precisely on the basis of furthering this family interest that these critics justify living 
liver donation by minors.  
 
The above criticism of the best interests standard is problematic, however, for several 
reasons. First, while familial relationships may entail certain moral obligations, it is not 
clear why these should give rise to the specific obligation to donate an organ (Steinberg 
2004). An argument should be put forward in defense of the existence of the latter type 
of obligation. Second, even if a solid basis could be provided in support of a moral duty 
to rescue family members, its scope would likely be limited to a very specific type of 
familial relationship. Parents may well have such a duty towards their children. 
However, it is less clear whether the child-to-parent and the sibling relationship are 
subject to the same obligation (Griner 1993). Third, even if minors were to have a moral 
duty to rescue, it is hard to imagine the latter extending to living liver donation. As 
Dwyer and Vig (1995) suggest, the degree of risk one should be expected to undergo, 
varies according to the type of familial relationship. Whereas one may expect parents to 
take significant risks for their children, the child-to-parent and the sibling relationship 
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could, at most, justify an exposure to moderate risks. As mentioned above, liver 
donation does not fit this description.  
 
Although the above criticism of the best interests standard is unconvincing, it may force 
us to somewhat qualify our proposal of a blanket prohibition on living liver donation by 
minors. We have conceded that parents may have a moral obligation to donate an organ 
to their child. In any case, regardless of whether or not parents actually have such an 
obligation, research indicates that they experience such a feeling of moral indebtedness. 
Adult parents often describe the decision to donate to their own child as natural and 
self-evident, emanating from the moral imperative to place the interests of their child 
before their own. Parents who are not accepted as suitable living donors for their own 
children often report negative feelings, such as disappointment and anger (Zeiler et al. 
2010).  
The same feelings and experiences are also likely to occur in minor parents. The 
exceptional nature of the parent-child relationship suggests that a minor parent 
donating to his or her child will most probably experience a substantial psychological 
benefit – substantial enough to outweigh any negative effects. A uniform prohibition on 
living liver donation by minors may impede minor parents in exercising what they 
regard as an essential part of their parental responsibility. Thus, minor parent-to-child 
living liver donation merits consideration as a possible exception to our blanket 
prohibition. In this respect, it deserves mentioning that in several US states, minors are 
generally deemed unacceptable liver donors, except if the intended recipient is their 
own child (Brown 2008). Donation requests from minor parents would always require ad 
hoc consideration. The specifics of how to deal with such requests, however, lie outside 
the scope of this dissertation.     
7.4 Concluding remarks 
Living liver donation entails an invasive procedure with a fairly high morbidity and 
mortality risk. Donation by minors is only acceptable when the procedure is the result 
of an informed, well-considered and autonomous consent of the potential minor donor, 
or when it is in the minor’s best interests. We have argued that minors should not be 
regarded as having sufficient decisional capacity to consent to living liver donation. 
Although adolescents possess sufficient cognitive maturity, they lack sufficient 
psychosocial maturity to resist family pressure and impulsivity and to fully take into 
account possible immediate and long-term risks. In addition, living liver donation by 
minors cannot be justified on the basis of the best interests of the minor, as current 
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knowledge regarding the psychological benefits of living liver donation by minors is 
inadequate. Moreover - presuming that a minor may experience psychological benefits 
as a consequence of living liver donation - these benefits are unlikely to outweigh the 
medical and psychological risks and burdens of the procedure. It is only in the case of a 
minor parent donating to her child, that the benefits are likely to outweigh the risks. 
Therefore, we conclude that, with the possible exception of minor parents donating to 
their child, minors should not be considered as potential living liver donors. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter swaps the heretofore dominant focus on organ shortage for an analysis of 
the broader category of scarcity of human biological material. Moreover, it shifts away 
from donation for therapeutic purposes to donation for research purposes. Human 
biological material is increasingly being used for research purposes. In combination 
with associated health-related data, research on human biological material allows 
researchers to investigate the effects of genetic predisposition, life-style and exposure 
to environmental factors. In this way, research on human biological material holds 
great promise for the development of diagnostic and therapeutic tools and disease-
preventing strategies.  
Biological material may be procured not only from living persons but also from the 
dead. Biological material removed post mortem is a particularly valuable resource for 
research, especially because some tissues generally only become available after death 
(e.g. brains, hearts, and metastasized tumors). Considering the enormous efforts that 
are currently being made to study the biochemical processes and possible genetic 
causes that underlie cancer and cardiovascular and neurodegenerative diseases, it is 
likely that biological material removed post mortem will continue to gain in 
importance. 
The removal and storage of biological material from the deceased raises specific ethical 
concerns. As has recently been highlighted in various post mortem organ retention 
scandals in England, Wales, Scotland and Australia, severe ethical problems arise when 
proper consent is not sought (English & Sommerville 2003; Thomas 2002). In the wake of 
the outrage caused by the scandals in the Bristol Royal Infirmary and Liverpool’s Alder 
Hey Hospital,76 the Human Tissue Act 2004 and Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 came 
into force in the UK. Subject to criminal sanctions, the post mortem removal of human 
biological material for research is now only allowed in the UK after so-called 
‘appropriate consent’ is given. If the deceased person had not given explicit consent, 
that consent must be obtained from a ‘nominated representative’ or, in the absence of 
such, from a person who stood in a qualifying relationship with the deceased.77 
 
                                                     
76  The Report of the Public Inquiry into children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995. 
(2001) Available at http://www.bristol-inquiry.org.uk/final_report/the_report.pdf and Royal Liverpool 
Children’s Inquiry Report. (2001) Available at http://www.rlcinquiry.org.uk/download/index.htm  [last 
accessed 18 March 2013]. 
77  Human Tissue Act 2004, Part I, 2-5. 
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In countries operating an explicit consent or so-called ‘opt-in’ system for post mortem 
organ donation, similar provisions apply to post mortem removal of body material for 
research. Likewise, some countries operating a presumed consent or so-called ‘opt-out’ 
system for post mortem organ donation for transplantation have recently extended the 
presumed consent system to post mortem removal of human body material for 
research. This has happened in Spain, France and Belgium. It has resulted in a twofold 
extension of the presumed consent regime that governs cadaveric organ transplantation: 
first, an extension from post mortem removal of organs to post mortem removal of any 
human body material that falls under the scope of the applicable law on human body 
material, and secondly, an extension from post mortem removal for transplantation 
purposes to post mortem removal for research purposes. 
In Spain, this extension was introduced by the Royal Decree of 18 November 2011.78 The 
Decree allows removal of body material after death for research purposes when the 
deceased person had expressed consent or at least had not indicated opposition. In the 
latter case, efforts must be made to gather information about the wishes of the deceased 
person, by exploring the existence of advance directives or, in the absence of these, by 
consulting the next-of-kin and health care professionals involved in the treatment of 
the person concerned. If there is no indication of the deceased person’s wishes, removal 
is allowed unless the next-of-kin provide reasonable objections. Removal is only 
permitted if it is performed within the framework of a research protocol that has been 
approved by a Research Ethics Committee.  
In France, a presumed consent system for post mortem removal of human body material 
for research was introduced by the Law N° 2004-800 on Bioethics of 6 August 2004.79 The 
Law amended the Health Act in a way that allows post mortem removal of body material 
for research if the person concerned had not indicated refusal. The opportunity is 
offered to register refusal in a special national registry. In the absence of registered 
refusal, the next-of-kin must be consulted about the wishes which the deceased might 
have expressed in this regard. If there is no indication of the deceased person’s wishes, 
the removal will be permitted. The next-of-kin should be duly informed about the 
purpose of the removal and have the right to be informed about what body material has 
been removed. The Agency of Biomedicine has to grant prior approval of the research 
protocol and needs to be informed prior to any removal. 
 
                                                     
78  Real Decreto 1716/2011, de 18 de noviembre, por el que se establecen los requisitos básicos de 
autorización y funcionamiento de los biobancos con fines de investigación biomédica y del tratamiento de las 
muestras biológicas de origen humano, y se regula el funcionamiento y organización del Registro Nacional de 
Biobancos para investigación biomédica, Art. 26 
79  Loi n° 2004-800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique. 
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Whereas specific protective measures are in place in both the Spanish and French 
regulations, this is not the case in Belgium. Concerning post mortem removal of human 
body material for research, the Belgian law on human body material of 19 December 
200880 simply refers to the provisions regarding presumed consent in the Organ 
Transplantation Law of 13 June 1986.81  
The Belgian law of 2008 equates the absence of any registered objection to post mortem 
removal of organs for transplantation with the absence of any objection to post mortem 
removal of any body material for any purpose. Thus, the law permits post mortem 
removal of body material from any corpse, unless the deceased person has objected to 
post mortem removal of organs for transplantation. No separate ‘opt-out’ register has 
been put in place for registering objections to post mortem uses of body material for 
research. However, the Belgian population is unaware of this law. Neither the 
government nor any other organization has made any effort whatsoever to inform the 
public of this new legal regime for the post mortem procurement of body material. As a 
result, any citizen who objects to post mortem removal of her body material for 
research will obviously fail to register this objection.  
Thus, in practice, the new Belgian presumed consent system amounts to a routine removal 
or ‘conscription’ of body material after death whenever a clinician or researcher: (1) finds a 
specific post mortem removal useful for research; (2) has access to a dead body; and (3) 
neither the deceased nor the next-of-kin object(ed) to post mortem removal of organs 
for transplantation. 
In this chapter, we attempt to determine which consent regime should govern the post 
mortem procurement of body material for research. Given that, in practice, the Belgian 
system boils down to conscription, we first analyze whether a regime of conscription or 
routine removal is ethically acceptable. We will assess the various arguments that could 
be put forward in support of a duty to make body material available for research 
purposes after death. Our analysis suggests that such a duty can be substantiated on at 
least two grounds (a duty to refrain from free-riding and a duty to contribute to the 
maintenance of public goods) and possibly also on a third ground (a duty of easy rescue, 
depending on how such a duty is interpreted), but that this duty is always conditional. 
We conclude that this duty could support conscription but only as a last resort and only 
 
                                                     
80  Wet inzake het verkrijgen en het gebruik van menselijk lichaamsmateriaal met het oog op de 
geneeskundige toepassing op de mens of het wetenschappelijk onderzoek/Loi relative à l'obtention et à 
l'utilisation de matériel corporel humain destiné à des applications médicales humaines ou à des fins de 
recherche scientifique, Article 12. Official versions of the law exist only in Dutch and French. 
81  Wet betreffende het wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/Loi sur le prélèvement et la 
transplantation d’organes, Articles 10-13. Official versions of the law exist only in Dutch and French. 
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if a way were found to guarantee that two conditions that attach to the duty would be 
met. Since neither of these two criteria is currently fulfilled, conscription must be 
rejected. We conclude, however, that the duty to make body material available for 
research purposes after death is sufficiently strong to defend a policy of presumed 
rather than explicit consent. 
8.2 Arguments in support of a duty to make body material 
available for research after death 
A duty to make body material available for research after death could be advocated on 
the basis of two more fundamental duties: a duty of fairness towards research 
participants for having benefited from the results of research and a duty of beneficence, 
on the assumption that this type of contribution to research will prevent harm and does 
not imply a significant sacrifice. In this section, we will examine these arguments and 
indicate to what extent, if at all, they could support a duty to make one’s body material 
available for research after death. 
8.2.1 Duty of Fairness 
It could be argued that people have a duty to make their body material available for 
research purposes after they die, out of fairness for having benefited from the results of 
biomedical research throughout their life. Following Rawls’ (1971) principles of justice, 
the duty of fairness implies that people who benefit from participating in cooperative 
social schemes have duties towards each other to assume, when called upon, the risks 
and burdens which accompany the involvement in such social schemes. On the basis of 
such a duty, several prominent bioethicists have argued for a general duty to participate 
in biomedical research which, it is implied, could also require persons to allow research 
to be performed on their remains (Caplan 1984; Harris 2005; Rhodes 2008). The duty of 
fairness can be split up into two more specific duties: a duty to refrain from free-riding and 
a duty to contribute to the maintenance of public goods. In the following two subsections, we 
analyze each of these duties and argue that they both support a conditional duty to make 
body material available for research after death. 
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8.2.1.1 Duty to refrain from free-riding  
Some bioethicists argue that people who do not take part in biomedical research, while 
at the same time accepting its benefits, are free-riding on the backs of those who do 
participate (Evans 2004; Harris 2005; Orentlicher 2005; Rhodes 2005). As we all (at least 
in industrialized countries) gain from the results of biomedical research, they argue, 
non-participants have an outstanding moral debt which implies a duty to also 
participate in biomedical research.  
Free-riding occurs when a person obtains a benefit resulting from the efforts of others 
and this person refuses to assume part of the burdens involved in bringing about the 
benefit (Schaefer et al. 2009). It could be argued that, although a moral debt will result 
from gaining from biomedical research in general, this moral debt can be made up for in 
other ways than participation in biomedical research. From this perspective, it is overly 
simplistic to label as free-riders those who benefit from biomedical research without 
themselves having participated. After all, almost all people already pay – via taxes, 
insurance policies or out of their own pockets – for almost every medical benefit they 
enjoy (Brassington 2011; de Melo-Martin 2008). In addition, they often also indirectly 
support – through taxes – biomedical research projects. However, according to this line 
of reasoning, it may be asserted that the small minority of individuals who do not 
financially support biomedical research can still be accused of free-riding and may fairly 
be expected to make up for their moral debt by participating in person. In response, it 
can be pointed out that the likely unfairness that leaves persons in a position of not 
being able to contribute financially may override obligations stemming from being free-
riders.82  
By contrast, if the focus is shifted to the moral debt arising from benefiting from specific 
knowledge resulting from biomedical research on body material, the conclusion that 
non-participation amounts to free-riding is much harder to escape. After all, specific 
biomedical research cannot be carried out on the basis of financial contributions alone 
(Chan & Harris 2009; Stjernschantz et al. 2013). It could therefore be argued that a moral 
obligation exists to allow post mortem removal of one’s body material for research. 
However, this duty is conditional in that it will not attach to persons who have already 
donated samples while alive. Furthermore, it will only extend to types of research 
similar to the ones from which these persons had actually benefited.  
 
                                                     
82  We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. 
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8.2.1.2 Duty to contribute to the maintenance of public goods 
A second argument put forward in support of a general duty to participate in biomedical 
research invokes the concept of ‘public goods’. A public good exhibits the characteristics 
of ‘non-rivalry’ and ‘non-excludability’. Non-rivalry implies that a person can use the 
good without diminishing the amount available for others. Non-excludability refers to 
the impossibility of excluding anyone from enjoying the benefits of the good, even if 
they contributed nothing to its provision (Clark et al. 2003). Some claim that the 
knowledge resulting from biomedical research represents a public good. Given that we 
all benefit from generalizable biomedical knowledge, it is argued, we have a duty to 
contribute to the advancement of such knowledge by participating in biomedical 
research (Schaefer et al. 2009). Again, this implicitly could require persons to allow post 
mortem removal of their body material for research. 
The abovementioned argument has encountered major resistance. A first criticism 
challenges the public good status attributed to biomedical knowledge on the grounds 
that disadvantaged groups have no (or limited) access to health care (de Melo-Martin 
2008). It is rightly stressed that in the industrialized world, access to the results of 
biomedical research also depends on factors such as one’s financial situation (health 
insurance), the availability of preventative health care and the extent to which 
information concerning medical solutions and developments is conveyed. In response, 
however, it can be pointed out that this argument does not seem generally applicable to 
countries operating welfare states where, at least in principle, access to basic health 
care is also provided for otherwise disadvantaged groups.83 Moreover, lack of access to 
health care does not preclude other ways of benefiting from biomedical knowledge. For 
example, people who do not have access to a vaccine will benefit from herd immunity as 
long as a substantial number of other persons are vaccinated. To mention another 
example, research conducted at the beginning of the last century demonstrated an 
inverse relationship between higher fluoride concentration of the drinking water and 
lower levels of dental caries experience (Ripa 1993). Based upon this finding, numerous 
countries have adjusted the water fluoride concentration to a level expected to promote 
dental health. Up until today, both the rich and the poor in those countries benefit from 
this practice. 
 
A second line of criticism argues that many biomedical research projects do not result in 
a public good. In this regard, three types of arguments are put forward. First, it is 
stressed that many research projects do not yield any relevant results and thereby fail 
 
                                                     
83  We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. 
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to produce a public good (Holm et al. 2009). Second, it is pointed out that a lot of 
research is carried out in a way that hampers other researchers from obtaining useful 
results in the same field and, thereby, hinders the development of public goods. Typical 
measures include the refusal to publicly report findings and the use of patenting and 
licensing practices, which may stall subsequent research and the development of 
diagnostic and therapeutic tools (Sterckx 2011; Cockbain & Sterckx 2011). Third, it is 
observed that biomedical research projects may also be harmful to the participants. 
Even in the absence of physical harm, there is a possibility of researchers exploiting 
research participants by viewing them merely as a means to achieving prestige and/or 
wealth, as in the cases of, for example, the late John Moore (see Moore v. Regents of 
University of California 1990) and the members of the Havasupai tribe in the United 
States (Van Assche et al. 2013) Furthermore, research results may, for example in the 
case of genetic research, also be used for insurance or employment discrimination or be 
stigmatizing for the research participant or the wider group (Ashburn et al. 2000). 
However, these arguments miss the point since they do not refute the public good status 
of biomedical knowledge but merely emphasize that research should be carried out in a 
proper way. 
A final group of critics acknowledges the public good status of biomedical knowledge, 
but disputes the claim that research participation is required in order to discharge the 
duty to contribute to the maintenance of the public good. However, as we have argued 
in the context of free-riding, biomedical research cannot be carried out on the basis of 
financial contributions alone. It could therefore be argued that, to the extent that 
biomedical knowledge can only be attained by direct participation of individuals, the 
duty to maintain the public good will result in a duty to participate. 
On this basis, a duty may be said to exist to contribute to the maintenance of biomedical 
knowledge by post mortem donation of body material for research purposes. However, 
it should be stressed that this duty is conditional. Following the general principle of 
fairness, persons who have donated body material whilst alive will already have done 
their fair share. Moreover, the duty will only extend to research projects that will result 
in biomedical knowledge constituting a public good. 
8.2.2 Duty of Beneficence 
An additional argument that could be invoked to substantiate a duty to make one’s body 
material available for research purposes after death does not focus on the duty of 
fairness but on the duty of beneficence. The latter implies that we have to act in ways 
that prevent or remove harm or that confer benefit (Beauchamp & Childress 2009). 
According to some commentators, given that biomedic
 256 
necessary tool for alleviating the plight of patients, we have a moral duty to participate 
in biomedical research (see, for example, Harris 2005). If such a duty were to be 
established, this could require people to allow post mortem removal of their body 
material for research. In this respect, a distinction needs to be made between the 
general duty of beneficence and the more specific duty of easy rescue. In the following 
subsections both duties will be analyzed and it will be argued that the duty of easy 
rescue can only support a conditional duty to make body material available for research 
after death. 
8.2.2.1 General duty of beneficence 
While the duty of non-maleficence (i.e. the duty to refrain from causing harm) can be 
considered as a perfect duty, the general duty of beneficence is merely an imperfect 
duty (Shapshay & Pimple 2007). The assumption of a perfect moral duty to help others is 
untenable, for at least two reasons. First, such a duty would require too great an effort 
because it would command people to continuously engage in a wide range of actions of 
benefit to society (Murphy 2000). Second, a perfect moral duty of beneficence would 
also undermine our moral integrity. Given that there are many ways in which harm to 
others can be limited, we would be obliged to spend most of our time, energy and 
resources on combating poverty, hunger, and wars, rather than on projects which 
minimize harm to others to a lesser extent. As Williams has convincingly argued, a 
perfect moral duty of beneficence would reduce an individual to a ‘harm-minimizing 
instrument’ lacking any integrity. After all, her actions would not correspond to her 
convictions and life projects (Williams 1990). 
An imperfect duty to help others implies that we ought to view the happiness of others as 
an end in itself. However, at the same time we are given great leeway in achieving this 
goal. We are allowed to weigh up this end against other (possibly private) ends. Thus, 
the pursuit of others’ happiness need not always be prioritized (Hill 1992). If we 
acknowledge the existence of an imperfect moral duty to help others, the question 
arises as to why this duty would entail obligatory participation in biomedical research, 
including making our body material available for research after death (Shapshay & 
Pimple 2007; Wachbroit & Wasserman 2005).  
The duty of beneficence requires us to support our fellow-man. There are various ways 
of achieving this end, however, many of which are much more effective than 
participation in biomedical research (de Melo-Martin 2008). Even if the fight against 
disease were our primary task, it is not clear why participation in research is the only or 
even the best way of achieving this. Biomedical research (especially in its current form) 
may not represent the best means of reducing the global burden of disease. Given the 
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close link between poverty and disease, fighting poverty would probably constitute a 
much more efficient means of combating disease (Woolf et al. 2007; Pogge 2002). 
In sum, if we consider the question at issue here from the perspective of a general duty 
of beneficence, the conclusion seems to be that, whereas people may have very good 
reasons to make their body material available for research after death, they are not 
required to do so. It is up to them to decide whether and, if so, under what conditions, 
they want to fulfill their duty of beneficence by engaging in precisely this type of act. 
8.2.2.2 Duty of easy rescue 
However, under certain specific circumstances the duty of beneficence may be a perfect 
duty, in which case the discretion normally allowed by beneficence is eliminated. This is 
frequently referred to as the ‘duty of easy rescue’. The duty of easy rescue was first 
elaborated by Thomas Aquinas and has been introduced in bioethics by ethicists like 
Peter Singer and Michael Slote. In a relatively old, but still very influential article 
concerning famine and ethics, Peter Singer (1972) argued, on the basis of his famous 
thought experiment about a child drowning in a pond, that we are morally obliged to 
prevent harm whenever we are able to do so without having to sacrifice anything of 
comparable moral significance. Similarly, Michael Slote (1977) endorses the view that 
we have a duty to prevent serious harm whenever we are able to do so without 
interfering with our own life plan and without incurring serious harm.  
According to Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 206-209), there is an obligation to rescue if 
five cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (1) someone is at risk of significant loss of or 
damage to life, health or another basic interest; (2) another person’s action is required 
in order to prevent this loss or damage; (3) this action will probably prevent the loss or 
damage; (4) this action involves no important risks, costs or burdens for the other 
person; and (5) the expected gain for the person in need outweighs any likely harms, 
costs or burdens for the other person.  
The duty of easy rescue is frequently used to justify an obligation of post mortem organ 
donation for transplantation, even to the point of advocating a system of conscription 
(Fabre 2006; Hester 2006; Snyder 2009; Spital & Taylor 2007). However, even if an 
obligation to donate one’s organs for transplantation after death could be established on 
the basis of a duty of easy rescue, a similar obligation to make one’s body material 
available for research purposes after death seems harder to substantiate. 
In the case at hand the first two conditions seem to be met since many individuals at 
significant (future) health risk will arguably substantially benefit from other people’s 
post mortem donation of body material for research. With regard to the third condition, 
discussion may arise as to how likely it needs to be that the post mortem donation of 
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body material by a third person will prevent the health loss of the other person. In 
addition, uncertainty may exist as to how obvious the causal link between the 
contribution and the health benefit has to be. On the one hand, it can be argued that, 
even if a high probability of success and a clear causal relationship can be difficult to 
demonstrate, a duty of easy rescue may be defended if one factors in that this kind of 
health relief can only be achieved by collective and sustained action. On the other hand, 
the stock examples of easy rescue presented in the literature (e.g. assistance from 
bystanders which does not put them in harm’s way; post mortem organ donation) seem 
to suggest that, at the time of the required action, both the rescuer and the person in 
peril have to be clearly identified and that the action of one and only one person is 
required to help the person in need (James 2007; Smith 1990). In view of these 
considerations regarding the third condition of easy rescue, it seems clear that the 
applicability of a duty of easy rescue can neither be easily substantiated nor simply 
discarded for the topic at issue here, i.e. making body material available after death for 
research purposes.  
Taking into account the fourth condition, a duty of rescue will only apply where the 
action that is required does not represent significant risks, costs or burdens to the 
person concerned (otherwise the rescue would not be ‘easy’). However, although this is 
frequently assumed, it is not at all obvious that the type of biomedical research at issue 
here – research on human body material – cannot involve important harms and wrongs. 
Some people may conscientiously object to the removal itself because of beliefs that the 
body should be buried as a whole. For these persons the costs incurred may be 
substantial and even disproportionate when compared to the expected benefits of their 
contribution.  
Even for people who do not find the removal in itself objectionable, a lot could be at 
stake. As has already been highlighted, research on human body material may involve 
severe infringements upon the privacy, autonomy, or moral integrity of the research 
participants. Indeed, body material may be used in a way that is incompatible with the 
moral values of the person concerned. In this context it should be noted that, following 
Ronald Dworkin’s (1993) terminology, so-called ‘critical interests’ may be at stake.84 
Such interests are bound in the projects, plans and choices that persons have made and 
that give meaning to their life. When meaningful life plans are made, it is important for 
the individual that others respect them and do not take actions that will critically 
impact on them in a negative way. From this perspective, people are entitled to their 
 
                                                     
84  ‘Critical interests’ need to be distinguished from so-called ‘experiential interests’ which are related to 
the pursuit of pleasurable experiences. Contrary to ‘critical interests’, the setback of experiential interests will 
be temporarily frustrating at most (Dworkin 1993). 
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body material being used in a manner that corresponds to their life story, character, and 
values.85 Failure to respect this would amount to instrumentalization.86 As bioethicist 
Julian Savulescu has put it: 
 
Each mature person should be the author of his or her own life. Each person has 
values, plans, aspirations, and feelings about how that life should go. People have 
values which may collide with research goals [...].  
To ask a person’s permission to do something to that person is to involve her 
actively and to give her the opportunity to make the project a part of her plans. 
When we involve people in our projects without their consent we use them as a 
means to our own ends. (Savulescu 2002, 648-649) 
 
In the literature, it is sometimes quickly assumed that dead individuals cannot be 
harmed by posthumous events. Proponents of this view argue that, as the deceased have 
no interests, there are no interests which can be harmed by the posthumous use of their 
body material (Spital & Erin 2002). By contrast, defenders of the concept of ‘posthumous 
interests’ argue that people do have critical interests that survive their death and may 
thus be harmed when these interests are violated (see, for example, Belliotti 2012).  
Although this debate is highly fascinating, we cannot elaborate on it here and we shall 
suffice to say that we agree with those commentators who claim that we should respect 
the wishes of people also after their death, yet not out of a concern for harming them 
through posthumous events but for the sake of the living (Hamer & Rivlin 2003; Partridge 
1981; Wicclair 2002). Generally, one can draw great reassurance and comfort, while 
alive, from the knowledge that one’s preferences and values will be respected after 
death. Conversely, the expectation that one’s preferences and values will be disregarded 
 
                                                     
85  As the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission already observed in 1999, anonymization of the 
body material cannot invalidate this claim: “It is incorrect to assume that because the sources cannot be 
identified they cannot be harmed or wronged. […] Individuals have an interest in avoiding uses of their tissues 
they regard as morally impermissible or objectionable. Thus, were their materials to be used in research that 
they would consider objectionable, it is possible that some individuals could be wronged, if not harmed” 
(NBAC 1999,61). At most, anonymization might offer protection with regard to privacy, although several 
recent studies suggest that even this cannot be guaranteed (McGuire & Gibbs 2006; Schmidt & Callier 2012; 
Lowrance & Collins 2007). 
86  We are not suggesting here that the instrumentalization argument holds generally, i.e. that it is never 
permissible to do something to a competent person that does not correspond to their life story, values and 
character. In exceptional cases coercion might be permissible (e.g. mandatory immunization; coerced 
placement and treatment) but these interventions find their justification in averting a grave and direct danger 
to the person concerned, third parties or society at large. These conditions do not apply to (post mortem) 
removal of body material for research. 
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after death is likely to result in considerable anxiety and distress among the living 
(Wicclair 2002). As a result, the living have an interest in respecting the wishes of the 
deceased because in doing so they will strengthen the traditions that will protect their 
own interests in having posthumous influence (Partridge 1981). 
Therefore, we would conclude that, even if the first three requirements for easy rescue 
would be fulfilled, no obligation to make one’s body material available for research after 
death could be established on the basis of a duty of easy rescue when that research 
would disregard important values and wishes of the deceased. Put differently, samples 
should only be removed after death if such removal and subsequent research would be 
compatible with the critical interests of the pre mortem person. Hence a duty of easy 
rescue can only be a conditional duty in the context at issue here, and it cannot be 
sufficient to justify a conscription regime. This leads us to the question as to how 
people’s wishes with regard to research uses of their body material should be 
ascertained, or, put differently, what kind of consent regime should apply. 
8.3 Consent regimes revisited 
We have reviewed several arguments that could be put forward in support of a duty to 
participate in biomedical research that could extend to a duty to donate body material 
for research after death. We found that such a duty could be substantiated on the basis 
of a least two grounds (a duty to refrain from free-riding and a duty to contribute to the 
maintenance of public goods) and possibly a third ground (easy rescue, depending on 
how the conditions for an easy rescue are specified). However, since, as explained 
above, in each of these cases important conditions need to be fulfilled before the duty to 
donate body material for research after death would be triggered, this duty is always 
conditional. What does this imply with regard to the question as to which regime should 
govern the post mortem procurement of body material for research? 
8.3.1 No consent: Conscription 
Can a conditional duty to donate body material for research after death commit us to 
accept a policy of conscription? Analyzing paradigmatic cases of conscription (e.g. 
military conscription; jury service; compulsory vaccination), Holm et al. conclude that 
conscription is only justified if its purpose cannot be achieved on a voluntary basis 
(Holm et al. 2009). However, in the context of post mortem removal of body material the 
claim that conscription is necessary is not plausible, for other, less coercive ways exist 
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to achieve a sufficient supply of body material. Even with regard to research that relies 
heavily on body material which only becomes available after death, there does not seem 
to be a need to resort to compulsory removal before other strategies have been actively 
pursued.  
If insufficient body material would be collected by resorting only to non-compulsory 
ways of post mortem removal, a policy of conscription could be justified on the basis of 
a duty to donate body material for research after death. However, in that case, the 
system of conscription would still need to comply with the conditions that attach to the 
duty. It could, for instance, be argued that, on the basis of a duty to contribute to the 
maintenance of public goods, samples from persons who did not donate body material 
while alive may be conscripted after death if access to these samples would be limited to 
research projects which focus on obtaining biomedical knowledge that would 
unquestionably qualify as a public good. It has been proposed that this could be the case 
for research that is entirely uncontroversial and is likely to result in benefits that would 
be made available to everybody and would contribute to leveling social differences 
(Christensen 2009). However, in our view, these and similar suggestions raise overly 
challenging and arguably insurmountable problems related to the implementation and 
monitoring of the system of conscription. It would, for instance, be unclear who in each 
instance would decide whether conscription to a specific research project would be 
justified and what characteristics this project would need to have in order to be 
compatible with the conditional duty to make one’s body material available for research 
after death. 
We can conclude that, in the current state of affairs, since the claim of necessity is not 
fulfilled and major problems of implementation and monitoring would arise, a system of 
post mortem conscription of body material for research cannot be substantiated on the 
basis of a duty to donate body material for research after death. 
8.3.2 Presumed consent rather than explicit consent 
By contrast, we would argue that the duty to donate body material for research after 
death is clearly strong enough to defend a system of presumed consent to post mortem 
removal of body material for research, rather than a regime of explicit consent which is 
the default option for participation in biomedical research. As we have seen, there are 
two and possibly three grounds to expect that individuals make their body material 
available for research after death. Yet, since the resulting duty will always be a 
conditional one, it is reasonable to leave it to the persons concerned to decide for 
themselves if they do not wish to donate and to expect them to take the necessary steps 
to opt out if they wish.  
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Indeed, it has been pointed out that a presumed consent system does not in any way 
restrict a person’s right to self-determination, as long as the person was aware of the 
system and the implications of action or inaction, had a reasonable time period in which 
to object, and was offered adequate and accessible means of formally recording 
objections (Den Hartogh 2008). Furthermore, for many people the cost of contributing 
more than strictly required by duty are low.87 It may, for instance, be assumed that a lot 
of individuals do not have deep seated objections to the removal of body material after 
death, even in the absence of guarantees that the research will comply with the 
conditions governing their duty (e.g. that the research will indeed result in knowledge 
constituting a public good). 
However, in order to minimize the chance that body material would be removed after 
death from persons to whom no duty applied (e.g. because the intended research 
project is incompatible with their pre mortem values, implying that the fourth and fifth 
condition for the existence of a duty of easy rescue would not be met) and who did not 
want to go beyond the call of duty, several requirements would need to be fulfilled. 
First, awareness-raising campaigns should be launched to inform the public about the 
possibility of post mortem removal of body material for research purposes, the possible 
research uses and the consent regime in place. Second, procedures should be 
established to allow potential participants to register their unwillingness to make their 
body material available for research after death.88 Third, in the absence of a registered 
refusal, the next-of-kin must be consulted regarding the deceased person’s wishes. 
Finally, it is conceivable that some people are unwilling to donate body material for 
certain types of research uses, while willing to do so for other research purposes. 
Therefore, besides the possibility for a blanket opt-out, it would seem to be advisable to 
also enable one to opt-out for certain generic categories of research uses.89  
Admittedly, a system of presumed consent would imply the possibility that some people 
may opt out of making their body material available for research after death without 
having discharged their moral duty even though the conditions for the applicability of 
 
                                                     
87  We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. 
88  In other words, post mortem donation of body material and donation of organs should be governed by 
separate registers.  
89  Admittedly, it is impossible to compose an exhaustive list of such categories. Nevertheless, one could 
envisage a system wherein a limited number of categories are listed, followed by a text-box in which the 
person can write down any other research uses that she deems unacceptable. Further analysis is necessary to 
underpin more specific proposals in this regard; our focus here is on highlighting the reasons why, for the 
case of post mortem uses of body material for research, it is ethically permissible to depart from the default 
regime for participation in biomedical research, i.e. explicit consent, and to adopt a regime of presumed 
consent with proper safeguards. 
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the duty were met. However, as noted earlier, there is no reason to legally enforce this 
moral duty as long as a sufficient supply of body material can be obtained by non-
compulsory methods. 
8.4 Conclusion 
On the basis of a critical examination of various arguments invoked in the literature, we 
found that a duty to make one’s body material available for research after death could 
be established on the basis of the duty to refrain from free-riding, the duty to contribute 
to the maintenance of public goods and, depending on the interpretation, possibly also 
the duty of easy rescue, although the latter ground applies less straightforwardly to the 
case under discussion here.  
However, we also found that in each instance the duty to make one’s body material 
available for research after death is a conditional one, hence this moral duty is not 
sufficient to justify the general adoption of a regime of post mortem conscription of 
body material for research purposes (and a conditional adoption would face massive 
monitoring problems). Moreover, we argued that a conscription regime, whether 
generalized or not, cannot be supported because it is unacceptable to resort to 
compulsory removal before other strategies to promote donation have been actively 
pursued and have been found to result in an insufficient supply of body material for 
research. 
By contrast, we found that the duty to make body material available for research after 
death is strong enough to depart from explicit consent, i.e. the default option for 
participation in biomedical research, and to support a system of presumed consent. 
Finally, we made a number of suggestions to improve existing systems of presumed 
consent so as to minimize the likelihood that body material would be removed after 
death if this would go against the wishes of individuals regarding the use of body 
material after their death. Indeed, we wish to strongly emphasize the necessity of 
putting in place various safeguards in order to prevent a regime for governing the 
procurement of post mortem body material for research from being labeled a presumed 
consent regime whilst in practice boiling down to a regime of general conscription, as is 
alarmingly the case in Belgium today. 
 
 
 264 
8.5 References 
Ashburn, TT., Wilson, SK. and Eisenstein, BI. (2000) “ Human tissue research in the genomic era 
of medicine: balancing individual and societal interests”. Archives of Internal Medicine 
160: 3377-3384. 
Beauchamp, TL., and Childress, JF. (2013) Principles of biomedical ethics. Seventh edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Belliotti, RA. (2012) Posthumous harm: why the dead are still vulnerable. Lanham, Md.: Lexington 
Books.  
Brassington, I. (2011) “ Defending the duty to research?” Bioethics 25: 21-26.  
Caplan, AL. (1984) “ Is there a duty to serve as a subject in biomedical research?” IRB: Ethics and 
Human Research 6: 1-5.  
Chan, S. and Harris, J. (2009) “Free riders and pious sons—why science research remains 
obligatory”. Bioethics 23: 161-171. 
Christensen, E. (2009) “Biobanks and our common good” In: Solbakk, J-H, Holm, S. and Hofmann, 
B. (eds.) The Ethics of research Biobanking. New York: Springer, pp. 101-114. 
Clark, CF., Kotchen, MJ. And Moore, MR. (2003) “Internal and external influences on pro-
environmental behavior: participation in a green electricity program”. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology 23: 237-246. 
Cockbain, J. and Sterckx, S. (2011) “Something more is necessary – Are genes and genetic 
diagnostic tests statutory subject matter for US patents?” Expert Review of Molecular 
Diagnostics 11: 149-158.  
de Melo-Martin, I. (2008) “Response to Rosamond Rhodes”. Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 
7: 13-14. 
Den Hartogh, G. (2008)  Farewell to non-commitment. Decision systems for organ donation from an 
ethical viewpoint. The Hague: Centre for Ethics and Health. 
Dworkin, R. (1993) Life’s Dominion. London: Harper Collins.  
English, V. and  Sommerville. A.(2003) “Presumed consent for transplantation: a dead issue after 
Alder Hey?” Journal of Medical Ethics 29: 147-152.  
Evans, M. (2004) “Should patients be allowed to veto their participation in clinical research?” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 30: 198-203. 
Fabre, C. (2006) Whose body is it anyway? Justice and the integrity of the person. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Harris, J. (2005) “Scientific research is a moral duty”. Journal of Medical Ethics 31: 242-248. 
Hester, D. (2006) “ Why we must leave our organs to others”. American Journal of Bioethics 6: W23-
28. 
Hill, TE. (1992) Dignity and practical reason in Kant’s moral theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Holm, S., Hofmann, B. and Solbakk, J-H. (2009) “Conscription to biobank research?” In: Solbakk, 
J-H., Holm, S. and  Hofmann, B. (eds.) The Ethics of research biobanking. New York: 
Springer, pp.255-262. 
James, SM. (2007) “Good Samaritans, good humanitarians”. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24: 238-
254.  
Lowrance, WW. and Collins, FS. (2007) “ Identifiability in genomic research”. Science 317: 600-
602.  
McGuire, AL. and  Gibbs, RA. (2006) “Genetics. No longer de-identified”. Science 312: 370-371. 
Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) (51 Cal.3d 120 Supreme Court of California).  
Murphy, L. (2000) Moral demands in nonideal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission. (1999) Research involving human biological materials: 
ethical issues and policy guidance. Rockville: NBAC. 
  265 
Orentlicher, D. (2005)  “Making research a requirement of treatment: why we should sometimes 
let doctors pressure patients to participate in research”. Hastings Center Report 35: 20-
28.  
Partridge, E. (1981) “Posthumous interests and posthumous respect”. Ethics 91: 243-264.  
Pogge, TW. (2002) “Responsibilities for poverty-related ill health”. Ethics & International Affairs 
16: 71-79.  
Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Rhodes, R. (2005) “Rethinking research ethics”. American Journal of Bioethics 5: 7-28. 
Rhodes, R. (2008) “In defense of the duty to participate in biomedical research”.  American 
Journal of Bioethics 8: 37-44. 
Ripa, LW. (1993) “A half-century of community water fluoridation in the United States: review 
and commentary”. Journal of Public Health Dentistry 53: 17-44.  
Savulescu, J. (2002) “For and against: no consent should be needed for using leftover body 
material for scientific purposes”. British Medical Journal 325: 649-651. 
Schaefer, GO., Emanuel, EJ. and Wertheimer, A. (2009) “The obligation to participate in 
biomedical research”. Journal of the American Medical Association 302: 67-72.  
Schmidt, H. and Callier, S. (2012) “How anonymous is ‘anonymous’? Some suggestions towards a 
coherent universal coding system for genetic samples”. Journal of Medical Ethics 38: 304-
309. 
Shapshay, S. and Pimple, K. (2007) “ Participation in biomedical research is an imperfect moral 
duty: A response to John Harris”. Journal of Medical Ethics 33: 414-417.  
Singer, P. (1972) “Famine, affluence, and morality”. Philosophy & Public Affairs 1: 229-243.  
Slote, M. (1977) “The morality of wealth”. In: Aiken, W. and LaFollette, H. (eds.) World hunger and 
moral obligation. Englewood Cliffs, JH: Prentice-Hall, pp.124-147. 
Smith, P. (1990) “The duty to rescue and the slippery slope problem”. Social Theory and Practice 
16: 19-41.  
Snyder, J. (2009) “Easy rescues and organ transplantation”. HEC forum 21: 27-53. 
Spital, A. and. Erin, CC. (2002) “Conscription of cadaveric organs for transplantation: Let’s at 
least talk about it”. American Journal of Kidney Diseases 39: 611-615.  
Spital, A. and Taylor, JS. (2007) “Routine recovery of cadaveric organs for transplantation: 
consistent, fair, and life-saving”. Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 2: 
300-303.  
Sterckx, S. (2011) “Patenting and licensing of university research: Promoting innovation or 
undermining academic values?” Science & Engineering Ethics 17: 45-64. 
Stjernschantz, F., Hanson,J., Mats G. and  Eriksson, S. (2012) “Why participating in (certain) 
scientific research is a moral duty”. Journal of Medical Ethics [Epub ahead of print: 
doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100859]  
Thomas, CM. (2002) “Should the law allow sentiment to triumph over science? The retention of 
body parts”. Discussion Paper Series 210. Massey University School of Accountancy. 
Van Assche, K., Gutwirth, S. and Sterckx, S. (2013) “Protecting dignitary interests of biobank 
research participants: lessons from Havasupai tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents”. Law, 
Innovation and technology 5: 54-84. 
Wachbroit, R. and Wasserman, D. (2005) “Research participation: are we subject to a duty?” 
American Journal of Bioethics 5: 48-49.   
Wicclair, MR. (2002) “Informed consent and research involving the newly dead”. Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 12: 351-372.  
Williams, B. (1990) “A critique of utilitarianism”. In: Smart, JJC. and Williams, B. (eds.) 
Utilitarianism, for and against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.82-117. 
Woolf, SH., Johnson, R. Phillips, R. and Philipsen, M. (2007).”Giving everyone the health of the 
educated: an examination of whether social change would save more lives than 
medical advances”. American Journal of Public Health 97: 679-683.  
 

  267 
Conclusion            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  269 
9.1 Research questions 
The research questions for this dissertation were:  
9.1.1 Financial scarcity in health care 
1. Are proposals to curb spending on health care in the elderly an effective means of 
addressing the health care cost crisis?  
 
1.1. Is age-based rationing of life-extending care an effective means of addressing 
the health care cost crisis?  
 
1.2. Is the biogerontological approach to healthy aging an effective means of 
addressing the health care cost crisis?  
9.1.2 Commodity scarcity in health care 
‘Coping mechanisms’ 
2. Are there acceptable moral grounds to use recipient age in the allocation of kidneys?  
 
2.1. Are there acceptable moral grounds to deprioritize the elderly in the allocation 
of kidneys?  
 
2.2. Are there acceptable moral grounds to prioritize pediatric patients in the 
allocation of kidneys?  
‘Solutions’ 
3. Are the currently proposed solutions to the kidney shortage well-suited to 
accommodate the projected surge in demand related to population aging?  
 
4. What are some of the recently proposed solutions to commodity scarcity in health 
care in Belgium and are these ethically sound?  
 
Below, we bring together our research findings with regard to each of these questions. 
This will allow us to make explicit some important similarities between financial and 
commodity scarcity in health care. We end this conclusion with some recommendations 
for further research. 
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9.2 Research question 1 
Proposals for addressing the health care cost crisis frequently take the form of a plea for 
curbing health care expenditures on the elderly. In this dissertation, we have examined 
two such proposals: age-based rationing and the biogerontological approach to healthy 
aging. Instead of using traditional ways of assessing these, we opted for a more 
unconventional focus on their effectiveness. The rationale behind this was twofold. 
First, whether or not age-based rationing and the biogerontological approach to healthy 
aging are effective cost containment tools ought to be an important consideration in 
any assessment of their moral acceptability. Second, as we have repeatedly stressed 
throughout this dissertation, the adverse effects of the health care cost crisis are 
already taking their toll. It is, therefore, imperative that we not postpone the 
examination of the effectiveness of the two relevant proposals as a cost containment 
tool. We simply cannot afford to pursue dead-end solutions to the problem at hand.  
 
Age-based rationing proposals rest on the assumption that population aging is an 
important driver of rising health care costs. Proponents of age-based rationing claim 
that, in denying the elderly life-extending treatment, we can severely reduce the 
adverse effects of population aging on health care expenditures. However, as we have 
seen, population aging is only a minor driver of rising health care costs. Medical 
technology is the root cause of the health care cost crisis. Recall that technological 
innovations often increase health care expenditures because of their tendency to 
produce a complementarity effect, i.e. they have a way of substantially increasing the 
reliance upon already available health care services and products.  
Of course, in denying the elderly life-extending treatment, age-based rationing 
proposals unintentionally address the problem of medical technology. However, the 
reliance upon medical technology is evenly distributed among the young and the old. 
Given that age-based rationing proposals merely address (some forms of) technology 
use in the elderly, the savings hereby obtained will be of a temporary nature only. As 
long as the use of technology remains uncontrolled in the young, health care costs will 
soon resume their rise once we have cut out expensive forms of technology in the 
elderly.  
 
As we have repeatedly stressed, it is highly unethical to deny the elderly treatment 
when the practice of doing so defeats its object, i.e. the goal of providing a solution to 
the health care cost crisis. This consideration illustrates how great a role the 
(in)effectiveness of a cost containment proposal can play in shaping our views on its 
moral acceptability. As such, it reinforces the importance, from a moral point of view, of 
examining the effectiveness of this type of proposal.  
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As a proposed solution to the health care cost crisis, the biogerontological approach to 
healthy aging fares even worse than age-based rationing. It makes a mistake similar to 
age-based rationing in that it aims to address population aging, rather than the root 
cause of the health care cost crisis. However, whereas age-based rationing at least has 
the merit of partially and inadvertently tackling the rising costs of medical technology, 
the same cannot be said of the biogerontological approach to healthy aging. The latter is 
likely to increase, rather than reduce, the use of expensive medical technology, for two 
reasons.  
First, a significantly expanded healthspan and lifespan will most likely be achieved 
through the application of a combination of innovative technologies, such as stem cell 
treatments, pharmaceuticals, and genetic consultations. Moreover, these technologies 
will probably need to be administered periodically from an early age until the final 
stages of one’s significantly expanded lifespan.  
Second, besides introducing a whole range of novel technologies, the biogerontological 
approach to healthy aging is also likely to lead to the complementarity effect described 
above, i.e. it is likely to result in an intensified use of already existing medical 
technologies. After all, a significantly extended lifespan (even if free of age-related 
diseases) implies an increase in the number of years during which one can ‘consume’ 
such technologies.  
 
As we mentioned in the general introduction, age-based rationing and the 
biogerontological approach to healthy aging are not the only cost containment 
proposals which operate under the assumption that population aging is a major driver 
of rising health care costs. Other proposals of this kind include the WHO approach to 
healthy aging and Medicare privatization. If successful, these proposals would reduce 
demand for health care in the elderly. In this dissertation, we have not explicitly 
addressed whether these proposals represent an effective solution to the health care 
cost crisis. Nevertheless, we need only draw on our assessment of age-based rationing 
and biogerontology to conclude that they share the same flaws. Medicare privatization 
and the WHO approach to healthy aging are also oblivious to the root cause of the 
health care cost crisis. In reducing demand for health care in the elderly, they will, 
similar to age-based rationing, inadvertently address the use of expensive technology in 
the elderly. However, once again, technology use in other age groups remains 
uncontrolled. Contrary to biogerontology, Medicare privatization and the WHO 
approach to healthy aging do not exacerbate the root cause of the health care cost crisis 
in that they do not rely on the development and use of sophisticated technology. In 
short, there is reason to believe that they will have an effect similar to age-based 
rationing, i.e. they will succeed at most in temporarily attenuating the trend of rising 
health care costs.  
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We have criticized age-based rationing, Medicare privatization and the healthy aging 
approach for their failure to provide a viable solution to the health care cost crisis. 
However, despite this criticism, we would like to stress that these proposals 
nevertheless deserve some praise. They have the merit of at least recognizing the 
problematic nature of rising health care costs. As we have seen, there is a minority who 
label the trend of increasing health care expenditures as laudable. These seem to believe 
that, in investing ever more financial resources in health care, we can come increasingly 
closer to fulfilling all our health care needs. The ensuing health benefits, they claim, 
outweigh the downsides of rising health care costs. Throughout this dissertation, we 
have encountered two arguments which undermine this line of reasoning.  
First, growing health care expenditures imply that ever smaller amounts are available 
for other public spending priorities, such as education and employment. The latter’s 
effect on health is greater than that of access to and use of health care services. 
Therefore, if one views health as the summum bonum – as those denying the 
problematic nature of rising health care costs clearly do – it makes little sense to invest 
ever greater amounts in health care at the detriment of more important determinants 
of health.  
Second, it is an illusion to think that we can come ever closer to meeting all our health 
care needs. Human wants and needs are inherently infinite. This is the so-called internal 
aspect of scarcity described in the general introduction. In other words, our current 
needs, once met, will soon be replaced by new needs. Upon the fulfillment of the latter, 
further needs and wants will, once again, develop. In this sense, our medical 
achievements always remain one step behind our needs. Due to their inevitably limited 
nature, our financial resources cannot possibly keep pace with our unlimited wants and 
needs. Although an inherent trait of humans, our urge to continuously upgrade our 
needs is also fed by medical technology. The latter, as was illustrated in chapter 6, can 
create new needs by broadening the definition of disease.  
 
Financial scarcity: directions for the future 
 
Evidently, we cannot make progress in addressing the health care cost crisis if we hold 
onto misguided strategies. Thus, in drawing attention to the flaws of current cost 
containment proposals, we have set the stage for a much more productive approach to 
the problem at hand. At the same time, however, our research merely represents a first 
step in the right direction. A next step consists in formulating and implementing 
measures which substantially reduce our expenditure upon medical technology. We did 
not embark upon this task in this dissertation as it is more suited to health technology 
experts and health economists. Nevertheless, our research findings point towards a 
series of recommendations which come in handy in the search for measures aimed at 
limiting the use of medical technology. We can distinguish two types of 
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recommendation. The first set lays out the necessary groundwork for developing the 
relevant measures, whereas the second pertains to the basic characteristics which such 
measures ought to display if they are to be successful.  
 
First set of recommendations  
 
If we are to create an environment that is conducive to the development of successful 
policies aimed at limiting the use of medical technology, we must take at least the 
following two measures.  
First, we must dispel the myth that population aging is the most important driver of 
rising health care costs. This myth has its origin in the 1980s, when age-based rationing 
proposals first emerged. The fact that it is still alive and flourishing bears testimony to 
its relentless nature.  
Second, we must bring about a change in attitude. The modern, deeply engrained 
addiction to medical technology ought to make room for an awareness of the many 
downsides attached to rising health care costs. The most promising way of conveying 
this message consists in stressing that ever increasing financial expenditures on health 
care are not necessarily the most effective route to a better health status.  
 
Second set of recommendations  
 
Our research findings suggest that, in order to be successful, measures to reduce the 
reliance upon medical technology ought to satisfy at least the following three 
requirements.  
First, as mentioned in the general introduction, a viable solution to the health care cost 
crisis consists of more than the mere elimination of waste (i.e. ineffective treatments). 
Thus, measures aimed at decreasing our uptake of expensive medical technology will 
need to tackle both ineffective and effective technologies.  
Second, as we have repeatedly stressed, such measures ought to address the use of 
technology across all age groups.  
Finally, these measures will have to improve upon currently employed methods of 
technology assessment. The latter, after all, have so far not succeeded in reducing the 
growth of health care spending to below the level of GDP growth. Our discussion of the 
relation between medical technology and rising health care expenditures hints at a 
possible way of making the current health technology assessment criteria more 
stringent. As repeated earlier, a factor which causes medical technologies to drive up 
costs is their tendency to produce a complementarity effect. Thus, when assessing new 
technologies, it will be important to take into account, not only their unit cost, but also 
their probability of increasing the reliance upon already existing health care services 
and products. It will not always be easy to predict whether or not complementarity will 
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occur, let alone the extent of the effect. As discussed in chapter 1, for example, 
innovations in treating coronary artery disease led to an increased incidence of ESRD 
and, thus, to a greater reliance upon dialysis. However, it was arguably impossible to 
foresee such an effect at the time these innovations were introduced. Besides 
attempting to predict complementarity, we also face the challenge of achieving 
substantial cost savings while at the same time ensuring that medical progress is not 
stifled. This issue was discussed in chapter 2.      
9.3 Research question 2 
The aging of the kidney transplant waiting list is increasingly perceived as a threat to 
the availability of kidneys for younger patients. In the US, this concern recently 
initiated an overhaul of the longstanding kidney allocation policy in favor of a system 
which deprioritizes the elderly. As the waiting list further ages and the adverse effects 
on the young become increasingly apparent, we may very well witness similar changes 
to allocation policies in other countries. Thus, the question as to whether there are 
acceptable moral grounds for deprioritizing the elderly will only gain in importance.  
 
In this dissertation, we have developed one argument which could potentially serve to 
support a lower priority level for the elderly. Our argument rests on a concern for 
minimizing harm. Following Feinberg, we defined harm as a setback to one’s interests. 
The basic interest at stake in organ transplantation is the interest in either continued 
life (lifesaving transplants) or a reasonable quality of life (non-lifesaving transplants). As 
we argued, this interest boils down to an interest in life projects. Thus, if we are to 
allocate organs so as to minimize harm, we ought to prioritize those who, in the absence 
of a transplant, experience the greatest setback to their interests in life projects. We 
identified the age group between mid/late 20s and mid 50s as satisfying this criterion. 
The rationale behind the inclusion of those in their mid/late 20s is that these people 
have the strongest interest in unstarted life projects. This is due to their being closest to 
initiating a whole range of projects. The inclusion of those in their early 30s to mid 50s 
in the age group eligible for prioritization rests on two grounds. First, their interests in 
started life projects are of the greatest strength level. Second, upon transplantation, 
their interests can be sustained at this strength level throughout the whole duration of 
the graft.  
 
Our harm minimizing model has important implications at both the beginning and end 
of the lifespan, i.e. it deprioritizes pediatric patients as well as the middle aged (55+) and 
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the elderly (65+). Concerning the effect at the end of the lifespan, it is the 
deprioritization of the elderly (rather than that of the middle aged) which is of greatest 
interest to us here. After all, the question we set out to answer in developing our model 
pertains precisely to the appropriate priority level for the elderly. From a harm 
minimizing perspective, there are two arguments for deprioritizing the elderly. First, 
they have no unstarted life projects and, thus, no corresponding interests in these. 
Second, whereas they have started life projects similar to those in the early 30s-mid 50s 
age group, the elderly’s interests in these projects are much weaker.    
 
In this dissertation, we have discussed age-based rationing, both as a proposed solution 
to the health care cost crisis and as a coping mechanism in the context of commodity 
(organ) scarcity. It is, therefore, interesting to compare how it fares in each of these 
settings.  
When analyzing age-based rationing as a proposed cost containment tool, we merely 
focused on its effectiveness. We did not consider the more traditional question relating 
to its moral acceptability, i.e. whether age-based rationing amounts to age 
discrimination. The main reason for this omission was that this question is rendered 
practically irrelevant by the finding that age-based rationing is an ineffective cost 
containment tool. As we have frequently stressed, this ineffectiveness in and of itself 
renders age-based rationing a morally unacceptably means of addressing the health 
care cost crisis. Nevertheless, as we pointed out in chapter 1, it may still be of 
theoretical interest to consider whether age-based rationing, as a proposed solution to 
the health care cost crisis, constitutes age discrimination. Although we did not explicitly 
address this question, our harm minimizing framework indirectly suggests that the 
answer to it is negative. After all, this framework, although developed with commodity 
scarcity in mind, can easily be extrapolated to the context of financial scarcity. We 
briefly hinted at this possibility of extrapolation in chapter 4. There, we stated that the 
interest in life projects in an instance of the more general interest in continued life. In 
other words, all denial of life-extending treatment, whether as a means of addressing 
the health care cost crisis or as a coping mechanism for organ scarcity, invariably sets 
back one’s interests in life projects. Thus, if the elderly’s weaker interest in life projects 
is a moral ground for deprioritizing them in the allocation of organs, then so is it a 
morally relevant reason for denying the elderly life-extending treatment as a means of 
containing costs. Nevertheless, we cannot stress enough that its non-discriminatory 
nature does not render age-based rationing a morally acceptable means of addressing 
the health care cost crisis. Its ineffectiveness as a cost containment tool outweighs any 
argument in support of age-based rationing.  
In this respect, age-based rationing as a cost containment tool differs from its 
counterpart in the context of commodity (organ) scarcity. In the latter setting, 
effectiveness is not an issue. As we have seen, simulations suggest that a 
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deprioritization of the elderly would attain its ultimate goal, i.e. shifting organs from 
older to younger transplant candidate recipients. Thus, if our harm minimizing 
framework is convincing, then age-based rationing is morally acceptable in the context 
of commodity (organ) scarcity.      
 
Besides granting the elderly a lower priority level, our harm minimizing framework also 
deprioritizes pediatric patients. Children have relatively few started life projects and 
thus, few corresponding interests. Moreover, despite having many unstarted life 
projects, their interests in the latter are rather weak due to the initiation of these 
projects lying in the relatively distant future. Both factors combined suggest that the 
magnitude of the harm experienced upon being denied a transplant is small for 
pediatric patients, relative to those in the mid/late 20s-mid 50s age group.  
 
In chapter 5, we analyzed whether this framework supporting pediatric deprioritization 
could stand its ground against the various arguments put forward in defense of 
pediatric priority. We identified five such arguments: the growth and development 
argument, the life expectancy argument, the cost argument, the fair innings argument 
and the minority argument.  
The growth and development argument exaggerates the adverse effects of delayed 
transplantation on children. Deficits in growth and development do not adversely affect 
pediatric patients’ quality of life. In addition, the growth and development argument 
overlooks the fact that children are not alone in facing complications while on long-
term dialysis. Adults with ESRD experience sexual dysfunctions, impairments of 
reproductive function and high rates of unemployment.  
The argument which attributes pediatric patients priority on the basis of their greater 
life expectancy also fails. As we have shown, the benefit of transplantation does not 
amount to restoration of life expectancy.  
With regard to the cost argument, we showed that pediatric priority is unlikely to 
represent the best route to achieving social welfare cost savings given that adult ESRD 
patients more heavily burden the system. In addition, we argued that health care cost 
savings are unlikely to occur as a result of prioritizing pediatric patients for the 
qualitatively better organs. This type of prioritization may reduce the need for 
retransplantation and duration of dialysis in pediatric patients. However, this reduction 
is likely to be offset by a corresponding increase in adults. This priority rule, after all, 
shifts the qualitatively worse organs to adults.  
Both versions of the fair innings argument are problematic. The first version wrongly 
assumes that children stand alone in needing a long lasting graft (i.e. a qualitatively 
better kidney) in order to attain their fair innings. The second version argues that 
children have enjoyed fewer life years and, thus, fewer opportunities for medical well-
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being than adults. We have shown, however, that age is too unreliable a predictor of 
such opportunities.  
The minority argument was also found wanting. In determining their chance of 
obtaining a kidney, this argument wrongly considers children as a ‘group entity’, rather 
than as individuals. From an individual perspective, children are not disadvantaged in 
the competition for a kidney.  
In addition to analyzing the arguments put forward in support of pediatric priority, we 
also pointed out some potential adverse effects of this policy. In reducing the reliance 
upon living donation in pediatric transplant candidates, pediatric priority policies may 
in the long run shorten children’s graft survival. In addition, the policy’s effect of 
decreasing the degree of HLA matching may reduce children’s chances of finding a 
compatible graft when in need of a retransplant.  
 
Our harm minimizing framework, when combined with the failure of the arguments put 
forward in support of pediatric priority rules, implies that there are strong reasons to 
doubt the legitimacy of such policies.  
 
With the exception of our own analysis, the legitimacy of pediatric priority has so far 
not been scrutinized. It is merely taken for granted that this practice rests on a sound 
basis. This observation, combined with the fact that our research findings were often 
met with indignation, suggests that it is taboo to question the legitimacy of pediatric 
priority. Our research findings contravene the deeply engrained intuition that children 
ought to be granted special consideration at all times. The remarkable weakness of the 
arguments put forward in support of pediatric priority renders it plausible that the 
institution of this policy was largely informed by this intuition, rather than by efforts to 
test this hunch against the standard of rational reasoning. In short, these arguments 
appear to be an attempt at post hoc rationalization of the relevant intuition. The fact 
that the policy’s potential adverse effects on children has so far failed to ring any alarm 
bells bears further testimony to the lack of rational argumentation in the issue of 
pediatric priority. It is, to us, the height of irrationality to introduce a policy with the 
aim of protecting children, while at the same time ignoring its potential 
counterproductive effects. We hope that our analysis of the issue can provide the 
necessary impetus for a more reasoned approach.   
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9.4 Research question 3 
Proposed solutions to the current organ scarcity tend to focus on means of increasing 
supply. In chapter 6, we argued that supply-oriented strategies are shortsighted as they 
fail to satisfactorily address the projected surge in kidney demand related to population 
aging and the obesity epidemic. We identified two reasons for the failure of these 
strategies.  
First, it is doubtful that supply-oriented strategies can be implemented in time to 
accommodate the 2030 peak in demand. Both scientific and ethical barriers hinder the 
timely implementation of so-called radical supply strategies. Conservative supply 
strategies, in turn, are met with great resistance, both from laymen and expert 
committees. This lack of public support is a strong contraindication to the 
implementation of the latter type of strategies as it significantly undermines the 
likelihood of their success.  
Second, supply-oriented strategies pose a considerable financial burden. The increase in 
supply, generated by conservative strategies, would fall significantly short of meeting 
the projected surge in demand for kidneys. As a result, these strategies would be 
accompanied by a substantial demand for dialysis. Given that dialysis expenditures are 
already heading along an unsustainable path, an increase in demand for dialysis of this 
magnitude would be financially catastrophic. Radical supply strategies fare no better 
than their conservative counterparts in terms of financial viability. We further discuss 
our findings concerning the cost implications of radical strategies in the section below. 
This will allow us to make explicit some of the important similarities between financial 
and commodity scarcity in health care that we have encountered throughout this 
dissertation.  
 
Similarities between financial and commodity scarcity    
 
In this dissertation, we have discussed financial and commodity scarcity in two separate 
sections. Contrary to what this ‘segregation’ suggests, both types of scarcity have much 
in common. We have already encountered one similarity, i.e. the fact that the argument 
for the moral relevance of age in kidney allocation most likely lends itself to 
extrapolation to the context of financial scarcity. However, the similarities run much 
deeper than this. In this respect, chapter 6 is key. It illustrates how the central problem 
affecting the context of financial scarcity – the relentless pursuit of medical technology 
and its cost implications – also permeates the issue of commodity scarcity.  
The hope vested in xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering as a means of 
solving the organ shortage epitomizes the modern attachment to medical technology. 
Both strategies fail to escape the main feature of medical technology, i.e. its high cost. 
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Xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering are likely to be subject, not only to a 
high unit cost, but also to the complementarity effect. They would intensify the reliance 
upon existing medical technology (transplantation in this case) by providing a virtually 
limitless kidney supply. The number of patients in need of a kidney transplant is 
estimated to reach approximately 2 million in the US by 2030. As explained in chapter 6, 
proponents of xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering would, in the face of an 
unlimited kidney supply, be committed to transplanting all of these patients. A virtually 
limitless kidney supply would most probably also broaden the definition of ESRD so as to 
include the late stages of CKD, thereby further increasing the reliance upon 
transplantation.  
The high unit cost of xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering, combined with 
this substantial increase in demand, suggests that it would be financially prohibitive to 
meet all needs for transplantation under these radical strategies. Thus, despite an 
unlimited supply, kidneys would still need to be rationed. The only difference with the 
current need for rationing is that the latter presents itself because of constraints on the 
number of available organs, as opposed to financial limitations. In other words, rather 
than eradicating the kidney shortage, xenotransplantation and kidney bioengineering 
would merely transform the problem from one of commodity scarcity to one of financial 
scarcity. The potential for this type of transformation illustrates, once again, how 
closely intertwined the issues of financial and commodity scarcity are. In taking us back 
to financial scarcity, the starting point of our dissertation, chapter 6 completes the 
circle.     
9.5 Research question 4 
In chapters 7 and 8, we analyzed recent attempts by Belgian policy makers to address 
two specific types of commodity scarcity in health care. The first type relates to scarcity 
of donor livers, whereas the second pertains to the shortage of body material for 
research purposes. We concluded that neither of these attempts are ethically sound.  
In response to the observation that a minor may sometimes be the only suitable donor, 
the Belgian transplantation law was recently amended so as to allow minors as young as 
12 to donate a liver segment or lobe to a sibling (on condition that they are capable of 
expressing their will and have given prior consent). We identified various problems 
with this amendment. First, the law fails to take into account that minors only exhibit 
cognitive maturity from the age of 14 onwards. Second, minors do not possess the 
psychosocial maturity required to be able to consent to living liver donation. Finally, 
although there may be exceptions to these rules, we currently lack the instruments to 
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reliably assess maturity on an individualized basis. Consequently, we do well to err on 
the side of assuming immaturity in minors.  
Belgium recently instituted a presumed consent regime for the post mortem removal of 
body material for research purposes in a bid to increase the latter’s supply. However, in 
practice the change in the law amounts to conscription. Such a regime of routine 
removal is problematic for two reasons. First, it is unjustifiable to resort to compulsory 
removal before having actively pursued other strategies for increasing the supply of 
body material for research. Second, as the duty to donate body material for research 
purposes after death is a conditional one, conscription would need to be limited to those 
who are subject to this duty. However, such a conditional form of conscription would 
pose enormous problems in terms of implementation and monitoring. As we argued in 
chapter 8, this conditional duty is sufficiently strong to support presumed consent. If 
the latter is not to coincide with conscription, we must at least inform the public of its 
existence and put in place an opt-out register separate to the one employed for organ 
donation for transplantation.  
9.6 Recommendations for further research 
As mentioned at the start of this dissertation, scarcity in health care is a vast subject 
matter. We have limited ourselves to a discussion of specific issues arising in a selected 
number of medical settings. Thus, some of our findings inevitably beg the question as to 
whether they hold in other settings. However, questions for further research also arise 
when staying within the confines of the settings analyzed here. Below, we provide a 
non-exhaustive overview of questions of either type.  
 
Our harm minimizing framework, developed in chapter 4, has its limitations. As already 
mentioned, we have not yet tested whether it can stand its ground against various 
existing criticisms of age-based rationing. One such criticism claims that, due to their 
higher life expectancy, women lose out more and, thus, are discriminated against under 
age-based rationing schemes. It must, therefore, be examined whether this criticism is 
valid. If it is, it raises the further question as to whether the harm hereby experienced 
by women outweighs the harm incurred by young patients upon being denied a 
transplant.  
Our harm minimizing framework serves to support the new UNOS kidney allocation 
policy. The latter, which governs the allocation of kidneys in adults, deprioritizes the 
elderly in favor of young adults. One of the criticisms invoked against this policy is that 
it runs the risk of significantly decreasing young adults’ reliance on living donation. 
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This, in turn, it is claimed, could adversely affect average graft survival. It will, thus, be 
important to conduct empirical research into the effects of the new policy on living 
donation rates.  
 
The abovementioned concern regarding decreased reliance on living donation in young 
adults is based on the observation that Share 35, the US’s pediatric priority policy, has 
significantly reduced adult-to-child living donation rates. As mentioned in chapter 5, 
only a few transplant centers have examined the effect of this reduction on pediatric 
graft survival rates. The limited evidence base points towards a negative impact. As this 
could undermine the legitimacy of Share 35, it is imperative that further research be 
conducted on the matter. It addition, it is important to examine to what extent the 
decreased degree of HLA matching, resulting from Share 35, affects children’s chances 
of obtaining a compatible graft the second time around.  
To our knowledge, no empirical research has been conducted into the impact of 
Eurotransplant’s pediatric priority policy on adult-to-child living donation rates. The 
importance of filling this lacuna extends beyond the potential implications for the 
legitimacy of this policy. If it turns out that living donation rates have not declined 
within Eurotransplant, this may provide us with clues as to how to ‘undo’ the trend 
observed in the US.  
Besides empirical matters, the issue of pediatric priority also potentially opens up 
avenues for further philosophical research. It would be interesting to investigate 
whether a pediatric priority policy is in place for organs other than kidneys and, if so, 
whether it rests on a more solid basis than its counterpart in the setting of kidney 
transplantation.  
 
In chapter 7, we developed a moral framework which provides guidance in 
distinguishing those categories of health care decisions which minors (of a certain age) 
are capable of making from those which they are incapable of making. We applied this 
framework to the setting of living liver donation by minors and concluded that minors 
do not possess the psychosocial maturity required for this specific type of decision 
making. It would be interesting to determine how living kidney donation by minors 
fares against the standard of this framework. However, it would also be worthwhile to 
examine what this framework has to say about pediatric decision making in health care 
settings outside of organ donation. Examples include participation in clinical trials and 
euthanasia. The latter is particularly interesting, given that Belgium has very recently 
extended the right to euthanasia to minors.  
 
A final recommendation for future research pertains to the issue of post mortem 
donation of body material for research purposes. In chapter 8, we made the case for a 
‘true’ presumed consent regime, i.e. one that does not boil down to conscription. As 
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noted in chapter 6, the effectiveness or success of a consent regime governing the 
procurement of body material is, to a great extent, dependent on the presence of a large 
constituency in favor of it. It is, therefore, crucial to conduct research gauging the 
public’s attitudes towards post mortem donation of body material for research and the 
possible consent regimes to govern it. This is all the more important given the lack of an 
evidence base on this matter and the increasing importance of research on human body 
material.     
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English summary  
Scarcity obtains whenever there is less of a good or resource available than needed to 
fulfill human wants and needs. Such situations compel us to decide how to use and 
allocate scarce services and goods. In short, scarcity entails the need to trade off various 
goods against others.  
Scarcity is omnipresent in health care. Intensive care beds, high-tech scanners, organs, 
and oocytes are but a few examples of scarce health care resources. For ease of 
reference, we introduce a distinction between ‘financial’ and ‘commodity’ scarcity in 
health care in this dissertation. We use the latter as an umbrella term for those goods 
which are inherently in short supply, i.e. goods which are, by nature, scarce. Organs and 
oocytes are typical instances of commodity scarcity. Financial scarcity, by contrast, 
refers to those resources which are theoretically abundant, but nevertheless provided in 
limited amount (or not at all) due to financial constraints or considerations. Intensive 
care beds and high-tech scanners fall into this category of scarcity.  
Even when narrowed down to health care, scarcity represents a vast topic of research. 
For example, it is the raison d’être of all issues pertaining to distributive justice in 
health care. Evidently, then, it is impossible to present an exhaustive analysis of any 
subset of issues relating to scarcity in health care, let alone to cover all the ground. In 
this dissertation, we mainly limit ourselves to a selection of ethical issues ensuing from 
the impact of population aging on scarcity. Population aging is increasingly being 
perceived as a grave threat, both in the realm of ‘financial’ and ‘commodity’ scarcity. 
More specifically, this demographic phenomenon raises concerns with regard to the 
sustainability of customary approaches to making the necessary trade-offs among 
scarce goods. The main aim of this dissertation is to present some of the most 
prominent, newly proposed alternatives to the current trade-offs and assess their 
ethical soundness. Part one of this dissertation addresses the alternatives put forward in 
the context of financial scarcity, whereas part two analyzes the proposals made in the 
realm of commodity scarcity.         
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Financial scarcity in health care  
For over three decades, health care expenditure in OECD countries has grown at rates 
exceeding the economy’s growth rate. This trend is unsustainable. The cause of rising 
health care expenditures is often attributed to population aging. As a result, solutions to 
the health care cost crisis frequently target the elderly. One such proposal is to deny the 
elderly all forms of life-extending care (age-based rationing). Another strategy is to 
invest more in biogerontology - research into the biology of aging. The idea is that such 
research will enable us to tackle age-related diseases simultaneously, thereby ensuring 
that the elderly enjoy an increased healthspan (i.e. that they enjoy an increase in the 
number of years spent in a disease-free state). This, in turn, it is believed, will reduce 
the pressure on the health care system.   
As health care costs continue to rise, the aforementioned proposals to curb spending on 
health care in the elderly are likely to further gain ground. It is, therefore, important to 
ask ourselves whether they represent a morally acceptable solution to the health care 
cost crisis. Their ethical soundness is, in part, dependent on whether they are likely to 
actually achieve their ultimate aim, i.e. whether they will succeed in reducing spending 
growth in health care to the level of overall GDP growth. It would, for example, be 
highly unethical to deny the elderly life-extending care if this practice offered little 
prospect of substantially controlling health care expenditures. The effectiveness of 
proposals to curb health care spending in the elderly has seldom or never been 
addressed in the literature. This is lamentable. After all, the adverse effects of the health 
care cost crisis have already started to materialize. Therefore, we cannot afford to adopt 
a trial and error approach to the problem.  
Part 1 of this dissertation examines whether proposals to curb health care spending in 
the elderly represent an efficacious means of containing costs. It does so by analyzing 
the extent to which these proposals tackle the root cause of the health care cost crisis. 
We conclude that both age-based rationing and biogerontology provide, at best, 
temporary relief from the trend of rising health care costs. The failure of both proposals 
points towards the need for developing cost containment policies which target both the 
young and the old.  
Commodity scarcity in health care  
Part two of this dissertation is devoted to a discussion of ethical issues ensuing from 
population aging in the realm of commodity scarcity. We predominantly focus on the 
stock example of commodity scarcity in health care, i.e. the shortage of donor organs 
for transplantation. Within this context, we mainly limit the scope of our discussion to 
kidney transplantation, given that the scarcity of this type of organ is most pronounced.  
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With respect to methods for dealing with the problem of kidney scarcity (and organ 
scarcity in general), it is useful to distinguish between ‘coping mechanisms’ and 
‘solutions’. We introduce the former concept to refer to strategies which are not aimed 
at diminishing the magnitude of the kidney scarcity, but merely attempt to make the 
best of the shortage. In other words, the term ‘coping mechanisms’ denotes the activity 
of devising criteria for the allocation of kidneys in a way which strikes a balance 
between the goals of fairness and efficiency. By contrast, ‘solutions’ are strategies which 
endeavor to lessen the kidney scarcity, either by reducing demand for or increasing the 
supply of donor kidneys.  
Part two of this dissertation is divided into two sections. Whereas the first section 
addresses ‘coping mechanisms’, the second is devoted to ‘solutions’. 
Coping mechanisms  
Population aging is increasingly being perceived as jeopardizing the availability of 
kidneys for the non-elderly under current allocation systems. This observation has 
incentivized UNOS to formulate a new kidney allocation policy which deprioritizes the 
elderly. The new policy, the implementation of which will take place at the end of this 
year, has elicited a series of criticisms. The most frequently cited concern is that age is 
morally irrelevant in kidney allocation. UNOS/OPTN policy makers have failed to 
seriously address this criticism. They have settled for ‘easy point scoring’, i.e. they 
merely make a hasty, uncritical reference to arguments that are commonly put forward 
in support of age-based rationing in the context of financial scarcity. This response is 
disconcerting. Criticisms of the organ allocation system should not be treated lightly. 
The perception that the new kidney allocation policy is based on an irrelevant criterion 
may, if widespread, damage public trust in organ exchange organizations. This, in turn, 
could have serious consequences, such as a decreased willingness to register as an organ 
donor. It is, therefore, important that the transplant community provide the public with 
a solid argument for the moral relevance of age. The fact that other countries are 
already considering a policy change similar to the one recently approved by UNOS only 
adds urgency to this task. The first section of part two of this dissertation is, therefore, 
devoted to the search for a more satisfactory account of the moral relevance of age than 
the one so far put forward by UNOS officials. We examine the moral relevance of age at 
both ends of the spectrum, i.e. at both the beginning and the end of life. To this end, we 
develop a framework grounded in a concern for minimizing harm. We conclude that the 
new UNOS policy, when assessed against this framework, is not far reaching enough. In 
addition to penalizing the elderly, a concern for minimizing harm also calls for 
deprioritizing pediatric patients.  
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Solutions 
The most commonly pursued strategy to reduce the gap between supply of and demand 
for renal allografts is to increase the supply of donor kidneys, both from living and 
deceased sources. Proposals to increase the kidney supply have mainly been developed 
with the current extent of the kidney shortage in mind. Unfortunately, however, the 
effects of population aging and the obesity epidemic on the prevalence of end-stage 
renal disease (ESRD) are yet to fully materialize. In other words, the kidney shortage has 
far from reached its peak. Projections suggest that, by 2020, the prevalence of ESRD 
patients in the United States will approach 785,000, an increase of more than 60% from 
2005 levels. By 2030, the expected peaking point of population aging, the US ESRD 
population could reach 2 million.  
Population aging and its effects have fuelled a recognition among policy makers that the 
traditional kidney allocation systems (i.e. traditional ‘coping mechanisms’) are no longer 
viable. Surprisingly, however, when it comes to devising solutions to the kidney 
shortage, the implications of population aging have gone largely unnoticed. In short, 
little or no thought has been given to the question of whether the currently proposed 
solutions are well-suited to accommodate an ever aging kidney transplant waiting list 
and the accompanying, projected surge in demand. Given that we are quickly 
approaching the peak of population aging, an examination of this question is long 
overdue. In the second section of part two of this dissertation, we address this lacuna in 
the research on the merit of currently proposed solutions. We argue that strategies 
aimed at increasing the kidney supply are shortsighted in that they merely transform 
what is, at present, largely a problem of commodity scarcity into a problem of financial 
scarcity. We make the case for a preventative approach.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
Schaarste ontstaat overal waar er van een goed of middel (‘resource’) minder 
beschikbaar is dan wat nodig is om aan de wensen en behoeften van de mensen te 
voldoen. Dergelijke situaties nopen ons ertoe keuzes te maken over hoe schaarse 
goederen en diensten worden gebruikt en toegewezen. Kortom, schaarste maakt het 
noodzakelijk verschillende goederen tegen elkaar af te wegen.  
Schaarste is alomtegenwoordig in de gezondheidszorg. Intensive care bedden, hightech 
scanners, organen en eicellen zijn maar een paar voorbeelden van schaarse middelen in 
de gezondheidszorg. Gemakshalve maken we in dit proefschrift een onderscheid tussen 
‘financiële’ en ‘goederenschaarste’ in de gezondheidszorg. We gebruiken 
goederenschaarste als een verzamelterm voor goederen waaraan inherent een tekort 
bestaat, d.i. goederen die door hun aard schaars zijn. Organen en eicellen zijn typische 
voorbeelden van goederenschaarste. Financiële schaarste daarentegen verwijst naar 
middelen die in theorie in overvloed voorhanden zijn, maar niettemin slechts in 
beperkte mate (of helemaal niet) ter beschikking worden gesteld wegens financiële 
beperkingen of overwegingen. Intensive care bedden en hightech scanners behoren tot 
deze schaarstecategorie.  
Ook als het verengd wordt tot de gezondheidszorg, is schaarste een breed 
onderzoeksonderwerp. Het is bijvoorbeeld de bestaansreden van alle kwesties in 
verband met verdelende rechtvaardigheid in de gezondheidszorg. Het is dan ook 
onmogelijk om een exhaustieve analyse te bieden van een specifieke set van problemen 
met betrekking tot schaarste in de gezondheidszorg, laat staan het thema volledig te 
behandelen. In dit proefschrift beperken we ons grotendeels tot een selectie ethische 
kwesties die ontstaan door de impact van de vergrijzing op schaarste. De vergrijzing 
wordt steeds meer gezien als een grote bedreiging op het gebied van zowel de 
‘financiële’ als de ‘goederenschaarste’.  
Meer specifiek leidt dit demografisch verschijnsel tot bezorgdheid over de 
houdbaarheid van de gebruikelijke manieren waarop de noodzakelijke afwegingen 
tussen schaarse goederen worden gemaakt. Het voornaamste doel van dit proefschrift is 
sommige van de meest opvallende alternatieven voor de huidige afwegingen voor te 
stellen en hun ethische verantwoordheid te toetsen. Deel één van dit proefschrift gaat 
over de alternatieven die naar voor worden geschoven op het gebied van financiële 
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schaarste, terwijl in deel twee de voorstellen worden geanalyseerd die in verband met 
goederenschaarste worden gedaan.         
Financiële schaarste in de gezondheidszorg  
Al meer dan drie decennia stijgen de uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg in de OESO-landen 
sneller dan de economische groei. Dit is een onhoudbare trend. Als oorzaak van de 
stijgende uitgaven voor gezondheidszorg wordt vaak de vergrijzing genoemd. Met als 
gevolg dat in oplossingen voor de kostencrisis in de gezondheidszorg geregeld de 
ouderen in het vizier worden genomen. Een van de voorgestelde oplossingen is ouderen 
alle vormen van levensverlengende zorg te ontzeggen (rantsoenering op basis van 
leeftijd). Een andere strategie is meer investeren in biogerontologie – onderzoek naar de 
biologie van het ouder worden. Het idee is dat dergelijk onderzoek ons in staat zal 
stellen om leeftijdsgebonden ziekten tegelijkertijd aan te pakken, waarbij ervoor wordt 
gezorgd dat de ouderen langer gezond leven (d.w.z. dat ze meer jaren vrij van ziekte 
kunnen leven). Dat zal dan op zijn beurt, zo wordt aangenomen, de druk op het 
gezondheidszorgsysteem verminderen.  
Aangezien de kosten van de gezondheidszorg blijven stijgen, zullen voormelde 
voorstellen om de zorguitgaven voor ouderen in de hand te houden waarschijnlijk 
verder terrein winnen. Daarom is het belangrijk dat we onszelf afvragen of ze een 
moreel aanvaardbare oplossing voor de kostencrisis in de gezondheidszorg bieden. Hun 
ethische verantwoordheid hangt deels af van het feit of ze hun uiteindelijke doel 
effectief kunnen bereiken, m.a.w. of ze er zullen in slagen de groei van de uitgaven in de 
gezondheidszorg terug te brengen tot het niveau van de algemene BBP-groei. Het zou 
bijvoorbeeld erg onethisch zijn de ouderen levensverlengende zorg te ontzeggen als 
deze praktijk weinig uitzicht biedt op een significante beheersing van de uitgaven in de 
gezondheidszorg. De effectiviteit van voorstellen om de zorguitgaven voor ouderen te 
beteugelen is in de literatuur zelden of nooit aan bod gekomen. Dat is jammer. De 
negatieve effecten van de kostencrisis in de gezondheidszorg beginnen immers al 
zichtbaar te worden. We kunnen het bijgevolg niet maken om dit probleem met een 
trial-and-error-aanpak te behandelen. 
  
In deel één van dit proefschrift gaan we na of voorstellen om de zorguitgaven voor 
ouderen te beperken een afdoend middel zijn om de kosten in de hand te houden. Dat 
doen we door na te gaan in hoever deze voorstellen de grondoorzaak van de kostencrisis 
aanpakken. We komen tot de conclusie dat zowel leeftijdgebaseerde rantsoenering als 
biogerontologie, in het beste geval, slechts tijdelijk soelaas brengen voor de trend van 
de oplopende zorgkosten. Dat beide voorstellen geen oplossing bieden, wijst erop dat er 
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nood is aan een kostenbeperkend beleid dat op zowel de jongeren als de ouderen is 
gericht.  
Goederenschaarste in de gezondheidszorg 
Deel twee van dit proefschrift is gewijd aan een bespreking van ethische kwesties die 
een gevolg zijn van de vergrijzing op het vlak van goederenschaarste. Wij focussen 
grotendeels op het typevoorbeeld van goederenschaarste in de gezondheidszorg, 
namelijk het gebrek aan donororganen voor transplantatie. In dit verband beperken we 
de scope van onze bespreking hoofdzakelijk tot niertransplantaties aangezien de 
schaarste van dit soort orgaan het meest uitgesproken is.  
Met betrekking tot methoden om het probleem van nierschaarste (en orgaanschaarste 
in het algemeen) aan te pakken is het nuttig een onderscheid te maken tussen 
‘copingmechanismen’ en ‘oplossingen’. We voeren eerstgenoemd concept in dat 
verwijst naar strategieën die niet bedoeld zijn om de omvang van de nierschaarste te 
verminderen, maar enkel proberen het beste te maken van het tekort. Met andere 
woorden, de term ‘copingmechanismen’ wijst op de activiteit die erin bestaat criteria 
voor nierallocatie te bedenken op een manier dat een evenwicht wordt gevonden tussen 
het gelijkheids- en utiliteitsbeginsel.  ‘Oplossingen’ daarentegen zijn strategieën die de 
nierschaarste trachten te verminderen door ofwel de vraag naar donornieren te 
beperken ofwel het aanbod ervan te verhogen.  
In deel twee van dit proefschrift bespreken we eerst ‘copingmechanismen’ en daarna 
‘oplossingen’. 
Copingmechanismen  
De vergrijzing wordt in toenemende mate gezien als een bedreiging voor de 
beschikbaarheid van nieren voor jonge mensen bij toepassing van de huidige 
allocatiesystemen. Deze vaststelling heeft UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing) 
ertoe aangezet een nieuw beleid voor nierallocatie te formuleren dat ouderen 
deprioriteert. Dit nieuwe beleid, dat eind dit jaar in de praktijk zal worden gebracht, 
heeft heel wat kritiek uitgelokt. Het meest aangehaalde bezwaar is dat leeftijd moreel 
irrelevant is voor de toewijzing van donornieren. De wijze waarop de beleidsmakers van 
UNOS/OPTN deze kritiek beantwoorden, is onbevredigend. Ze stellen zich tevreden met 
het scoren van een makkelijk punt, ze verwijzen gewoon snel en kritiekloos naar 
argumenten die doorgaans worden aangevoerd ten gunste van leeftijdgebaseerde 
rantsoenering in de context van financiële schaarste. Dit antwoord is verontrustend. 
Met kritiek op het orgaanallocatiesysteem mag niet lichtzinnig worden omgegaan. De 
perceptie dat het nieuwe beleid voor toewijzing van donornieren op basis van leeftijd 
ongegrond is, kan, als ze wijd verspreid geraakt, het vertrouwen van het publiek in 
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organisaties voor orgaantoewijzing ondermijnen. En dat zou op zijn beurt zware 
gevolgen kunnen hebben, zoals een verminderde bereidheid bij het publiek om zich als 
orgaandonor te registreren. Het is daarom belangrijk dat de transplantatiegemeenschap 
het publiek een stevig argument voor de morele relevantie van leeftijd kan voorleggen. 
Het feit dat andere landen al een beleidswijziging overwegen zoals die welke UNOS 
onlangs goedkeurde, maakt dit alleen maar dringender. De eerste sectie van deel twee 
van dit proefschrift is daarom gewijd aan de zoektocht naar een meer bevredigende 
verantwoording van de morele relevantie van leeftijd dan die welke door de 
beleidsmakers van UNOS is gegeven. We gaan na wat de morele relevantie van leeftijd is 
aan beide uiteinden van het spectrum, namelijk zowel bij het begin als op het einde van 
het leven. Daartoe ontwikkelen we een kader dat als doel heeft schade te minimaliseren. 
We komen tot de conclusie dat het nieuwe UNOS-beleid, als het aan dit kader wordt 
getoetst, niet verregaand genoeg is. Naast het feit dat ouderen worden gepenaliseerd, 
vraagt het criterium ‘minimalisering van schade’ook dat pediatrische patiënten worden 
gedeprioriteerd.  
Oplossingen 
De strategie die veelal wordt gevolgd om de kloof tussen vraag en aanbod met 
betrekking tot niertransplantaties te verkleinen, is het aanbod van donornieren van 
zowel levenden als overledenen te verhogen. Voorstellen om het aanbod te vergroten 
zijn hoofdzakelijk uitgewerkt met de huidige omvang van het tekort aan nieren voor 
ogen. Maar jammer genoeg beginnen de gevolgen van de vergrijzing en de 
obesitasepidemie op de prevalentie van end-stage-renal-disease (ESRD) of eindstadium 
nierziekte nu pas ten volle voelbaar te worden. Met andere woorden, het tekort aan 
nieren heeft zijn piek nog lang niet bereikt. Projecties geven aan dat tegen 2020 de 
prevalentie van ESRD-patiënten in de Verenigde Staten zal oplopen tot 785.000, wat 
ruim 60% meer is dan in 2005. Tegen 2030, de datum waarop de vergrijzing naar 
verwachting zal pieken, zouden de Verenigde Staten twee miljoen ESRD-patiënten 
tellen.  
De vergrijzing en de effecten daarvan hebben de beleidsmakers doen onderkennen dat 
de traditionele systemen voor nierallocatie (d.w.z. traditionele ‘copingmechanismen’) niet 
langer leefbaar zijn. Maar wanneer het erom gaat oplossingen voor het tekort aan nieren 
te bedenken, dan wordt aan de implicaties van de vergrijzing verrassend genoeg weinig 
aandacht besteed. Kortom, er is weinig of niet nagedacht over de vraag of de thans 
voorgestelde oplossingen geschikt zijn om het hoofd te bieden aan een wachtlijst met 
aldoor ouder wordende kandidaten en de hiermee gepaard gaande stijging van de vraag 
naar donornieren. Gelet op het feit dat de piek in de vergrijzing snel dichterbij komt, 
had een bespreking van deze kwestie al lang moeten plaatsvinden. In de tweede sectie 
van deel twee van dit proefschrift bekijken we deze leemte in het onderzoek naar de 
verdiensten van de momenteel voorgestelde oplossingen. We argumenteren dat de 
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strategieën om het aanbod van nieren te verhogen kortzichtig zijn omdat ze wat nu 
grotendeels een probleem van goederenschaarste is omvormen tot een probleem van 
financiële schaarste. Wij pleiten voor een preventieve aanpak.  
 
  
 
